An exposition of the idea of justice in its relations to socialist and communist ideology by Cunningham, Tom Faichney
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
https://theses.gla.ac.uk/ 
 
 
 
 
Theses Digitisation: 
https://www.gla.ac.uk/myglasgow/research/enlighten/theses/digitisation/ 
This is a digitised version of the original print thesis. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Copyright and moral rights for this work are retained by the author 
 
A copy can be downloaded for personal non-commercial research or study, 
without prior permission or charge 
 
This work cannot be reproduced or quoted extensively from without first 
obtaining permission in writing from the author 
 
The content must not be changed in any way or sold commercially in any 
format or medium without the formal permission of the author 
 
When referring to this work, full bibliographic details including the author, 
title, awarding institution and date of the thesis must be given 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Enlighten: Theses 
https://theses.gla.ac.uk/ 
research-enlighten@glasgow.ac.uk 
TrffcJ UNIVKRhUW OP GLASGOW, 
LcjiJAKT!v.LL'T OF JuRIGPRULFNCL
AW LX ^G oITIO ^ OF P lF  ILLA OF JtiG TICF 
IN ITS  R-LLA PIONG PO 
GOCiALIoT ALL GO/.r.u N Io P  ILiiiOLCGY 
BuilNG T {£ P {ciSIS OF
TO. i'A IC \ 'W  CLGfNlWG.W. LL . r . , L . T . ^ . t 0 . 1 .  P.5 . A.
SJHvITTEL FOR T-idi LcI.Rn.w OF MASTiili OF LAw'G, 
APRIL l ^ o b .
ProQuest Number: 10948110
All rights reserved
INFORMATION TO ALL USERS 
The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted.
In the unlikely event that the author did not send a com p le te  manuscript 
and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed,
a note will indicate the deletion.
uest
ProQuest 10948110
Published by ProQuest LLC(2018). Copyright of the Dissertation is held by the Author.
All rights reserved.
This work is protected against unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States C ode
Microform Edition © ProQuest LLC.
ProQuest LLC.
789 East Eisenhower Parkway 
P.O. Box 1346 
Ann Arbor, Ml 48106- 1346
■ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I owe an immense debt of gratitude to my supervisor and 
mentor, Professor Tom Campbell, without whose firm guidance and 
boundless patience this essay would never have materialised in 
anything resembling its present form. Professor Campbell's own 
writings have exerted, and will hopefully continue to exert, a 
powerful influence on my perception of the domain of legal 
philosophy, as articulated here. I am also indebted to those 
members of staff at the University of Glasgow, particularly 
Mr. David Goldberg and Dr. Olivia Robinson, who have freely exten­
ded both practical assistance and moral support over the years.
Mention must also be made of Dr. William Lyons of the Moral Philosophy 
Department. Had it not been for my attendance, during session 1979 - 
80, at the series of lectures offered by Dr. Lyons under the title 
of "Problems in Moral Philosophy", the general preoccupations of 
Chapter One would probably never have dawned on me. Whereas much 
of the credit, then, lies elsewhere, the responsibility for this 
essay and its shortcomings cannot be delegated, but rests with me 
alone.
I am indebted also to the Clerk and Governors of the 
Charles K. Marr Educational Trust for their support.
Thanks are also owed to my sister Sheila, whose efforts on 
my behalf would put many a professional typist to shame, and also 
to my friend Mr. Peter Lavery, who took the photograph which appears 
on the title page.
Tom F. Cunningham, 
Manchester, April 1986.
CONTENTS
CHAPTER 1 ON MATTERS OP NORM AND METHODOLOGY P.l
SECTION (i) SOME PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS. 1
(ii) ARE NORMATIVE UTTERANCES MEANINGFUL? 5
: (iii) THE FUNDAMENTAL JUDGEMENT OF VALUE. 19
(iv) - DEONTOLOGY VERSUS CONSEQUENTIALISM. 26
(v) THE DIALECTICAL METHODOLOGY. 52
(vi) THE DUALISTIC APPROACH TO THE IDEA 35
OF JUSTICE.
CHAPTER 2 ALIENATION, LAW AND REASON; AN ACCOUNT 41
OF THE CULTURAL EVOLUTION OF MANKIND
(i) ON NATURE. 41
(ii) ON SOCIETY. 44
(iii) ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF HUMAN SOCIETY. 6l'
CHAPTER 3 TWO STRANDS OF BOURGEOIS IDEOLOGY 70
(i) INTRODUCTORY. 70
(ii) PROFESSOR NOZICK AND THE PRINCIPLE OF 70
NATURAL LIBERTY.
(iii) PROFESSOR HAYEK'S SPONTANEOUS ORDER. 95
(iv) CAPITALIST SOCIETY. 103
CHAPTER 4 SOCIALISM, COMMUNISM AND JUSTICE 110
(i) SOME PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS. 110
(ii) AN EXPOSITION OF THE MARXIAN THEORY
OF JUSTICE. 117
(iii) THE WITHERING AWAY OF LAW AND STATE. 147
(iv) TROTSKY'S REVOLUTIONARY MORALITY;
THE ETHICS OF INSURRECTION. 163
CHAPTER 5 THE MODERN AGE 168
(i) REVOLUTION VERSUS REFORM. 168
(ii) THE FRONTIERS OF JUSTICE. 179
SUMMARY
As indicated by its title, the itinerary, of this thesis 
consists in the task of tracing the dialectical .movement of the 
concept of justice, (which analysis itself follows the highest 
phases in the progression of the concept of will), and then, as 
this concept becomes relatively determinate, in establishing its 
relationship to the historically emergent ideologies of socialism 
and communism.
Whilst declining to espouse Hegel's wider, thesis that the 
entirety of objective reality, inclusive of the laws of natural 
science,' is an externalised construction or creation of mind or 
spirit (which alone is ultimately real), I adopt a modified version 
of Hegel's thorough-going idealism. According to my view, firstly, 
natural forces are, to some extent at least, capable of being 
consciously understood and directed according to human purposes; and 
secondly, there are indeed forces and processes which have their 
origin in conscious human behaviour, in the form of competitive 
interaction, but which frequently assume an immediate appearance 
of external and even hostile necessity. This position enables me 
to’interpret the history of human society as an ongoing dialectical 
interaction of mind with itself, in its articulated conscious form 
on the one hand, and its externalised, objectified form on the other, 
and to conclude that the Highest and perfect form of human society 
is that which succeeds in resolving this opposition. Further, it 
follows that the development of justice runs parallel to the wider 
movement of social advance, since justice, that is, a system of 
universal, general rules for the regulation of the activities of 
competing self-interested agents, is the primary means by which this 
resolution is effected.
The opening chapter examines the formal anatomy of justice 
and seeks to locate the theory of justice within a definite 
metaethical position. In so doing, I explore the nature of the 
logical nexus between the form and substance of ethical values, 
concluding that since values are not to be found as naturally self- 
subsistent entities in the real world, they must be the products of 
social convention. Far, however, from this committing me to a form 
of ethical relativism, it follows that justice is a functional 
device, differing only from the other such articulations of conscious
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design in the mode of its creation, and as such the function J 
thereby disclosed yields a logically necessary criterion for the 
evaluation of the successive conceptions of justice, and at the 
same time determines the substance of the highest form, or Idea, 
of justice, together with the phases of this development. This 
theme is resumed in the second chapter, which introduces the 
elemental concepts of cultural evolution, and at the same time 
sets out to discover what the function is; this enquiry proceeds 
from the question of what the world would be like without imperative 
rules for the regulation of personal conduct, and from this there 
emerges confirmation of the- assertion that the function of justice 
lies in the effecting of a.resolution of the opposition referred 
to in the second paragraph. A central concern of this section is 
a detailed examination of hoboes1 state of nature.
Having come this far, it now becomes possible to continue 
the second chapter with an exposition and appraisal of the successive 
historically emergent conceptions ofjustice. Firstly, we encounter 
those taboo moralities associated with primitive charismatic 
religions, in which man's position at the centre of the ethical 
universe goes unsuspected, and in which the validity of moral and 
legal positive values is taken to be contingent upon and to reflect 
a necessary natural or even divine order. As a consequence of this 
mode of conciousness, characterised by a general incapacity for 
evaluating, values themselves, all existing status and normative 
ideology is taken as absolute, and the substance of social norms 
for the most part bears no reference to the needs and requirements 
of humanity; conduct which is in itself harmless is frequently 
proscribed, generally under pain of•the;severes-t penalties, while 
several forms of harmful behaviour continue to be permitted. This 
'ethical outlook presents a contradiction of the profoundest sort, 
for at this time lav/ and morality are creations all perception of 
whose nature and origins is lost to their creators. This form of 
estrangement is carried over into the feudal epoch, the laws and 
social forms of which arise as the necessary response to the chronic 
social instability which precedes it; this phase rests, however, 
upon the forceable exploitation by the rulers of the ruled, and upon 
rigid and ultimately arbitrary distinctions of status. It is not 
reason, but an intermarriage of violence and unquestioning social
custom misrepresented as divine will which here is sovereign; this 
melancholy/' condition of things continues intact until the vital 
principle of moral autonomy, in the form of the paramount significance 
of the individual conscience, is heralded by the Protestant 
Reformation. This-precept which identifies reason, and not mere 
customary acceptance as sovereign, is an essential element in Hegel's 
philosophy, but as Hegel goes on to demonstrate, it is, when 
standing alone, one sided and therefore conceptually inadequate.
For where there is only "subjective freedom", the consequence is 
either the melancholy withdrawl of the subject from an external 
world which is devoid of reason or meaning, much as is characteristic 
of the negative philosophies of Stoicism, Epicureanism and Scepticism, 
or else the collapse of society into cnaos in the face of the 
absence of any uniform and universally accepted code of values.
Wnat is in fact required is a form of society which embraces and 
reconciles both the demands of free personal reflection and also 
the spontaneous community which, so Hegel claims, was to be found 
in Ancient Greece. The synthesis of these elements is a condition 
of things in which there is both subjective and objective freedom, 
since in it society is so constituted as to embody the principles 
of universal reason and as such commands the free and spontaneous 
allegiance of all thinking' beings. Hegel identifies this condition 
as the state of rational freedom.
As the conditions which give rise to the necessity for 
feudalism dissolve, it is supplanted by the bourgeois conception 
of justice which is specific to the capitalist age, and is founded 
on equality before the law, private property, and liberty of 
contract and therefore of economic activity. The normative ideology 
of this epoch, with which the third chapter is concerned, is 
exemplified by the works of two contemporary theorists, Nozick and 
Hayek. The former of these scholars bases his defence of unrestrained 
capitalism, in the shape of his "entitlement theory" of justice in 
holdings, upon natural law considerations, but runs into the 
theoretical problems encountered in the difficulty of accounting 
for the ontological foundations of such a system, and, related to 
this, in the difficulty of establishing a self-evident or even 
coherent substantive principle of original acquisition, such a 
principle being indispensible to his position.
Hayek, on the other hand, while reaching conclusions which
are broadly similar to Nozick1s, proceeds not from natural law 
assumptions, but from a eulogy of the allegedly self-regulatory 
nature of the free market order, within which individuals are related 
by the abstract rules of civil society. The inhabitants of this 
society are at liberty to pursue their own particular ends, being 
constrained only in the means by which they do so. Hayek, unlike 
Nozick, attains a perception of justice as essentially a functional 
device, and advances the claim that the conception of justice which 
he espouses is sufficient to resolve the tension or opposition of 
particular to general interests. For rules as such have no purpose, 
in the sense of specific ends to be brought about, but possess the 
function of maintaining the conditions in which spontaneous order 
is conserved. Within this structure, individuals find that their 
prosperity lies in responding to the "signals", in the form of 
fluctuations in prices, wages etc., generated by the market order, 
which lead them not only to the most lucrative forms of activity, 
but also to those which are most generally desired. Such an advocacy 
of reliance on the spontaneously arising' mechanisms of the market 
claims that the abstract or formal rules of civil society are 
adequate to co-ordinate the activities of indefinite numbers of 
otherwise unconnected persons; it purports, in snort, to discover 
in civil society nothing less than the embodiment of universal reason 
envisaged by Hegel as the necessary complement to the otherwise 
incomplete principle of moral autonomy, and to which free, rational 
individuals will spontaneously conform.
However, at second glance, Hayek’s theory appears deficient, 
in that the forces and processes arising out of economic competition, 
even within a system of rules, are by no means part of a mysterious 
providence, but are by their nature a wholly random mixture of 
processes, (which here are represented as reflexes of movements within
e .
an overall principle of motion, and, consequntly, development, which
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are treated as inferential rather than causal in nature), some of 
which happen to accord with human design, and others wnich promote 
chaos. Indeed, as the bourgeois age and its attendant mode of . 
production advance to their mature form, the signals thrown up by 
the market order grow increasingly misleading, and humanity is ever 
more cast into a radical economic and social insecurity. Any
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improvement upon the state of nature envisaged "by Hobbes and indeed 
upon nature as it originally presents itself, is merely, relative, for 
humanity remains, although at a higher level, divided against itself, 
and as such, dominated by its own actions turned aginst it in 
apparently alien form.
Since it is at this stage in the development of human society, 
according to Marx and Engels, that the stage is set for its 
reconstitution on the basis of the common ownership of the means of 
production, I now turn my attention, in the fourth chapter, to the 
conception of justice advanced by those theorists, or at any rate 
to the implications of their works for the theory of justice. I 
- consider;the remarkable variety of interpretations v/hich have 
followed in the wake of Marx's pronouncements on distributive justice, 
and emphatically reject the naive view .that Marx equated communism - 
in which all receive according to their needs and contribute labour in 
accordance with their abilities - with both justice and equality, or 
even with either of these. I cannot consider that a scrutiny of 
Marx's writings warrants such a construction, and in any case such an 
approach treats justice as being devoid of any definite conceptual 
boundaries. I then proceed to examine the extent to which the socialist 
principle of distribution in proportion to labour contribution - 
which according to Marx would be characteristic of the first phase of 
post-revolutionary society - is capable of resolving the theoretical 
and practical inadequacies of the bourgeois conception of justice 
earlier considered. I then examine and endorse the thesis that Marx 
considered that communist society, the second phase of post­
revolutionary society, woulo represent not justice made actual, nor 
the supercession of any specific conception of justice, but the super­
cession of the concept of justice as such. Since justice is 
specifically concerned with the regulation of the interaction of 
competing groups and individuals ,it follows that all considerations 
• of justice would become redundant and superfluous in a community 
based not on competition, but on the unlimited and spontaneous 
co-operation of all. I then proceed to a critical scrutiny of the 
doctrine of the witViering away of law and state, and examine whether 
rule-governed behaviour would hold any place in a society which has 
outgrown the need for organised coercion. This section includes an 
analysis of the relationship between communism as envisaged by Marx,
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and Hegel's state of rational freedom, and also takes up the theme of 
the transformation of human nature.which Marx and his followers 
appear to claim would take place in communist society.
In the fifth and concluding chapter, I seek to put forward a 
comprehensive picture of modern society, and to analyse the legislative 
forms of the great social democracies of the present time, in the light 
of the concepts examined in the first four. Inter alia, I conclude 
that welfare legislation is to be considered not as founded upon 
justice, but as the overriding of justice by other ethical considerations- 
that is, otner elements of Right - such as humanity, utility and so 
forth. It is this approach- of recognising the concept of justice as 
possessing definite conceptual boundaries which enables it to be 
considered as an object of rational contemplation.
Chapter I: Matters of Form and Methodology and their
Relation to Substance.
"Morality is not to be discovered bat to be made", (l)
(i) Some Preliminary Considerations.
It would appear a sound enough procedure to commence with a 
general consideration of the province of definition, in such a fashion 
as to take account of the various essentially formal elements of 
Right (2), each in its contingent relations with the others. Such 
an analysis is certainly necessary and indispensible, if any attempt 
at a comprehensive systematic unity is to be made. Towards this end,
I consider that a definite task confronting ine in this chapter is the 
presentation, and, hopefully, even a resolution of various central 
problems of legal and ethical theory, with the general aim that such 
deliberations shall re-emerge throughout the subsequent chapters as 
central, uniting themes casting light on all that follows. Generally 
then, the later chapters are concerned with the norms or values which 
are, or are asserted to be, the content or substance of justice, 
that is, with first order matters; the present cnapter is exclusively 
concerned with second order questions, that is, with tne ontological 
problems of the nature, status and definition of normative terms and 
propositions.
Much unnecessary confusion can be averted in advance by- 
giving consideration to the dichotomy of definition, that is to say, 
the sphere of analytical propositions or logically necessary truths 
(which represent one facet of second order matters), on the one hand, 
and on the other, assertion, tne realm of value judgements (which 
latter are always and exclusively first order and therefore 
synthetic). Such an enterprise is most important, and must be kept 
in mind in order to comprehend the dialectical interpenetration of these 
opposites, and thus to perceive their point of conceptual synthesis.
(5)« More basically, in drawing- such a division, one precludes much 
sophistry and illusory inference, both intended and otherwise, such 
as is occasioned by the illicit movement from the analytic to the " 
synthetic. (4) Of this tendency, the presentation of tautologies 
as substantive truths is the paradigm form.
Corresponding to this distinction, questions of the structure
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'•what is ...?" admit of two distinct interpretations, and therefore 
of two distinct forms of answer. As an example, "what is the tare 
weight?" might correctly "be answered either by "fifteen ounces", or 
by "the weight of the container when empty", depending on how the 
question was intended. Conversely, definition is a limited enter­
prise, and leaves unanswered, indeed unconsidered, the question of 
how we ought to behave, (it must, however, be conceded that certain 
terms such as "courageous", "cowardly", I'generous", and "mean" 
have come to possess such eulogistic or dislogistic connotations so 
that particular value judgements might be said to be incorporated 
in the definitions of these terms. (5) Argument concerning moral 
or legal values, such as takes place between moral philosophers, and 
almost daily in the courts of law, far from being dispute over 
definition, actually requires and presupposes concensus on matters 
of definition in order to be meaningful. An argument which comprises 
disputes falling into both categories, as if they were one, is 
doomed to become hopelessly confused.
Applying this to the theory of justice, one feels that Kelsen's 
essay What is Justice? (6) involves itself from the outset in much 
unnecessary confusion by reason of its, I would contend, misconceived 
title. Many philosophers, particularly in the present century, have 
drawn attention to the vital importance of correctly framing one’s 
questions (7); in Kelsen’s essay, the question at issue is rendered 
at least open to confusion, because the title creates the illusion 
that what are, in reality, two distinct enquiries, indeed, two 
different modes of enquiry, are one.
To proceed; law (and therefore justice) involves, in general 
terms, the resolution of the tension between the particular and the 
universal (8). In its normative sense it consists in a system of 
rules prescribing and evaluating human conduct; in common with other, 
subsidiary, forms of Right, such as positive morality and value 
systems associated with particular religions, it derives its system­
atic unity, that is, its character as an order (9) as opposed to being 
a variety of unconnected and.unrelated normative statements, from 
its formal conceptual hierarchy, descending from a single purely formal 
groundnorm of unrestricted generality to an in principle infinite 
variety of single judgements, by way of a process of subsumption (10), 
and, in the case of law (and also in particular forms of organised 
religious orders), delegation (10) also. This latter category is,
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however, of limited significance. We may say, provisionally, that 
justice is in some sense the substantively, and of course the 
formally ideal legal order, it being only in the face of the 
indeterminacies of actual positive legal systems that specific norms 
can be said to be created by authoritative judgements rather than 
by means of unaided conceptual necessity. The concepts of law and 
justice are analytically tied, but the relationship is not one of 
mere synonymity. Justice is a noumenon, an absolute, against which 
all phenomenal, particular legal systems and the norms thereof 
stand to be evaluated, (ll)
In passing', it is necessary for me to clarify the nature of 
the distinction between formal and substantial justice, since much 
depends upon it. Formal justice merely places constraints upon the 
application of legal norms, imposing the requirements of impartiality, 
but does not bear upon the substance of these norms. On the other 
hand, substantial or substantive theories of justice actually provide, 
or purport to provide, a basis for the preference of one particular 
norm or system of norms against others, (12)
A normative order is by definition a systematic hierarchy 
of norms, in descending order of the generality of such ought- 
propositions, and rights and duties are best understood as components 
of these values, or ways of describing them from different perspectives. 
For instance, if we can deduce within a specific order the conclusion 
that Mr. Jones must perform a certain action, or alternatively must 
refrain from it, such as fulfilling a term of a contract which he 
nas entered into, or abstaining from conduct stigmatised as a crime 
or delict, we can say that, in terms of that order, he has a duty.
Again, if there is a rule whose effect is to secure him against a 
certain type of action by others, in particular or generally, we may 
say that he possesses a right. Such terms as rights and duties, then, 
do not even purport to refer to descriptive entities, as has been 
erroneously supposed eg. by Alf Ross, (13) but merely afford a 
convenient short-hand (14) method of focussing upon the application 
or operation of norms in relation to specific individuals; such 
propositions as employ these terms, incidentally, demonstrate, as 
has been remarked by Searle (15), that not all normative statements 
assume the grammatical structure of "ought*1 propositions.
Furtner, the character or pedigree of any normative system, 
as being religious, moral or legal, depends wholly upon and is
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fixed by the nature of tne formal groundnorm implicit in it, that 
is, its internal reference to compliance with the will of a 
postulated deity, (or of institutions allegedly possessing divine 
origin), to social approval or disapproval, or to a formally 
constituted assembly, document or even the will of a single 
rational person. One might clarify, this-contention by recourse to a 
single example. I have frequently heard religious believers, challenged 
to produce evidence supporting'their views, fall back upon the 
assertion that the essence of the Christian faith and the truth 
thereof is the principle of love for one’s fellow man. Prom this,
I have been asked to accept, there follows the truth of God's 
creation, salvation through Christ, original sin, Heaven and Hell,
( as if the intermediate logical steps are altogether too obvious 
to require to be expressly drawn attention to), and, on the occasions 
when the proponent of this view has happened to be a Roman Catholic, 
the exclusive mission and authority of " the Church", and papal 
infallibility also. The catalogue of fallacies involved in this 
thoroughly muddled line of "thought" could fill a volume by itself, 
but what 1 wish to point out here .is' this, that, this fraternity 
principle by itself holds no necessary connection with Christianity, 
nor indeed with any religion. It might, and indeed has been by 
militantly atheistic communists (16), quite easily be preferred out 
of a purely humanistic, secular, concern for one's fellows; it is a 
religious norm only insofar as it is subscribed to out of compliance 
with what is asserted to be the expression of the will of a 
postulated deity, and even then the connection is an accidental, not 
an essential one.
This much, the formal autonomy of each type of value system 
from the others, follows analytically, and much confusion can be 
avoided in advance by bearing this conclusion in mind. Even Plato 
(17) involved himself in much misconceived discussion, in wrestling 
with the problem of why one ought to obey the law, and why one ought 
to be morally good; but this much is quite unproblematic, one ought 
to be morally good simply by reason of what these words mean, that 
is, by definition. Similarly, one has a legal duty to obey the law, 
simply because what the law prescribes is synonymous with what are 
one's legal duties. ±n neither instance is it necessary, as Plato 
attempts to do, to advance separate reasons, prudential or normative,
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hypothetical or categorical, in order to validly support these 
conclusions.
It is, however, equally vital to understand what this does 
not entail, as to understand what it does. It does not follow, on 
the strength of this reasoning, that one has an a priori; moral 
obligation to comply with the provisions of any legal system, that 
is, one must not be led to infer the identity of all normative 
orders from their common normative structure, as Lloyd explains 
in the course of his exposition of Kelsen's The Pure Theory of Law,
’Ought1 here does not refer to moral obligation 
but simply to the normative form of legal 
propositions. (18)
Duties under the various particular legal systems can 
and do conflict with each other, and with duties under religious 
and positive moral orders; and furthermore, as I shall shortly 
attempt to establish, it is a perfectly simple task to cite examples 
of legal rules, past and present, which can scarcely fail but 
offend against conscience, one’s perception of what the substance 
of actual legal systems ought to be.
(■ii) Are Normative Utterances Meaningful?
It will be noticed that the foregoing is a rough outline
of the definitional structures of all the various forms of
normative system; anything more elaborate is, regrettably, outwith
the scope of this present work. As such, the foregoing does not
concern itself with actual values, which are synthetic, not merely
analytical, and thus accords with contemporary analytical •
jurisprudence, such as is expounded by Hans Kelsen and H. L. A. Hart;
from the merely formal point of view, systems of law, positive
morality etc., can without any logical contradiction possess any
content whatsoever. (19)
This result, no doubt, will appear as less than satisfactory,
particularly for the present work, which after all, attempts to
consider the norms of justice. Such formal analysis cannot issue
us with substantive rules to direct our conduct, nor does' it even
purport to do so. Again I must stress the vital importance of 
keeping the two functions of definition and assertion separate in
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one's mind.; if you put to me the question of how you ought'to live, 
and I reply that you should do your duty, or do the right and abjure 
the wrong, or some such thing, then I have not answered your question, 
I have merely rephrased it.
At the outset, I made it clear that the central aim of this 
chapter is the consideration of various second order problems such ■ 
that confront all the diverse theories of justice, simply by virtue 
of their common nature as such. I am thus led to a consideration 
of the nature and status of normative, (primarily ethical), 
propositions generally, and of whether they can be considered to be 
meaningful at all. This latter, especially, appears as a vital issue, 
since if the answer be the negative, the whole of this enquiry needs 
must end here.
To this question, there are, at first sight at least, four 
possible answers. Firstly, there is the school of thought in ethics 
which treats the authentic norms of justice as being objectively 
valid and cognisable for all times and persons, independently 
of custom in any form. This position, (more often implied and 
founded upon than explicitly defended), as exemplified by Professor 
Kozick (20), is known as objectivism, and has-a juridical analogy 
in the doctrine of natural law (21), which holds that there exists 
a system of legal norms binding' on all men, and on which all 
particular conventional legal systems depend for their ultimate 
validity. (This relation is all the more apparent where ethics and 
law are treated as being coterminous). It is with this position 
that natural rights and human rights tend, to be associated. At the 
opposite end of the scale, and arising no doubt as a reaction against 
this first position, is the view tending to be associated with 
logical positivism that normative utterances are meaningless. (22;
If this be the truth of the matter, then not even a formal analysis 
of the anatomy of legal and ethical structures (in the sense of the 
analysis undertaken by Kelsen in the General Theory of Law and State 
is possible. The absurdity, after all, of seeking to trace the 
analytical connections of terms contended to be meaningless, (in, 
the present context, rights, duties, norms and so forth;, must 
surely be obvious. Thirdly, there is a less thoroughgoing form of 
value scepticism, which at least concedes grammatical meaning to 
normative terms, but denies that they possess any semantic reference;
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be this so, a formal analysis is possible, bat little more. Thus, 
according to this view, ethical terms such as “good" can be 
defined but have no place in the real world, just as no-one can 
perfectly coherently depict a unicorn, although, as a matter of 
empirical fact there is no such thing. Logical coherence is a 
necessary, but by no means sufficient condition for the de facto 
existence of a particular object of thought. To be meaningless, 
a term must not only not possess semantic reference, but also be 
in principle incapable of doing so. Such a term, then, having 
no place even in the world of forms, might be "omnipotence". 
Consider the following; "If X is omnipotent, can he create a 
stone so large that he cannot lift it?"
For "X" might be substituted God, Allah, the pope, Hitler, 
Stalin, or Jones, but the central point remains this, that 
whether one answers in the affirmative or the negative, one is 
forced to confess to a limitation on X's power. The concept of 
omnipotence - insofar as the word is taken to denote completely 
unlimited power - in itself involves irresoluble contradictions, 
and as such must be rejected. It is only if normative terms can 
be shown to be similarly incoherent that they can be concluded 
to be meaningless.
In the light of the foregoing, it can be seen that it is 
procedurally sound to commence with problems of definition, since 
of necessity all question of meaning precedes that of semantic 
reference. Thus, God is the transcendent author of the Universe, 
simply as a matter of definition, and quite independently of 
whether God possesses objective existence or not; the question of 
God's existence is precisely coterminous and synonymous with that 
of the existence of a transcendent author of the Universe. In this 
way, as J.L. Mackie points out (2$), a claim to objectivity, in 
the sense of concrete autonomy from merely subjective will, and 
to unrestricted universality and generality, are definitive 
features of morality as generally conceived of, if not articulated 
as such, irrespectively of whether these claims possess any 
de facto foundation or not. (24) Fourthly and finally, there is 
ethical, (and associated with this, legal), relativism. (25)
These doctrines hold that utterances made concerning systems of
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law and positive morality, although not meaningless, can and do 
vary with time and place, and that no actual system of values, 
endowed with substance by the force of social convention alone, 
can correctly be said to possess any higher measure of authenticity 
than any other, actual or'possible. According to such a view, the
criteria of what constitutes a legal system are purely formal, and
(
say nothing concerning the values themselves. Particular 
conceptions of what is right, this position holds; are purely 
relative, and however deeply ingrained in our individual and social 
consciousnesses, have no reference whatsoever beyond the actual 
practices and shared understandings of particular .societies, this 
thesis,' incidentally, formed a major strand in the case advanced 
for the defence of the Nazi war criminals at Nuremberg. (26)
According to this view a formal science of law (27) is possible, 
as is a science of descriptive morality, or a science setting out 
the values which are in fact in force within a particular legal 
system or systems, whereas a science of normative ethics or of 
justice is not. Such a position must be carefully distinguished 
from the other strand of legal positivism, which insists on no 
more than that the law as it is, and as it ought to be, are two 
wholly different matters for enquiry. This latter view is 
entirely compatible with, and indeed is frequently the vehicle 
for strong, even objectivist, moral views (28); however, ethical 
relativism and legal positivism do frequently go together, and this 
association finds its paradigm expression in the works of Kelsen, 
specifically in his essay What is Justice?
A further dichotomy must be drawn; "objectivism", so it 
would appear, must not be taken as a synonym for "naturalism"; 
rather, the latter requires cto be taken as one variety of the 
former. Naturalism is that category of objectivism which seeks 
yf/ tb ^definitively^identify goodness with some natural, factual 
quality, such as pleasure, self-sacrifice, balance of happiness 
over pain, or some such thing. It was the substance of Nioore’s 
thesis (29) that all such ideologies are fundamentally erroneous, 
by virtue of their common commission of what he termed the 
"naturalistic fallacy", but he remained nonetheless an objectivist, 
since conferring upon goodness the somewhat precarious position of 
being a non-natural quality, but one nonetheless existing objectively,
that is, independently of any subjective will(s) or 
consciousness(es).
Moore identifies the naturalistic fallacy as the attempt 
to define a non-natural object, such as "good", by means of a 
natural one. However, his usage of the crucial term "natural" is 
highly problematic. He defines "nature" as: "the subject matter
of the natural (30) sciences and also of psychology" (31), 'but a 
moment*s reflection should suffice to expose this as blatantly 
circular, and, therefore, less than illuminating. He continues,
"It (nature) may be said to include all that has existed, does 
exist, or will exist in time." (32)
So, does this not amount to an acceptance that "good", 
since not a natural quantity, is therefore non-existent?
Equally, his claim that "good" is indefinable might appear to be 
indistinguishable from the position that it is meaningless. In 
fairness, however, regard must be had to Moore*s views on 
definition. It is not enough, apparently, in defining a word, to 
give an account of what is generally used to and taken as 
signifying. True definition consists in analysing a complex idea 
into its simpler elements (33)> and. since, according to Moore,
"good" is a fundamental, simple term incapable of further division 
into constituents, it cannot be defined. This belief continues 
tacitly, even unconsciously, recognised in the usage of the term 
"analytical" to denote definitional truth, but otherwise it 
has been largely superceded, along with the more general contention 
that words are to be taken as referring to some object of thought, 
by the "use** theory of meaning, according to which a word is to 
be defined by the linguistic function it performs, for example, 
in the case of "good", evaluating. In my own view, the "use" 
theory is probably correct; the first view, the "nominalist" 
theory is not incorrect as such, but ratner its defect is that it 
is too narrow, "Standing for" an object of thought is one use to 
which words may be put, but clearly there are other uses, such as 
the conjunction of ideas, this being the function of the word "and".
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However, he goes on to qualify this account of nature on 
the;following page, to be natural, it seems, an object (and 
"good" is throughout presumed to be an object, or at least a quality 
capable of attaching itself to objects; must be capable of existing 
"by itself (34) in time". (35) Perhaps the crucial factor is that 
non-natural qualities are not cognisable by any of the empirical 
senses. Those things which are good, i.e., according to floore, 
which possess the quality of goodness, can only be perceived to 
be so, Moore tells us, by considering them in isolation. There 
are also those events and actions which are good in the secondary 
sense of being, as a matter of fact, conducive to those things 
which are adjudged to be good in themselves by means of the above- 
referred-to "thought experiment", that is, by considering them in 
isolation. Since these fundamental judgements are to be made .in 
this manner, Moore has been labelled as an "intuitionist". The 
attendant difficulties should be obvious. Those objects which Moore 
claims are, good in themselves are beauty and social intercourse;i 
but what is to be the objective criterion for what constitutes 
beauty? (This is at least as problematic, indeed arguably more so, 
than the question of the criterion of what is objectively good), 
and, as to the latter, the recluse or the hermit would clearly not 
agree. And who would be referee to determine which party is correct?
I would strongly suspect that what is natural is simply what 
is, that is, has objective existence, so that nature and 
objectivity are one in the same. If this be so, then the position 
which I have described as "non-natural objectivism", and therefore 
Moore's system, would have to be rejected as incoherent or self- 
contradictory. it turns out, therefore, not to be a feasible 
position after all.
What, then, can be said in faviour of Moore's identification 
of the "naturalistic fallacy"? Is it, indeed, a fallacy at all? 
uertainly, Moore's formulation bears with it the castigation of 
the confusion of form with content, referred to earlier, and there­
fore of defining a term by means of another with which it is in . 
principle incapable of being synonymous. And secondly, naturalistic 
positions entail the illicit movement from factual premisses to 
evaluative conclusions, which is of course in violation of the 
principle that no factual (3b) proposition, nor indeed, any number
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of these in combination, alone suffice for the valid inference of 
a conclusion which is evaluative in structure.
But this much is less than remarkable; more than a century 
previously, hume had pointed to the rrnzJative autonomy of the
factual and the evaluative, and had recorded that this insight, if
generally noticed,
"wou'd subvert all the vulgar systems of morality" 3^'/)
All in all, Moore is best considered as having heralded 
the final phase in tne reductio ad absurdum of objectivism, ror 
just as his contention that-"good1 is indefinable came close to 
the confession that it is meaningless, his espousal of 
intuitionism took him dangerously close to the conclusion that 
moral evaluations are ultimately groundless. This thought is 
expressed by Professor J.L.Mackie as follows;
the central thesis of intuitionism is one to which 
any objectivist view of values is in the end
committed: intuitionism merely makes unpalatably
plain what other forms of objectivism wrap up. ($8)
. This being so, what followed at Moore's heels in the field 
of meta-ethics can scarcely be a matter for surprise; Moore, 
after all, had unwittingly laid the foundations for the arising 
conviction that first-order moral controversy comes to no more 
tnan an opposition of subjective "intuitions", dressed up as 
revelations 01 objective truths, and such as admits of no 
resolution.
It was at this point in the sequence of ideas that there 
arose tne influential school of thought, instigated by Bertrand 
Russell's former pupil, Ludwig Wittgoistein; this school was 
logical positivism (39)» anh held that a proposition is 
meaningful if and only if, firstly, it is a logically necessary 
truth, that is, an identity, or alternatively,. it is a synthetic 
assertion whose veracity is capable of being tested empirically.
In the field of meta-ethics, the emotivists, so-called, were swift 
to seize upon the corollary that value judgements, since failing 
this test, are to be considered neither meaningful nor significant. 
The truth of the matter, it was held by A.J.Ayer (40) and his . 
followers, is that ethical utterances, whatever claims may be made
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for them, do no more than express the subjective approval or 
distaste of the utterer. Much the same approach is applied to 
legal theory by the Scandinavian Realist school (notably Alf Ross), 
who resist all normative accounts of the nature of law, holding all 
normative terms such as right, duty, and so forth to be mere sham 
concepts. (41)
Emotivism was in its turn succeeded by prescriptivism, the 
most noteworthy achievement of which was the shifting of the emphasis 
in second-order enquiry from the allegedly attributive nature of 
moral utterances to the speech-act, or linguistic function, entailed 
in this form of evaluative discourse. (42) However, there 
remained unallayed the same sense of the ultimate futility of 
discussing the real subject-matter of ethics, the values themselves; 
the dream of a science, (or systematic corpus of knowledge), of 
normative ethics or justice seemed remote. In order that this dream 
be made actual, the content of morality, according to Sidgwick 
would have to be "an object of knowledge, and as such the same for 
all minds" (43)•
This, then, is a statement of the problem, one which presents 
itself to many as the dilemma of discovering themselves to hold 
strong ethical views which they are ultimately unable to justify 
intellectually. To take a single example, I might enquire why I 
ought not to launch an unprovoked assault on a given individual.
It might, of course, be pointed out that I would thus run the risk 
of equally violent retaliation; but this argument, however 
persuasive it might be on my conduct, is not a moral argument, it 
is merely a prudential one; it should be noticed that if accepted 
as a moral argument, it would yield the peculiar consequence that 
the stronger my proposed adversary, the more wrongful would be my 
action, while by the same argument it would be entirely perrnissable, 
should he (or she) be weak and unprotected. Alternatively, and 
more relevantly, it could be protested that (as a matter of fact) 
such action would cause my victim unnecessary suffering. I 
might then pose the question of why I ought not to cause 
unneccessary suffering (whether to my present victim, to persons, 
or sentient beings generally). It may then be further explained, 
again as a matter of fact, that such behaviour tends to reduce 
the aggregate of (human?) happiness, but, again, I might enquire
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of the basis of this injunction, and so on, ad infinitum. It 
would seem, prima facie at any rate, that moral principles may 
be inferred logically, i.e. objectively,from more general ones (44)» 
but only to the extent that the more general principles are 
presupposed; it is the ultimate, moral principles themselves which 
are held open to doubt. What, then, is the solution, if, indeed, 
one exists?
It is well at this stage for me to acknowledge my debt to 
Professor, J.L. Mackie, on whose enlightening book Ethics - Inventing 
Right and Wrong my own views Concerning this solution are loosely 
based.
\
Professor Mackie begins try emphatically discarding- 
naturalism; in a formidable recital of considerations tending to 
refute the existence of values which are simply there, as "part of 
the fabric of the world" (45) he cites as the chief amongst these 
the variability of positive moral values (46), the "metaphysical 
peculiarity" (47) of such a claim, the problem of conceiving how 
normative attributes can follow from, or be supervenient upon 
natural qualities, and
the corresponding epistemological difficulty of 
accounting for our knowledge of value entities 
or features and of their links with the features 
on which they would be consequential. (47)
r
These arguments, he tells us, summarise the case for the 
brand of moral scepticism which concedes conceptual significance 
to morality, while at the same time denying it a natural content.
So far, despite the clarity and authority of exposition, 
these conclusions are less than remarkable. What is genuinely 
seminal is the set of inferences which Professor Mackie goes on 
to draw. His starting position stands parallel to the relativism 
of Kelsen (48), in that both emphatically and explicitly reject the 
existence of values possessing absolute or self-subsistent validity, 
but here the two accounts dramatically diverge. According to 
Kelsen, it follows that nothin g more can scientifically be said 
of Right or justice beyond the operation of a formal analysis (49)» 
together with, by means of this formal analysis, an exposition or 
presentation of the values actually disclosed by particular systems 
of law. Rut, for Mackie, it is not in spite of, but precisely
13
because of the simple fact that nature knows of no inherent 
legal or moral values that such values are not given to us by 
some abstract, mysterious power, but have to be constructed by 
c- the men in society whose purposes they are to serve.
It is implied in this that it is erroneous to commence
from a search for the "Form of the Good". (5u) such as Plato
depicted, as an "eternal extramental reality" (51), whilst scorning 
to consider positive morality, this latter being conceived as a 
mere reflex of the ultimately real, a parasitic, pale shadow of 
absolute morality, and as such casting no further light on the 
problem. On the contrary, it is essential to.commence with an 
understanding of the nature of conventional, positive morality, 
and tne mode of its creation. In issuing moral utterances, one 
does not prescribe, but rather one subscribes to a prescription
which is thereby presupposed. And it is precisely in this way
that positive moral values are accorded substance, and given more 
or less articulate form as general social requirements. The 
distinction between right and wrong lies essentially not in the act 
itself, but in the meaning (52), or social significance with which 
in the wider social process it comes to be bestowed; values arise 
as an artifact of human invention, and as a creation of social 
/ convention. In the case of morality and customary law, this takes 
place directly, and in the case of legislation ( whether by court 
or assembly), indirectly. In other words, it transpires that there 
is after all a middle ground between objectivity on the one hand, 
and mere subjective consensus, that is, coincidence of "intuitions", 
on tne other. The essence of convention is that it operates by 
means of those shared understandings such as are variously 
occasioned by life in society. An analogy with language is helpful 
here; words,as immediate empirical entities, are nothing more than 
configurations of sounds or markings on a page, but their ability 
to convey thoughts and messages of various sorts results not from 
any natural providence, but by virtue of significances attached 
by means of the self-same process of shared understandings 
established in the course of social life. The Scandinavian 
iiealists would do well to reflect that their contentions concerning 
normative propositions to the effect that these, since possessing 
no inherent significance, and so, they claim, no significance at 
all, can only oe communicated by means of language, and therefore 
words, which clearly hold no better claim than values to objective
1 c;
status. To live in society, indeed, is one in the same as being 
a party to shared understandings as to normative and linguistic 
significances.
It would appear that the creations of the normative orders 
and of language are purposive activities, although not entirely 
consciously so; in the case of the former, the quest for justice 
is transformed from a mission of discovery to an enquiry as to 
which of all possible conceptions of justice will serve its purpose 
best. It is in this sense that Mackie sees himself engaged in a
"choice of a first order moral system" (53)
For all activities or entities postulating some purposive 
element yield a logically necessary criterion for their own 
evaluation, this depending in each case for its substance upon 
how the specific objects implied by the activity or entity are to 
be most effectively met. To extend the language analogy, the 
function or object of language as one such form of purposive activity 
is the expression and transmission of ideas,and .thus we arrive at a 
rational criterion by means of which one language, or one linguistic 
usage, mignt be preferred to another out of something more 
substantial than simple personal favour. • To take a rudimentary 
example, I have found the French "Monsieur" to afford a means of 
addressing a man whose name is unknown, while at the same time 
avoiding both excessive familiarity and obsequiousness*. In this 
respect, the French language is superior to the English, which 
knows no directly equivalent term capable of fulfilling this 
desirable function. By this same criterion, provided by a simple 
consideration of what language is for, socially established 
linguistic usages are to be condemned, and if possible, discarded, 
where these militate against clarity of thought and exposition, or 
contain and thus afford means to the perpetuation, wilful or 
otherwise, of errors of thought. For example, ambiguity, the 
mother of equivocation, arises where quite separate objects of 
thought are denoted by a single term. This tendency is all the 
more deplorable where the two distinct ideas are sufficiently 
alike as to be liable to confusion; the paradigm case of this must 
surely be the word "law". (54J That descriptive and prescriptive 
laws are designated'by this single word is no mere coincidence, 
but is rather the legacy, and indeed the germ, of the formerly
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orthodox belief that the two are one (55) • This view is seldom 
encountered in its absolute form nowadays; but it remains a fertile 
source of confusion. Thus, to speak of the "law of the survival ' 
of the fittest”, as does Herbert Spencer (56), makes■this phenomenon 
appear as if it possessed an intrinsic, inherent legitimacy. Again, 
as has been noted already, a question such as that posed in the 
title What is Justice? is in itself radically objectionable, in 
that the use of the word "is" obscures and thus confounds the 
division between the two quite separate functions thereof, and 
indeed of any verb. In all of this, particular linguistic forms 
fall far short of the demands of self-conscious spirit.
This, I think, is sufficient to demonstrate the principle 
that language can, like charismatic forms of religion, operate 
as a corrupt and corrupting influence, simultaneously reflecting 
and preserving or perpetuating false correlations of objects of 
thought; and the crucial point is this, that this tendency falls 
condemned not by any arbitrary principle but by the criterion of 
evaluation which the institution of language, as both a form and a 
manifestation of instrumental rationality gives to itself.
And precisely the same procedure applies to everything 
that is "for" something; the definition of the word "knife" is 
such as to necessitate the conclusion that a "good" knife is, 
inter alia, a knife that is sharp, i.e. good for cutting. That 
is, that a good knife is a sharp knife is part of the meaning 
of "knife", although sharpness is no part of the meaning of the 
evaluative adjective "good" in this or any other context. (There 
is at least one interesting corollary to this line of thought; 
that is that a purely formal definition, i.e. a definition which 
makes no reference to specific function, of a functional term - 
and this, as I snail attempt to establish shortly, is a category 
which includes law and morality - is doomed to failure. If there 
be any who doubt this, then I challenge him to attempt to formulate 
a definition, as opposed to a mere description, of "knife" without 
making any reference to cutting.)
Such a procedure applies not merely to "functional" (57) 
words such as, in the example given above, "knife", or, to take 
Mackie's other example, "hygrometer", but to all ideas (eg. 
rockclimbing) which postulate some purposive activity, or some
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element of instrumental rationality, that is, will articulated, 
as such in some determinate direction.
Suppose that i express the opinion that Macfavish is a 
good footballer. "Good", here, does not of course mean morally 
good, it merely signifies in the present conxext a positive 
evaluation of footballing skill. (This, incidentally, illustrates 
the relative character of the word "good”. Someone or something 
cannot be good in his or itself, or in isolation; the evaluation 
must be related to some objective criterion of judgement, that is, 
it must be good at or for some thing or purpose.) Suppose now 
that a critic asks me to justify this evaluation. I point out 
.that MacTavish shoots strongly and accurately, runs quickly in 
possession of the ball, and that opjjonents find it most difficult 
to dispossess him. My critic goes on to protest that these are 
factual, descriptive qualities, and as such they cannot infer or 
entail by themselves a favourable or indeed any evaluation at all. 
But this is misconceived, for I do not contend that "goodness" is 
a quality naturally inhering in or supervenient upon his ability 
as a player; it is simply that, given the object of the game, 
tnese are among the qualities wnich it makes sense to commend. In 
this light, it would not be logical to commend such unfavourable 
qualities as lack of physical fitness, nor for that matter, a 
neutral one (in this context) such as intellect.
This self-same procedure can, if these are indeed the 
creatures of human rationality, be extended to the systems of 
values governing human conduct; law and morality. Towards this end, 
I shall in the following chapter give consideration to the object 
of subordinating human conduct to rules of law and morality, an ' 
enquiry which can only be.made by means of the Hobbesian approach 
of enquiring as to how we would fare if no such institutions had 
been devised. (A consideration of Hobbes's ideas in this context 
forms the central theme of cnapter 2, and therefore the details 
of tne question of what function societal (i.e. legal and moral) 
values possess shall be resumed in that context; for present 
purposes, it will suffice to emphasize that it is upon the function 
or object of these systems of values that the argument turns, and 
not upon the object of life or any such notion, nor directly 
upon any immediate objects which particular persons may hold.)
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For the present, it is contended that, while substance is no part 
of definition as such, the nature of a normative order as an 
instrument and medium of rational will gives rise to a certain, 
relatively determinate content, standing apart from, but in. a 
condition of secondary or^indirect entailment to form. This 
content, as values evaluated, arises not out of the activity alone, 
but out of the activity together with the necessary criterion of 
judgement with which it bestows itself. The revelation that the 
province of normativity is not after all the creature of nature, 
as the category oi* pure being, but of Reason, is indeed an 
exhilerating one, dismal only to those who aspire to no higher 
destiny for mankind than an eternity of darkness and idolatry. (58) 
The conclusion that moral values are intersubjective, is not, after 
all, an embarrassing one.
(iii) The Fundamental Judgement of Value
"and thou hast tried them which say they are apostles, 
and are not, and hast found them liars " (59)
It should be clear from the foregoing that what is 
required to attain the reconciliation of form to substance in 
the context of Right, that is, the totality of absolute values 
conceived of and comprehended as a systematic unity, is a 
fundamental value judgement, to perform the role of a substantive 
groundnorm. (60) We are called upon to select a foundation for 
our morality, and as to wnat is the correct choice, this is 
predestined by the nature of Right, as it shall in the course of 
this essay, it is to be hoped, progressively reveal itself. This 
nature, at any rate, places constraints on what values can 
rationally be chosen, and what cannot. V/e are here engaged in 
evaluating the various possible conceptions of Right, each of which 
is determined and identified by its characteristic substantive, 
groundnorm, in precisely the same fashion as the pedigree or 
character of a normative order, as being legal, moral or religious, 
is established by reference to its formal groundnorm.
It must be asserted that social, that is, positive, 
morality is an aggregate not additional to nor apart from the
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particular moral codes, i.e. conceptions, espoused by the various 
members of a society, in every value judgement I express, I 
contribute to, reinforce, extend or contradict (and hence in part 
seek to change} the prevailing values of society. The opinion that 
the unearthing of the norms of the absolute, the ideal, system is 
an undertaking so problematic that the best we can do is to acquiesce 
in whatever happen to be the prevalent values accepted in our own 
society can thus be seen to be utterly erroneous. Korality has 
no source external to ourselves, so that wilful blindness simply 
degenerates into a bizarre and unreflective game of f'ollow-my- 
leacier, to a destiny unknown. Hence, the vital significance of the 
right of private judgement asserted by the Protestant Reformation 
(61); as we are the fabricators of morality so too must we be its 
architects.
Kant, on this matter, is both lucid and inspiring, for he 
places upon moral agents not merely the obligation of simple 
obedience to the rules of law and social custom, but also to the 
duty/to^criticallyy evaluate these; the rational moral agent, then, 
is called upon to do more than simply follow the positive social 
norms, by which he finds himself confronted. It is in this sense, 
that Singer asserts (62) that a merely customary morality, even 
when not based on the will of a despot, is deficient, and falls 
short of the ideal of rational freedom, since amounting*to no 
more than dependence on external social forces. In the Kantian 
system, the moral law is to be determined as the content which the 
pure moral, or rational, will accords to itself, in isolation from 
all extrinsic considerations such as personal inclination or 
purported moral authority. (63) Nowhere is this more clearly in 
evidence than in Kant's principle of Autonomy (64), which is one 
of the alternative formulations of the categorical Imperative. (65) 
One must, then, strive to attain a single fabric of 
rationality, by means of the transvaluation of the values with which 
all are confronted from without (66); it is, beyond question, the 
gravest tragedy of the human condition and history that the great 
mass of people are content to acquiesce, without reflection, in 
those existing beliefs and values which are prevalent in their own 
societies. Hegel's analysis is sound when he writes;
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The unsophisticated heart takes the simple line 
of adhering with trustful conviction to what is 
publicly accepted as true and then building on 
this firm foundation its conduct and its position 
in life. (67)
Arising by the power of the negative, we have the emphatic 
rejection of blind acceptance and faith in purported external 
authority;
It is a sheer obstinacy, the obstinacy which does honour 
to mankind, to refuse to recognise in conviction anything 
not ratified by thought. This obstinacy is the 
characteristic of our own epoch, besides being the 
principle peculiar to Protestantism. (68)
However, in the very same .passage, H^el - or so, at first 
glimpse, it would appear - betrays the spirit of the Reformation, 
and with it the basis of moral autonomy when he represents the 
transvaluation of values as a mere* "vanity and particularity-of 
opinions and' things", • (69) •
It is certainly true that in Heel’s system, in particular 
with regard to his historicism (70), progress by means of the 
vision of the aggregate of those single individuals that are able 
in imagination to transcend the limitations of their own immediate 
condition is viewed with scepticism (71); in one celebrated 
passage he writes that;
It is just as absurd to fancy that a philosophy 
can transcend its contemporary world as it is to 
fancy that an individual can overleap his own age, 
jump over Rhodes. (72)
However, once one rejects Hegel's historicism and with it 
the implicit view as to the inevitibility of progress, it certainly 
seems that moral autonomy is one of the few hopes for moral advance, 
and that conscience, as the capacity for the critical transvaluation 
of prevailing positive values, is the only inalienable right, since 
it is simultaneously our highest obligation entailed in the nature 
of Right as the vehicle of conscious volition. This, the appeal to 
and demand of direct experience,' is surely the essence of that
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simple message made sacred by the-blood of the Protestant (73) 
martyrs; the pretension of those who claim to be the exclusive 
fonts of esoterically revealed moral truths reveals itself in the 
last analysis as no more nor less than the final refuge of error 
and deception. (74)
Certainly, it is in part the solution to the contradiction 
involved in Hegel’s seemingly ambiguous stance in relation to moral 
freedom that whilst Hegel was unimpressed by moral freedom as a 
means to the attainment of the ideal social order, it remained 
none-the-less an essential element in his conception of the ideal, 
once attained by other means. There is more to the solution, 
however,'than this. It is to the nature of Hegel’s own solution 
that I now turn my attentions.
It is in the very nature of moral evaluations as subscriptions 
to, and not merely as descriptions of presupposed prescriptions 
that tnese are frequently framed with reference to an ideal - or 
imputedly so - ordering of relations. It is this mode of appeal, 
to transcendent values, detached from the actual practice of one's 
own society, which Hegel rejects (75) as an alienation, an 
estrangement from true community, and as opposed to the need for 
an ethic which is "universally accepted and valid". (76)
And certainly, a small amount of reflection is sufficient 
to reveal that moral autonomy, however vitally.important it might 
be, cannot in itself be the whole story. For, taken by itself, 
moral freedom proves to be a less than adequate 'basis for human 
society, since it dissolves itself into a radical subjectivism, 
which opposes itself to societal rules (in the sense of universally 
accepted patterns of conduct) and to social cohesion in any form. (77) 
Nor does the individual conscience trapped in an irrational 
world fare happily, since having no other recourse than a 
melancholy;; withdraw1 from an external, brute reality of which it 
feels itself to he no part;
In the face of the demands of the State for outward 
conformity, freedom can only be found by retreating 
into oneself (78)
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and by Mtaking refuge in a philosophy" (78) which stresses the 
unimportance of the external world.
It is to this felt inadequacy which Hegel's seemingly 
ambiguous, indeed contradictory, attitude to moral autonomy can 
be traced. It can now perhaps be perceived that Hegel's essential 
strand of thought is much more complex than a simple preference 
of one conflicting element, moral freedom or customary harmony, 
one against the other, or even than a mode of compromise as 
between the two. Rather, he sought a more intricate arrangement 
which would successfully embody and reconcile both of these 
opposing formulations. (79) 1
What Hegel had in mind was a mode of social life which 
united the demands of the individual conscience with the spontaneous, 
customary community of Ancient Greece; this would be attained when 
the entirety of the social process came to be rationally organised, 
and all individuals freely chose to participate in it, since 
recognising in it the application and realisation of principles 
of universal reason. (80) This condition of things, which unites 
both subjective and'objective freedom (81) is the state of rational 
freedom, and was considered by Hegel to be the goal of human 
history. (82) In the light of my earlier misgivings concerning the 
inevitability of progress however, there remains the difficulty 
of how freedom on the objective level is to be attained in the first 
place, if not by means of moral autonomy, in alliance with conscious 
(and probably violent) action.
The fundamental judgement of value, from which all absolute 
values flow, is the criterion by which all social rules and 
institutions stand to be evaluated and adjudged to be rational or 
irrational;' as such, it is intimately related to the function 
which Right as a functional device discloses. Since chapter 2 is 
concerned chiefly with the discovery of this function, it is to be 
hoped that all these related matters shall become clearer in that 
context also. for now, it is sufficient to note that the nature 
of Right as a functional device is in itself sufficient to locate 
the criterion somewnere witbin the province of will, that is, the 
satisfaction of the requirements of sentient beings. By this alone 
societal values come to have imposed upon them the general constraint 
of conformity to what can be concluded to be located at some point
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within the sphere of sentient design. The question, at the most 
general, fundamental level, becomes this; what conduct does it make 
sense to prescribe, and what conduct does it make sense to 
proscribe? It is.a futile and meaningless exercise to forbid 
behaviour which is harmless (or even beneficial), or to require 
conduct which is entirely unattended by advantage (or even harmful). 
A man's desire to continue in life is not what makes his right to 
do so, but if men did not wish to go on living, and if nobody 
derived any benefit from the lives of others, there would be no 
conceivable merit in according men this right. Similarly, 
the fact that people on occasions may wish to die, at least raises 
the possibility of the right to die, or to take one's own life.
In the most general terms, then, morality must be taken as operating 
on the', side of the advancement of the human condition, and as 
militating against unnecessary suffering and pain; this assertion 
is specifically
the proposition that only the concerns of conscious, 
sentient beings have the moral significance to serve 
as the ends of a rule-governed order (83)
Of course, this thesis that absolute values operate on the 
side of human "interests" must be taken only as a very general 
formulation, to which a considerable number of gaps will require to 
be filled in. Certainly, in its raw state, it is open to a battery 
of objections.
To begin with, it may be asked whether all interests are 
equally significant. Certainly, that they are so may appear to be 
the view of the utilitarians; however, socialists generally grade 
preferences or interests according to whether they are "social, 
non-social (or) antisocial" (84) in orientation, and certainly, 
since Kight is a device which aims at social cohesion (a theme 
which shall be elaborated upon in chapter 2), it is clear that 
•interests of the first (or, at the least, the second sort), possess 
the greater moral significance, whilst interests of the third sort 
may possess none at all.
Secondly, the connection between Kight and the advancement 
of human interests might be claimed to be radically misconceived,- 
in that the application of rules characteristically comes into
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play in situations in which human -interests are opposed. But I 
do not mean to imply that such particular dispute situations 
should always he settled according to the dictates of human interests - 
for if such a resolution was always possible, morality and law would 
be superfluous - nor even that such particular interests should 
be adjudicated by a simple counterbalancing of opposing interests 
one against the other, so as to produce the greatest net satisfaction.
What is however closer to what I do mean to say is that such
situations should be determined according to universal, general 
norms of conduct which should themselves be chosen as possessing* 
consequences which most clearly accord with sentient designs 
generally. It is of course commonplace that duty and inclination 
frequently diverge; in all this, it can be seen that the 
relationship of Right and will is a complex one.(85) That .
relationship is none-the-less an essential one, and its
clarification will be one of the chief tasks for chapter 2. One 
further explanation is necessary; as will later be demonstrated 
in detail, it is to a very considerable extent the province of 
Right not to discover and provide for the particular concerns of 
specific natural persons, but to maintain the condition in which 
those individuals are substantively free to pursue those concerns 
for themselves.
These objections left to one side for the present, we come 
to perceive the seeming paradox that from the moment we abandon the 
illusion of objectivism in ethics in favour of a Mfunctional 
device" theory in which the nature of the function gives rise to 
a fundamental value judgement in the form of the necessary 
criterion of evaluation which the activity of creating norms of 
conduct gives to itself, we are, as with all deduction, embarked 
upon the path to a logically determinate conclusion'which- is 
independent of all subjective considerations. It also transpires
from this abandonment that the solution to the problem is nevertheless 
objective, in the secondary sense that it is the same for all 
minds (86); despite, or rather because of the conclusion that 
norms of conduct have no independent foundation but are contingent 
upon human reason, the question of the ideal substance of these 
norms is such as admits of an objectively determinate answer.
Thus, this answer is such that even one unconcerned for the fate
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of humanity must "by , force of reason, in the absence of error, be 
compelled to acknowledge it, although of course such a person would 
be indifferent to whether or not this ideal substance be realised.
Thus, the division of naturalism against positivism is 
revealed as being less than absolutely authentic (87), and the 
essential unity of these is directly perceived. The characteristic 
paradox of the present work .is precisely that out of the rejection 
of the existence of objective, that is, natural, values, we are 
afforded a means to the objective determination of Right in its 
highest form, that is, in its fullest condition of conceptual 
development and in synthesis with the content which it gives to 
itself. - It is solely in virtue of this conclusion that we are 
enabled to perceive the prospect of a science of ethics, where a 
"science" is defined as a systematic corpus of knowledge 
concerning an entity, (or entities), which is in principle capable 
of becoming an object of thought or contemplation.
(iv) Deontology versus Gonsequentialism.
There must now be resolved a further question, one relating 
essentially to the formal structure of the ethical order. It 
is a question of fundamental importance to political science, and 
in particular to the various moral and juristic problems raised by 
the ideology of socialism. (88) The question is this; are we to 
evaluate human conduct according to a deontological or a 
consequentialist conception?
The former of these categories conceives of the ethical 
order as consisting structurally in a logical hierarchy of values, 
•that is, principles and rules which are universal in obligation and 
general in application; and, since such means-orientated, non- 
teleological accounts (an example of these being Robert Nozick’s 
Anarchy, state and Utopia (89) )are, as such, generally successful 
in eliminating occasions for different principles to.come into 
mutual conflict, there is the tendency, or at any rate the 
opportunity for such conceptions to be absolutist. Further, since 
pure forms of deontology (again, wozick’s book affords a fine 
example) treat certain sorts of Dehaviour as good or bad in
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themselves, such conceptions are inescapably naturalistic', since 
excluding therefore the prospect of morality as an instrument or 
mode of conscious design; instrumental rationality, after all, 
presupposes a telos. compliance or non-compliance with an order of 
pre-conceived rules is seen by this view as the sole criterion for 
moral evaluation, and the convenience or otherwise of the consequences 
for the actor or for anyone else, is considered morally irrelevant.
To this, there are two aspects. On the one hand, there is entailed 
the conclusion that violation of the rules stands condemned, and 
cannot be justified nor even!'; mitigated merely by reference to 
agreeable consequences flowing from such an action, nor even to 
necessity. (The implications of this view, as we shall see in 
chapter 3> for taxation and the legitimacy thereof are clear). 
Conversely, the dire.st consequences, though they be fully forseen, 
or even intended, are not incompatible with morally permissable 
action, so long as no violation of the rules occurs. This category 
is known to the law of Scotland as damnum sine iniuria (90), and 
the paradigm instance of it is loss, even ruination, inflicted by 
means of trade competition.
Consequentialism, however, is directly teleological, and 
evaluates conduct according to its tendency to promote or to 
frustrate a given end, or ends. (91) This simpler form dispenses 
entirely with the elaborate structure of constraints associated 
with deontological conceptions, and finds itself in opposition 
to rights, for example, property entitlements, as mere obstacles 
to the favoured goal. Probably the paradigm form of this latter 
category is act utilitarianism, which principle directs us to 
pursue the greatest happiness of the greatest number. This facet 
of consequentialism is the best illustration of the propensity 
of deontology to dispense with the moral appraisal of ends, and to 
provide a means - directed structure within which moral agents are 
left at liberty to pursue their own independent aims, and in which 
they are constrained only by the reciprocal rights of others.
This sort of view, as proposed by Hayek (92), has the definite 
merit that it renders entirely redundant all the difficulties 
concerning what sorts of things are good or bad in themselves (93)» 
that is, what are to be the consequences and sorts of interests of 
which our moral order is to take account. The question of what
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sorts of entities are desirable in themselves is a nonsense; in 
our enquiry as to what is objectively desirable, we are thrown back 
upon the form of will, that is, ethical freedom.
The question which I now wish to pose is this; can this 
division between these two categories be sustained absolutely?
To begin with, a consequentialist conception remains none-the-less 
deontological in the limited sense that it retains a single, rule 
in the place of the discarded system of rules, as opposed to dispensing 
with rules entirely. And, to approach the division from the opposite 
direction, internal reference to known or probable consequences 
will form a necessary part of the substance of the deontological 
conception, since it is in the nature of rules that they apply 
to the conduct of at least partially rational beings who have some 
perception of the likely results of their action. Rules are • 
concerned with behaviour, and behaviour consists not merely in 
action, but in action which encompasses some definite goal or 
goals. ^
Even the resort to consequences alone would have to be 
restricted to those which are known or reasonably foreseeable; 
after all, one otherwise wholly discards the mental aspect, and 
indeed the whole foundation of moral agency. Under a view which 
graded conduct solely and purely according to, actual consequences, 
attempted murder, insofar as it fails entirely, would have to be 
accounted entirely innocuous, and the man who encompasses the 
death of another, but like Macbeth resembles in his irresolution 
•'the poor cat !• the adage" who let " 'I dare not’ wait upon 
•I would' ", (94) would have to be considered ethically inter­
changeable with the man who entertains no such desire. Conversely, 
actions having the most appalling consequences may frequently 
involve neither foresight nor intention. And in any event, whether 
one considers oneself an adherent of the deontological position or 
not, consequentialism even in this restricted sense of moral 
evaluation proceeding according to consequences directly and 
intentionally flowing from particular actions, appears to be 
radically incoherent; the contradiction lies in the fact that 
participation in a system of socially established rules can 
operate to the most beneficial of consequences, while a general 
pursuit of diverse aims, each of which
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by itself is on balance favourable is directly self-defeating. (95) 
Consideration, after all, must be given by the pure rational will 
not merely to the consequences.of particular actions, but also to the 
consequences of actions of that type being generally followed, and, 
indeed, to the consequences of the operation of a system of rules.
In other words, the ideal legislator, or moral agent operating under 
the principle of moral autonomy, must have regard not simply to a 
specific action, but to that action generalised into a maxim of 
personal conduct, and universalised into a rule of conduct applicable 
to all. This should be made reasonably clear by means of recourse 
to a single example. If one confines the scope of one’s deliberations 
to the direct consequences of particular actions, one might be led 
to condone the taking of an article from its producer, in order to 
confer it upon some other who can derive a greater satisfaction from 
it. However, even if one adopts the telos here implied, the derivation 
of the maximum satisfaction from material objects, it must be 
recognised that if such conduct forms a general pattern, the most 
disastrous consequences, when viewed from the wider perspective, will 
ensue. (96) For people would generally be deterred, for want of secure 
possession, from producing objects of economic value, that is, which 
are desired as useful, since running the risk of summary confiscation. 
As one application of the ’’goose that laid the golden eggs".syndrome, 
the attempt, or rather, the general pattern of isolated attempts to 
increase the total satisfaction from available resources would fail 
as directly counter-productive, in that the actual outcome would be 
the direct opposite of that which was intended; out of the attempt to 
enhance the aggregate enjoyment of physical resources, this aggregate 
would in fact be drastically curtailed. Right, it would therefore 
appear, is not the substance but rather a higher phase of the 
articulation of will; the objects of this functional device are not 
particular objectives (ie. desired consequences) generally, but rather 
these former relate to the maintenance of conditions in which these 
latter can effectively be pursued.
However, the pure deontological position presents itself as 
no less problematic. For it apparently holds out an autonomous, self- 
contained order of rational (rational, that is, in the sense of 
conforming to a principle of formal systematic unity) precepts having 
no necessary connection with human designs. Accordingly, the self-
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subsistent values of the pure deontological order appear as ends in 7. 
themselves, and therefore as being simply there in the nature of 
things; it was in this sense that I earlier remarked on the close 
relationship of pure deontology to naturalism. (97) This aspect is 
most clearly in evidence in the writings of Immanuel Kant , who with 
a negligence which is quite remarkable confuses the common interest 
with self or sectional interest (98) and thus holds justice,to be an 
entity having no necessary point of contact with the satisfaction of 
the human will. It must however be observed that pure consequent­
ialism in its own way eliminates all question of the objects of, or 
benefits to be derived from a system of socially established norms, 
and thus tends also to naturalism, in that it requires to vindicate 
one sort of immediate consequence ,as being intrinsically superior to 
all others.
Indeed, one is drawn to conclude that the truth must lie in 
some form of reconciliation of these apparent alternatives, since 
neither taken as the concluded truth is wholly acceptable. And 
further reflection tends to confirm that each is a component, in 
itself devoid of significancerof a higher organic unity upon which it 
completely depends for the resolution of its one-sidedness. (99) As 
I have argued already, the institution of general, universal, socially 
established norms of,conduct (which are necessarily deontological in 
form) can be demonstrated to be clearly desirable from the viewpoint 
of utility, or indeed of any other consequentialist goal that could 
sensibly be proposed.
Further, it seems less than probable that the arch-deonto- 
logist:Kant could have held by the test of the categorical imperative 
(100), that it is permissable to act without regard to the consequences 
of one's actions; after all, in so acting, a man could scarcely be 
imagined to be acting in accordance with good will in any recognised 
sense, nor, indeed, according to any principle at all. It is 
difficult to imagine a rule which would bear no internal reference to 
direct consequences; from "Thou Shalt Hot Kill" (101), it must 
obviously follow that one must not engage in conduct having the 
immediate consequence of causing another's demise, such as by planting 
a dagger between the ribs. Consider in this light the Courts of Law, 
which in assessing delictual liability in Scotland apply the, standard 
of the. reasonable and prudent man having regard to the probable and
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forseeable consequences of his actions, (102) and themselves follow 
much the same code, in considering the consequences for the future of 
each decision made by them. Thus, in Walker v Vhitwell (10^ ), they 
concerned themselves not simply with present justice between the parties 
but held to be invalid a will that had not been attested by one of the 
two requisite witnesses until after the death of the testator, in 
view of the adverse implications of a contrary precendent for 
subsequent cases. (104) This clearly illustrates that a framework of 
rules has no necessary incompatability with consequentialist 
considerations, although at first sight the two confront one another 
as logical opposites.
For deontology, it is argued that it is impossible for an 
individual to fully assess for himself the full calculus of 
consequences flowing from his actions. But rules have no further 
foundation than the aggregate accumulated wisdom of mankind. Rules 
are essential, indeed, it might be argued,;definitionally so, to social 
life, but come to be imagined to have some other basis, and as such, 
come to be followed blindly. In the end, rules can only be evaluated 
by reference to the consequences that they guard against, or promote. 
Rules are not good in themselves simply because they are rules,, nor 
even because they can be universalised without contradiction; 
deontological considerations in themselves leave it an open question 
what content universal general rules should have conferred upon them.
Both of these elements, then, are opposites, yet neither is 
capable of coherent self-sustainance, and indeed each has an inherent 
tendency to reveal itself as an extension of the other. Any 
intelligible understanding must of.necessity embrace a synthesis or 
resolution of the opposition here described. Deontology represents, 
as we have seen, the category of reason, at any rate in the one-sided 
sense of systematic coherence whilst consequentialism is representative 
of the antithesis, that is, the opposing and by no means more finally 
authentic pole of the same concept. Right, as being in itself 
inherently rational, of necessity embraces both these poles (105), so 
that any conception which treats them as absolute opposites cannot 
be sustained. Accordingly, the process of synthesis in which each 
abstraction, and therefore the opposition itself, is superceded and 
thereby resolved, is by no means a compromise, nor an admixture of 
heterogeneous elements, but on the contrary entails the emergence of 
a single, pure, conceptual whole.
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(v) The Dialectical Methodology
An explanation for the dialectical methodology which I have 
employed in the preceding sections, and which is fundamental to this 
essay as a whole, must now be given.
In its original Greek form (106), and in the present essay, 
the dialectical principle of development appears as the primary means 
of conceptual analysis. As indicated by its Socratic roots , it is 
by no means peculiarly socialist, and indeed I shall attempt to 
demonstrate that it has, in the hands of socialist theorists, been 
both ill-used and brought into unmerited disrepute. Stalin, for 
example, degraded it to the "philosophical" basis for what Orwell 
was later to stigmatise as "doublethink" (107), and as such an 
instrument for pretending that a state of affairs is not as it truly 
is, but its direct opposite. (108)
Accordingly, the dialectic is a procedure which goes beyond 
merely formal reasoning, which can do no more than proceed from 
concepts as given. (109) (However, as shall shortly be demonstrated, 
formal logic does have a role to play within dialectical or substant­
ive reasoning). It is one of the central contentions of this essay 
that' since jurisprudence is largely preoccupied with the analysis of 
legal concepts, dialectical forms of argument hold a vital function 
in that science. In particular, the dialectic as here presented is 
intimately connected with the earlier passages on the necessary 
criterion for the evaluation of values, which theoretical device 
seeks to transcend the formal logic which in that context proves 
impotent. It is characteristic of my whole enquiry that I seek 
analytical ties beyond mere synonymity.
The dialectical approach gives rise to a hierarchy of 
conceptions commencing with the simplest, most immediately 
accessible understanding of the concept under scrutiny, which insofar 
as it is conceptually inadequate as it stands, gives rise to a theor­
etical impasse or contradiction, which can be resolved only by means 
of a synthesis. - Synthesis is the movement in which a contradiction 
is overcome and yet at the same time preserved. This resolution or 
reconciliation of the two sides of the contradiction - the thesis and 
the antithesis (110) - is made possible by the fact that it is not 
merely the thesis and the antithesis which are revealed to be less 
than wholly authentic, but so also is the contradiction itself, since
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it arises only at a level of comprehension which is imperfect and ' 
misconceived. The synthesis demonstrates that the contradiction has 
"been illusory from the beginning. This facet is most amply illustrated 
in what is, in Hegel’s system, the highest synthesis; the attainment 
by Spirit of self-awareness through the recognition, in the 
’’external" world, of itself in objectified form. The contradiction 
between subject and object is, in this movement, resolved through 
being demonstrated to have been false all along.
Inadequate conceptions assume the form of abstractions, that 
is, conflicting pairs of one-sided understandings in which the concept 
is presented not as it is in itself - that is, as the Idea, the 
absolute, which is the goal of conceptual analysis - but as it appears, 
from one particular direction or the other. The identity or 
interpenetration of opposites (ill) is not however a fixed, absolute 
law, and it is certainly not to be taken as implying, for example,
that the Idea of justice is one and the same as the Idea of injustice,
nor that the idea of X = the Idea of not-X. It is to be taken simply
as signifying that along the route to the Idea, (eg., as in the present
essay, the Idea of justice), there are encountered various 
(ultimately illusory), oppositions which tend to collapse on closer 
inspection, this abrogation being symptomatic of the logical 
inadequacy of both abstractions, and of the supposedly absolute 
opposition between them.
Formal logic serves to identify these contradictions or 
negations, and at the same time formal systematic coherence is the 
unifying principle of the conception. Each conception is developed 
by means of formal inference (112), and falls to be discarded when 
by means of this process there is brought to light an inherent 
inconsistency. Thus, in Kant’s writings, the dialectic was employed 
to demonstrate that certain concepts, or our understandings, 
ie. conceptions, thereof, were inauthentic, since self-contradictory. 
(113) The synthesis, as we have seen, is the higher conception which 
overcomes the opposition, but its appearance may serve only as the 
precondition for it proving to be one-sided or inadequate in some 
further sense, and thus giving rise to a new negation and synthesis. 
This process determines both a fixed succession of conceptions, and 
also the Idea, the highest, the perfect understanding, which 
corresponds to the object of contemplation as it is in and for itself,
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and which is, together with the progressive phases of its being, 
logically and precisely determinate. In the context of the Idea of 
justice, these considerations tend against that simple relativism A 
earlier discussed which seeks to infer from the heteronomy of moral 
ideas held by men the relativity of moral concepts, in that it shall, 
be the fundamental objective of the succeeding chapters to demonstrate 
the manner in which all such ideologies can be precisely located 
within the structure of a logical hierarchy, whose successive phases 
and summit can be logically, that is, objectively established. (114)
In other words, I advance a conception of essence which transcends 
the rudimentary approach of seeking out a lowest common denominator, 
or a set of common,,indispensible features. (115)
In passing, it is also necessary for me to explain the points 
of departure taken by my use of dialectics from the formulations of 
Hegel, Marx (116) and Engels. To deal with Hegel first, his absolute 
idealism (117) placed a far greater emphasis upon the interconnection 
of Ideas than will be found here, and thus upon the Idea of Ideas 
and the nature of the ultimate reality, that is, of objects in general. 
(118) Hegel's ambitious objective, it will readily be appreciated, 
far exceeds the scope of this present essay; I concern myself only 
with an analysis and presentation of particular Ideas, (mainly justice) 
and as such I deal with the logical interconnection of Ideas only 
peripherally, although some remarks shall be made on the wider 
metaphysical question here and there in the succeeding chapters. 
Further, while the dialectic is treated here as limited to the realm 
of conceptual necessity and interconnection, Hegel obscured the 
distinction between conceptual, ie. logical, and causal necessity (119) 
and in the hands of Marx, the dialectic becomes essentially a tool 
for the analysis of real movement, and as such, a causal theory. (120) 
Thus, for Marx, contradictions and the rest are to be located and 
found at work in social forms themselves, rather than in their 
attendant ideologies.
After the death of Marx, Engels constructed an elaborate 
metaphysic in which the dialectic was presented as the basis of the 
principle of real movement applicable not only to society, but to 
nature writ large. (121) However, the precise relationship of the 
dialectic to matter, which Engels took to be the true foundation of 
reality, and the question of how the triadic dialectal syllogism of
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thesis, antithesis, (these two being paralleled, Engels claimed 
unconvincingly, by action and reaction) and synthesis can be 
applied to opposing movements in nature - e.g.; to the resolution 
of forces, such as is expounded in any elementary natural philosophy 
text-book, or even to the Darwinian theory of evolution which Engels 
so greatly admired (122) - have never been made clear.
fvi) The Dualistic Approach to the Idea of Justice.
To return to the main strand of the argument; we are led, 
by the synthesis with which section (iv) was concluded, to a vision 
of a deontological system of first order precepts, accompanied by a 
second order telos, giving rise to criteria for the evaluation of 
these precepts. That is, deontology is the province and form of the 
first order system, while consequentialism operates at the level of 
the evaluation of values, and is the concern of the ideal legislator, 
or rational moral agent in his capacity as such. This, in fact, is 
the synthesis encompassed by rule (as opposed to act) utilitarianism .
(123); however, the telos which is determined by the nature of Right 
as a functional device may turn out, in chapter 2, to be somewhat more
narrow than the broad concept of utility. That is, in common with all
functional devices, its function is specific, and not concerned 
merely with purposes generally; it is this generality which . 
utilitarianism implies. Nonetheless, the insistence upon the 
consequentialist element reveals itself to be one in the same as the 
assertion that Right is a form of instrumental rationality and as 
such confirms Right in its analytical relationship with the Idea of 
will. .(In advance, it might be conjectured that the so-called 
fundamental rights, i.e. natural rights, human rights"and so forth
(124) are those which refer directly to the criteria by means of 
which positive values are to be evaluated, and indeed determined.)
It is of course consequent upon the transvaluation of values 
that certain rules and systems of rules, are revealed to be of a merely 
relative validity; since opposed to the necessary form and nature of 
Right and the criteria for the critical appraisal of values determined 
thereby. It should also be observed that my usage of "first order" 
and "second order" in no way diverges from this context to that in
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which it was last used, for, as I have already sought to demonstrate, 
the object of morality and the necessary criterion for the evaluation 
of values springing therefrom are actually entailed by the 
ontological conclusions concerning the nature and conceptual 
significance of the governance of human conduct by means of abstract 
rules. . '
Applying these principles, it would seem that a properly 
formulated and developed socialist ideology - and indeed the same 
holds for any purportedly "progressive" system of ideas - would 
encompass a dualistic conception of entitlement, corresponding to 
descriptions of and subscriptions to conceptions of Right, whether 
actual or possible. (The reason for my qualification relating to 
ideologies which are "properly formulated and developed" is that I am 
not here concerned merely with ideologies and thoughts such as are 
confined to subjective consciousness, and as such are possibly 
incomplete or self-contradictory, but only with the concrete Ideas 
therein contained such that they furnish themselves with objective 
reality, and thus, by the. general power of logic, raise themselves 
above, and become independent of, consciousness in any form. (125))
If this were not so, that is, if socialism did not contain as an 
essential postulate an Ideal order beyond the actual rules and values 
in force within a given society, or at the -very least, some principle 
by means of which relative entitlements generally can be assessed, 
then the statement that, for example, 7% of the population owns 84% 
i of the wealth, far from being an objection, would simply be self- 
justifying. Similarly, the proposition that "all men are equal" when 
uttered in condemnation of prevailing inequality is coherent only 
when taken as referring to the postulated Ideal order, and as such, 
as expressed in full perception of the dual nature of reality upon 
which dialectical forms of reasoning are predicated.
If the specific nature of the social bond is identified with 
the dominant normative ideology, (dominant, that is, in the .sense
that it is actually followed,- under sanction'or otherwise), it is 
tautologous that any particular society is just by its own standards, 
and that any alternative mode of social organisation is. in greater or 
lesser measure unjust. Since the evaluation of competing social 
forms is identical with the evaluation of competing conceptions of 
Right, there is required a standard of evaluation which is
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ulterior in reference to any specific society, but relates rather to 
the Idea of society, that is, society in its absolute sense.
The aualistic conception of entitlement, corresponding 
to law as it is, and as it ought to be, is to be found in the 
positivist analysis of law, which is typefied in Bentham's dichotomy 
of expository and censorial jurisprudence. (126) In the present 
essay, however, my treatment of the division owes more to the 
idealist dichotomy of appearance and reality, relative and absolute 
or an sich and fur sich (127).
Accordingly, a man’s utilisation of, and intromissions with, 
an object may, within and in terms of a given positive order, be 
justified by reference to his property right in it, but that 
property right, or rather the general norm on which it is based, may 
itself be called into question, as conforming or not to the Ideal. 
Equally, the privileges of a monarch or of aristocracy can be 
justified within the order,in terms of status. But this status is 
far from being valid in itself and self-justifying; this process of 
relative vindication in no sense establishes the absolute ■ 
justification of the value or the order. However, it must be 
recognised, that the dualism proposed in this chapter, far from 
postulating a pre-existing higher order of being, begins by 
recognising that all values are man-made, and therefore serve not 
gods, nor are ends in themselves, but rather they serve the creatures 
of the earth. The Ideal order, as we have seen, is quite simply 
that- conception of Right which exactly satisfies the criterion 
of evaluation which Right as a functional device gives to itself.
The cornerstone of the Kantian system of moral.philosophy 
is the idealist contention that there can be but one logically 
consistent version of reality, and that therefore there can be 
but one authentic system of universal values. (Unlike Kant, who 
was a relativist in matters of episto^ology, the anti-empiricist 
Hegel applied this methodology to knowledge generally; thus, 
according to Hegel’s account, real reality is cognisable not to the 
senses, but by means of pure, or• a priori reasoning (128)). Hence, 
the conception of the normative order adhered to by Kant and his 
follower Nozick is essentially static and monistic. This monistic 
approach manifests itself in two aspects; firstly, in that it 
denies the autonomy inter se of law and morality, and contends
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that the purported proposition of each depends for its validity, 
indeed for its normativity, upon its conformity with what is put 
forward as "the law of nature". (Monism receives another, entirely 
different, impetus from those thinkers such as Kelsen who contend 
that there is no ideal system of values beyond the values of the 
positive order in any given society, so that this is the only level 
of existence of values cognisable to human reason. Hegel has been 
associated with this ethical relativism, not. because he contends 
that there is no ideal system of values, but because he holds that 
no individual can overleap his own age, nor the stage to which 
Reason has developed in his own time, and that therefore the Ideal . 
though far from illusory cannot for. the present be directly 
comprehended (129)). Secondly, it manifests itself in the repre­
sentation of justice not as the evaluation of positive values, but 
simply as the direct and immediate evaluation of persons, actions 
and events; that norm which cannot be subsumed under justice, or 
what, according to this view, is the same thing, the "law of 
nature", is not a value at all, rather it is a brute command, 
error or deception. From this analysis it follows that the positive 
law is properly conceived of not as a normative order at all, but 
as a factual activity, at best enforcing and declaratory of the 
natural law; it follows that the orthodox view that the positive 
law is itself analysable into rights and duties is an ideological 
fiction, the entirety of our rights and obligations being conceived 
of as being already contained in the immutable, eternal, "law of 
nature". f
At the other end of the political spectrum from Nozick’s 
emphatic defence of private property (13o)» certain socialists 
appear to adopt a comparable approach, retaining to their own 
accounts a monopoly of normative terminology, while referring1 to 
the expression and application of rival systems in purely 
descriptive terms. Thus, in many cases socialist writings wholly 
fail, or refuse, to differentiate the normative concept of ownership 
from brute, factual possession. (131) In many instances this can 
undoubtedly be attributed to a poverty of conceptual analysis, 
while in more mature renditions, it is more probably due to the 
writer espousing a fully considered refusal to represent the 
organised concentration of the means of production, and more
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specifically the resources of nature in the hands of the few as other 
than brute fact. (132) However,, it should be clear from the 
foregoing that there is no logical contradiction involved in 
referring to a norm or conception of Right, without simultaneously 
endorsing it.
It would appear plausible to attribute a dualistic view­
point to Marx, certainly if one a’cknowledges as authentic the 
dichotomy to which Husami (135) draws attention as between Marx's 
sociology of morals on the one hand, and his theory or conception of 
distributive justice on the other. The dichotomy corresponds to 
Marx's identification of the various pre-socialist systems, each 
one pertaining to a specific phase of social and economic develop­
ment, of which it represents the juridicial expression, and on the 
other hand, to his evaluations of these orders. According to this 
view, therefore, far from there being but one possible system of 
values, each successive mode of social organisation begets its own 
characteristic moral and legal ideology. Thus, from tne point of 
view of any ideological form, and of those persons who operate 
within it, conceiving of it as the sole authentic form, its evaluation 
appears as a contradiction in terms, and its supercession as 
expropriation. It was in this spirit that Martin Luther denounced 
the emancipation of the serfs as beingj
"against the Gospels and robbery;I* (134)
Similarly, when the heritable jurisdictions in Scotland were 
abolished, in 1747» substantial compensation was exacted for those 
who were thus deprived of the profits of the administration of 
justice (135)J the old law was even in its abrogation confirmed.
And when in 1868 the Russian serfs were emancipated, they were made 
to pay for their freedom. (136) In the present age, although it is 
the purpose of recent land tenure legislation to eliminate the 
essentially feudal "feu duty", again this can be effected only by 
means of payment to the displaced "superior" (137)»
However, at second glance, the dichotomy of Kant's static, 
monistic conception of Right, on the one hand, and on the other,, the 
dynamic principle espoused by Hegel and Marx is not an absolute one; 
the Ideal system of norms is that which can be concluded to be in a 
condition of full conceptual development, devoid of internal, 
contradictions. Particularly with Hegel, who claimed that conceptual
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development is paralleled in its stages by historical development, 
the similarities with Kant become obvious; the historically 
emergent juridical order is that to which society is by the force 
of Reason drawn. It might then be truly said that there is but one 
conception, or Idea, of Right, and that all systems rival to it are 
misconceptions, since all in greater or lesser measure embrace 
error, in the form of logical inconsistency.- It is on the stage 
of World History that each successive conception "by deed, instead 
of by argument” (138)
is fully worked out, so that its implications and therefore also 
the contradictions latent within it are rendered explicit (139).
The resolution of the opposition between monism and dualisjji as here 
expounded, is, incidentally, such as to give rise to the suspicion 
that only in a society which is classless, that is, one in which 
there are no separate categories of persons who by reason of their 
condition as such hold radically conflicting interests, can there be 
a single universally accepted system of values; competing classes 
imply contending conceptions of Right. Society is properly 
ordered, and therefore on its own terms actual, only when its 
values acquire a genuine universality,, expressive of the vital concerns 
of all rather than of antagonistic sectional interests. Conversely, 
a social structure, even where not inconsistent with considerable 
inequality, cannot properly be accounted a class society, unless, 
taken as a whole, the structure operates to the advantage only of 
one limited faction.
The essence of justice is objectivity (140), that is, 
impartiality, and thus negates merely subjective interests;•it 
follows that this objectivity is only brought to the culmination 
of its progressive realisation when the separation of Right from 
subjectivity in the form of factional interest is complete. /
I have in this, the opening chapter, sought to pursue an 
analysis of the anatomy of the Idea of Right, consisting in its 
formal structure, and of the precise relationship of this form to 
substance, and of the nature of the connection between the two.
To an elaboration of the crucial element, that is, the function which 
values perform in human existence, and to the substantive principles 
arising therefrom, I now turn my attentions.
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Chapter 2: Alienation, Lav and Reason: An Account 
of the Cultural Evolution of Mankind.
"History ... is the long road, of mankind to conceptual 
and practical domination of nature and society, which 
comes to pass when man has been brought to reason and 
to a possession of the world as reason" (1)
(i) On Nature
It will be recalled that in chapter 1 I provisionally 
defined nature (2) as consisting in the unrestricted totality of 
those e.ntities and processes which possess objective existence, and 
are not therefore contingent upon human consciousness. It is this 
external reality which directly confronts the subjective mind at 
the beginning both of personal existence, and of the history of 
mankind.
It was one of the fundamental tenets of Hegel's idealist 
philosophy that the essential constituent of reality is mind, without 
which the existence of material objects is an impossibility.
According to this view, the objective universe exists as the 
externalised creation (5) of the universal spirit, which has the 
former as its embodiment, and which manifests itself in the world 
through the vehicle of human consciousness, its phenomenal 
reflection. In the course of world history, spirit progressively 
returns to itself by coming to recognise itself in the world of 
objects, and is one with it. As the unconditional creation of the 
absolute spirit, or God, the world of objects conforms to rational 
principles. As mind advances, it attains an ever greater perception 
of the laws of nature, and in the final phase of its self­
development, absolute knowledge is attained when mind comes to 
grasp that, all along, the nature which it has been contemplating 
is not some alien "other"; rather, it has itself for its own object.(4) 
Professor Hegel’s ambitious, and, as some would have it, • 
implausible, thesis shall not be followed here as received truth.
This is because, firstly, as has already been stated, an enquiry 
into the metaphysical foundations of the substance of reality 
exceeds the scope of this present work; and secondly, because it 
does not appear to be true. Whilst, certainly, the laws of nature
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lend themselves to conscious understanding and direction, there appears 
to be no basis for the view that these laws have their origin in 
consciousness in any form. I certainly concur with Hegel that 
consciousness shapes its own environment, but it does so not by 
fabricating nor by altering the laws of science, but by utilising 
them. As a specific instance, all weighing instruments make use 
of the law of gravity, whether by means of the principle of the 
beam, the spring balance or the load cell, but the law of gravity 
goes on as unchanged and unchangeable as if these machines had 
never been devised.
It is true, in a limited sense, that the world conforms 
to inherently rational principles. In particular, it should be 
noticed that understanding, and therefore science and knowledge 
would be impossible if it were otherwise, and the world was not 
describable in terms of general laws, for understanding requires 
rationality on two fronts, in the mind of the knowing subject, and 
in the constitution of the object; understanding is nothing more 
than an apprehension of general truths, on the basis of which 
analysis and prediction may proceed, and so it follows that where 
there is no such pattern of generalities, neither can there be 
understanding. However, it is simultaneously true that the natural 
universe is irrational, in the sense that in itself it knows of 
neither purpose nor direction. This is not to be taken as 
implying that the natural system of things is static; on the contrary, 
it has many laws which are process principles, that is, which are 
concerned with the growth and decay of plant and animal life, and 
of celestial bodies. What I do wish to convey is that where 
tendencies towards end results are to be found occurring naturally,, 
they are to be accounted as entirely fortuitous from the viewpoint 
of sentient will, which alone can impose purpose and rational 
direction upon its environment, (5) Nature, then, is in the most 
simple terms, what is; it represents the category par excellance 
of "sein" as opposed to "sollen”. (6) It has no inherent rightness 
nor legitimacy, but neither is it the creature of Manichaean (7), 
wilfulness. I do not mean that the effects of undirected natural 
lav/s are a matter of indifference; on the contrary, there are a very 
great number which either positively os? adversely affect sentient 
interests. What I do intend to say is,that where either of these
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effects occur, they do so blindly, and not as the outcome of 
benevolence nor malice.
Accordingly, I would affirm that human progress entails 
the subordination of natural forces to human ends, and reject the 
contrary identification of what is natural with what is right, on 
the grounds of being in harmony with the universal order. It was 
in this spirit that Pope Leo XII forbade vaccination against... 
smallpox as being contrary to nature (8), the same nature that is 
possessed of a ferocity and violence which is all its own.
Nor, in respect of this exaltation of nature, would it 
seem that the Roman Catholic Church has advanced significantly 
in its teaching. In The Catholic Marriage Manual (9)> a volume 
duly granted the Nihil Obstat and the Imprimatur (these being 
•‘official declarations that a book or pamphlet is free of doctrinal 
or moral error'1) both by the Archdiocese of hew York, and by the 
Archdiocese of Westminster, we discover frequent instances, 
particularly in the context of birth control, of the identification 
of what is artificial with what is immoral; indeed, the two are 
treated as if they were direct synonyms. In this assertion, we 
have no lesser authority than that of the Pope himself;
No reason, however grave, can be put forward by 
which anything intrinsically against nature may 
become conformable to nature and morally good. (10)
Marx knew of the autonomy of the will, and of nature Vs 
true status. He considered it one of the prime acheivements of 
and historical justifications for the capitalist epoch that what 
he referred to as the "idolatry of nature" (11) was dissolved, as
Nature becomes for the first time simply an object 
for mankind, purely a matter of utility; it ceases to 
be recognised as a power in its own right; and the 
theoretical knowledge of its independent laws appears 
only as a strategem designed to subdue it to human 
requirements, whether as the object of consumption, 
or as the means of production. (12)
This then is the external necessity which the rational 
subject is called upon to master, and in opposition to which
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there arises will, which is the corollary and exclusive province 
of mind, that is, personal, spiritual existence. Consciousness 
begins its odyssey of self-assertion over the objective world 
when the rational individual, in an act of appropriation, first 
seeks to direct his environment towards the fulfilment of his needs 
and desires. In this sense, the rise and not the fall of man 
begins with the taking of an apple from a tree. Still subjective 
rationality is attained in the movement in which mere immediate 
desire proves to be a self-contradictory form of will, and is 
superceded; in the ensuing condition of things, immediate desires 
are subordinated to perceived future needs. The taking of fruit 
which fortuitously happens to be growing on trees is replaced by 
the intentional cultivation of crops for future consumption, and 
in the place of the occupation of natural shelters such as caves 
men come to construct dwellings using such natural materials as 
come to hand.
The subjective ego accordingly realises itself in the 
principle of subjective rationality, and comes to govern 
itself by means of hypothetical imperatives (lj) and general 
maxims of conduct (14); will or volition alone causes the external 
environment to grow conformable to its own designs.
(ii) On Society.
And here, if there were but a single mind, or at the least 
an unrestricted innate harmony of subjective wills, the story 
would approach its end. Tne ascent of man would consist purely 
in technological progress, as opposed to being a more complex 
movement simultaneously embodying a social and ethical process of 
development.
But the term ’’social", and its relationship to ethical, and 
other normative systems, requires to be illuminated. The 
normative sphere, as was argued in chapter 1, is an essentially * 
social phenomenon. This is because values are not to be found as 
self-subsistent entities in the physical world, but arise in 
relation to socially attached significances, and, therefore, 
within the wider context of the process of the transformation of 
the world from being so many naturally occurring substances and
44
processes to a condition of being composed of objects which are 
definable solely in terms of function. Biological man becomes 
man in society in that movement in which he becomes party to 
shared understandings, such as linguistic usages and moral values. 
Society, therefore is by no means an "all or nothing" phenomenon, 
but on the contrary comes to be actualised by degrees. The social 
bond is one and the same as the totality of shared significances 
subscribed to and recognised within a given group of human beings. 
Through this identification of a social form with its character­
istic terms of association, we discover that the development of 
human society is simultaneously the development of Right, and 
therefore, of freedom, volition and reason, which I shall attempt 
to demonstrate are its corollaries. It also follows that the 
highest condition of Right is inseparable from and logically 
coterminous with the actualisation of the highest form of society.
This is the society to which the ideal system of values is both 
appropriate and applied, just as any mode of society is to be 
identified by and with the substance of its dominant normative 
ideology.
But what is the definitive role which normative values 
play in human existence, that is, what is that essential function 
which gives rise to the touchstone for the evaluation of specific 
norms and systematic conceptions of Right? In this section I 
shall attempt to give a full answer to this question, and the 
answer that I shall give, in its basic essentials, is that the 
function of the institution of social values is to provide the 
means to the overcoming of the difficulties involved in the concept 
of subjective instrumental rationality. More exactly, this role 
arises in relation to the perceived logical inadequacy of subjective 
rationality as a conception of will. And since subjective 
instrumental- rationality is the expression of the will of the subject, 
this is no less than the claim that the subjective will is itself 
an inadequate form of will, properly conceived.
One recent ethical position which is broadly analogous to 
that which shall be expounded here, in that it proceeds from a 
view of the institution of societal norms as being a positive, 
man-made device having a determinate and ascertainable function or 
object, is contained in G.J. Warnock’s The Object of Morality (15)«
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The central thesis of this work would seem to‘be that in order to 
understand a particular species of evaluation, it is necessary first 
to be aware of what -is hoped to be achieved by that species of 
evaluation. (16) This doctrine however, is significantly different 
from that which is expounded here, for in this present essay it is 
claimed that the criteria for a given mode of evaluation arise 
not from the mode of evaluation itself, but from the activity 
evaluated. The institution and propagation of societal rules is 
conceived of as a conscious activity, an evaluative activity is 
itself evaluated; it must at all times be remembered that a 
double normative is involved.
'Although by a more simple route, Warnock arrives at much 
the same enquiry as is arrived at here, that is; what is the 
purpose of rules of conduct? Accordingly, he sets out the question
°f ?
What it is in the human predicament that calls 
for amelioration, and second, what might reasonably be 
suggested (to put it guardedly) as the specific 
contribution of ’morality1 to such amelioration. (17)
However, Warnock’s examination of this contribution, and 
of the ’’human predicament” is less than inspiring. In fact, he 
does no more than argue from "limited sympathies", and to a 
subsidiary extent, "limited rationality"; it is these defects 
which, we are told, morality is brought into the world to 
countervail. (18) No more penetrating analysis than this is 
attempted.
Far more illuminating in this respect is J. R. Lucas’s 
On Justice (19) which sets out to account for the contribution of 
rules of conduct by means of reference to "Game Theory". Game 
Theory is concerned with the philosophical expression of the 
inadequacy and limitations of subjective instrumental rationality 
through a consideration of such model constructs or "parables" as 
the prisoners’ dilemma.
Consider what is apparently the original formulation of 
the prisoners’ dilemma; according to Lucas, it was first set out 
by A.W. Tucker (20), and it is repeated both by Lucas himself, and 
by Lawrence H. Davis, in his article "Prisoners, Paradox and 
Rationality".(21) . The scenario, as related, is as follows.
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Two men are under suspicion of a serious crime and, 
additionally, a much less serious charge is also preferred against 
them, (in neither of the two accounts is the serious crime 
identified; however, according to Davis the minor charge is that 
of carrying concealed weapons, whereas according to Lucas1s 
account, it is tax evasion). They are apprehended, and held in 
separate cells. Each is offered the following deal, to the . 
knowledge of the other; (l) If he confesses to the serious charge, 
he can then turn state evidence, and provided the other prisoner 
thereby implicated does not also confess, the first prisoner will 
be given an unconditional amnesty, while his partner in crime 
will be jailed for twenty years. (2) If both prisoners confess, 
they will each receive a sentence of five years. (2) If both 
remain silent, since it would not then be possible to gather 
sufficient evidence to secure a conviction for the more serious 
charge, they will each be jailed for one year only on account of 
the minor charge.
Let us suppose that you and I are the two prisoners.
This being so, our pay-off matrix is as follows (in Game Theory 
terminology, each of the four squares represents an "outcome”, 
which is itself subdivided into two "payoffs”, one for each "player”);
I CONFESS • I DON'T CONFESS
I GET I GET
YOU 
GET 5 
YEARS
YEARS YEARS
I GET
YOU
DON'T
CONFESS
YOU
GET
YOU 
GET 1 
YEAR
YEARS
It is consequent from this situation that whether you 
confess or not, I will in either event be better off if I confess; 
if you should decide to confess, then I receive a five year sentence, 
whereas, had I not confessed, I would have been condemned to twenty 
years. And should you elect not to confess, then I go free, instead
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of serving the one year sentence which I would have incurred
by not confessing. You will reason similarly, since our
predicaments are precisely symmetrical. This being so, I can 
infer with a high degree of confidence that you will confess, and 
on this assumption I shall base my actions. We are thus both led 
by the logic of our situations to confess.
The important point is this; we encounter the paradox 
that through separately-following the course directed by 
considerations of immediate personal advantage, we jointly elect 
to incur sentences of five years apiece, while had we taken the
opposite course of action, our sentences would have been for the
much shorter period of one year. This paradox, indeed, is all 
the more acute since had it been our joint aim to go to prison for 
as long as possible, we would have been impelled to decisions 
which would have led - as the reader will observe - to us being 
given sentences for the shorter of the two periods. In either case, 
it is from either of our points of view too dangerous to attempt 
to resist the determined outcome, that is, to rely upon the other 
to also choose to pursue the perilous option. For, to do so would 
be to risk a sentence of twenty instead of five years, and it would 
also entail abandoning all hope of being set free. And, in any 
case, insofar as it is permissible to adopt the not unrealistic 
postulate of unconditional self-interest on the part of us both, 
there can be no motive whatsoever for either party to take this 
risk. We are each effectively presented with an impasse which 
there is no prospect of either of us separately breaking through.
There is a variation on this theme which is set forth in 
David Lewis’s article "Prisoners’ Dilemma is a Newcomb Problem." (22) 
Again, we have two prisoners in symmetrical predicaments. Again, 
also, the conditions of the -prisoners' mutual isolation and 
knowledge of the other prevail.
Each has placed before him $1000, which he can elect to 
take or not to take, on the basis that he may keep the $1000 if he 
chooses to take it, while if he elects not to, his counterpart 
receives $1,000,000. The payoff matrix which appears in Lewis's 
article is as follows; (following Lewis, I shall use the verb 'rat' 
to denote election to appropriate the $1,000.).
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I RAT I DON'T RAT
v
\  I GET
YOu\ $1000
GET. \
$1000 \
Let us examine the decision with which both prisoners are 
confronted, in seeking to maximise their respective pay-offs. Each 
perceives that whether or not he rats has no bearing on his 
opponent's decision, nor therefore on whether or not he can expect 
to receive $1,000,000. As one of these captives then, I reason in 
my isolation that whatever you do, I will be $1,000 better off if 
I rat than I would be if I do not. Therefore, acting in 
accordance with this watertight logic, I rat, as so shall you.
The remarkable and paradoxical conclusion which we arrive at this 
time is that each of us receives $1,000 only, whereas had we both 
acted in a manner contrary to perceived self-interest, or even 
acting so as to receive as small a sum of money as possible, we 
would each have received the much larger sum of $1,000,000.
Let us look at one final example from a third source, 
J.L.Mackie's Ethics - Inventing Right and Wrong (23), in which1 
the following scenario is presented (24);
There are two soldiers, Tom and Dan, each of whom mans a 
separate strongpost against an enemy advance. Neither is in a 
position to observe the other's actions, although each is fully 
aware of the existence and situation of the other. If both 
soldiers remain at their respective posts and resist the enemy 
advance, each stands a reasonably high chance of survival (let us 
say 50%) • If both turn and run, each stands a poor prospect of
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survival (say 20%). If one runs, and. the other stays, the one who 
runs stands a good chance (10%) of survival, while the one who 
stays has a very poor chance (10%). This time, the pay-off matrix 
looks like this;
RUN X. 20% Xv io%
20% 70% X.
TOM
STAY . X. 70°% X. . 50%
10% \ 50% Nv
Figure $,
It should he observed that immediate self-interest will, 
this time, counsel-flight, and that Tom and Dan - each of whom, 
it should be recalled, is separately acting so as to maximise his 
own personal prospects of survival - are led, in effect, to elect 
for a 20% chance of survival, whereas, had they chosen otherwise, 
that is, acted in a manner contrary to immediate self-interest, 
they would have held a 50% prospect of attaining the end which is, 
ex hypotnesi, desired.
It is in the light of such considerations that Lucas 
concludes (25);
too exclusive a concentration on one’s own short­
term interest can be self-defeating, as the Prisoners’ 
Dilemma shows. To be really rational, we shall need 
to expand our concept of rationality, to take a 
wider perspective and a longer view.
We are also furnished with the concepts which are 
necessary to an explanation of R,B. Braithwaite’s comment (26) 
to the effect that
It would be reasonable for Robinson Crusoe to aim 
simply at maximising his own satisfaction while he 
was alone on his island.
50
but that with the advent of Man Friday, a separate 
personal identity, the situation is qualitatively and not merely 
quantitatively changed. The agent trapped in the prisoners' 
dilemma finds his rationality turned against him, in that instead 
of it being the means to enabling him to direct his efforts to 
the bringing about of the more favourable of two outcomes, he is 
impelled by it to the less favourable outcome. His merely 
subjective freedom is revealed to be a mode of determination by 
external forces, and all element of choice - presupposed by will - 
is eliminated. Rationality, freedom, will, mind, improperly
conceived, are swiftly transformed into their opposites.
-Proceeding now to apply this vision of the futility of 
general unconstrained pursuit of the immediate advantage to 
concrete human situations, we find that these tend to differ 
from the theoretical, imaginary constructs which we have been 
considering in two primary respects. Firstly, the same types of 
situation will arise with considerable frequency in human 
experience, and not merely on a "one-off” basis. Secondly, whereas 
in all the models examined, there have been two "players" involved, 
there will in practice invariably be more than two, and, indeed, 
there will be an in principle unlimited number*
Examples of conditions of what I shall refer to as 
alienation, the opposition of subjective to objective rationality, 
can be found at several levels of cultural development, chiefly in 
relation to competitive,economic interaction, and can also be 
characterised as the division of the immediate personal interest, as 
against the social interest. And, following from this, on the 
basis that whatever is in any real sense in the social interest 
must thereby be in the interests of the individuals concerned,
, it is therefore further consequent that an opposition of the 
subjective will or consciousness to itself can also be perceived.
One such illustration is the problem of overpopulation in 
lands such as India. Clearly, it is in the general interest that 
population growth be restricted according to the limits imposed 
by the availability of natural resources; but in the absence of' 
an old age pension scheme, it is in the vital interests of the 
individual peasant to bear as many children as possible, in 
order to be ensured of adequate support in his advanced years.
Many other instances emerge in the course of social development, 
(27) and these shall be identified as their proper contexts arise. 
For now, it is sufficient to notice that in such situations, an 
attempt by any altruistic soul to resist the general flow would 
amount to no more than an act of spectacular but futile self- 
sacrifice, achieving nothing with regard to the aim of resolving 
the impasse.
The unco-ordinated actions of subjective wills tends to 
generate movement towards broader unintended consequences, which 
assume the form of mechanistic regularities possessing the 
characteristics of independence and detachment from will. Mind 
thus finds itself once more exiled from the world of purpose and 
meaning to the world of cause and effect, and mere subjectivity 
comes into contradiction with its own essential postulate of 
instrumental rationality, as a specific relation of means to end.
Taylor graphically depicts this self-opposition, the 
abstraction of subject from object, in the following terms;
Subjectivity thus spawns two worlds, as it were, - 
the unconscious world of nature and the conscious 
one of moral action and history. Having the same 
foundation, the two strive to rejoin each other (28)
However, even at the highly theoretical and artificial 
level on which the model situations were earlier presented, the 
general outline of the reconciliation referred to in the second 
sentence of the above quotation is clearly emergent,being 
indicated by the nature of the problem itself. What is needed is 
for the "players1’ to form a "coalition” (29), in terms of which 
they jointly agree in advance to follow the course of conduct 
which will conduce to the commonly desired end, or even to be 
forced to do so. (in Mackie's example, Tom and Dan both consent 
to being chained to their respective posts, provided that this is 
also done to the other (30)).
In this movement, in which the counsels of immediate 
advantage are subordinated, "first-personal” (31) modes of 
reasoning are superceded in favour of "omni-personal" (31) 
considerations, and, corresponding to this, categorical rules of 
just conduct emerge from the abrogation of hypothetical maxims of
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action. Categorical rales are normative, not‘merely prudential, 
and also possess the dimension of universality in addition to that 
of generality. It is by this means that objective rationality 
comes to be realised. Nor can it be doubted that what is 
objectively rational in any given problem situation is logically 
determinate, since it is already implicit in the subjective 
rationality which objective rationality abrogates by becoming 
explicit. This follows whether we endorse the postulated aim or 
not, since all the hypothetical situations discussed above are 
fully reversible,, in that, in the first, as has been remarked, 
attempts by each prisoner to secure as .severe a sentence as 
possible would secure sentences of one year each, instead of five 
years. Similarly, in the second, if the aim were to receive as 
little money as possible, the players would be led to converge 
upon the outcome in terms of which both receive $1,000,000 instead 
of $1,000, and, in the third, if Tom and Dan were to try to be 
killed in action, each would have his chance of survival increased 
from 20% to 50%* this objective rationality, this inner,
though hidden unity of purpose which enables law and morality to 
enter into existence; and if it were not so hidden, then law and 
morality would be unnecessary and indeed inconceivable.
We have thus far attained a general and formal account of 
the role which norms of conduct play in human affairs, but if the
resulting understanding is to provide a basis for deducing not
only why but what rules are required, then we must have recourse
to that particular form of alienation which is specific to and
immediately precedes the original institution of human society, and 
which therefore underlies the account of the emergence of societal 
rules as such, and not merely of any particular rule or rules.
The analysis of this condition of estrangement finds its classic 
exposition in Thomas Hobbes’ book Leviathan (32), and is identified 
as "the state of nature”, the negation of society. (33) The line 
of argument which I adopt is that such an analysis affords a 
perception of the essential function of societal rules, and hence 
yields a means to the deduction of their proper substance. To an 
exposition of Hobbes I accordingly proceed.
In the beginning (that is, at the necessary starting.point 
of cultural evolution), the individual mind is confronted by others
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and (as we have seen) by the physical world as wholly alien 
phenomena, terrifying and incomprehensible. As between individuals, 
it is the age characterised by the paradox of absolute freedom; 
if one defines freedom as an uncurtailed immunity from the possibility 
of constraint by others, it is clear that total freedom for more 
than one person is wholly impossible. Here, there is no property, 
no contract, and therefore no division of labour; consequently, the. 
increased production and efficiency which this last makes possible 
is lost. (34) There are those on.the political left (35) wno 
contend that the identifying- feature of the law is that is is 
the means whereby all instruments of production are reserved to 
the direction of the predatory classes; this view does not go far 
enough, for in the state of nature, not only can there be no private 
ownership of capital, but no capital at all. The division of the 
population into classes presupposes a relative degTee of social 
stability. This idea, which is corroborated in general terms by 
John Stuart Mill (36) is expressed by Adam Smith thus;
It is only under the shelter of the civil magistrate 
that the owner of the valuable property which is 
acquired by the labour of many years or perhaps of 
many successive generations can sleep a single night 
in security (37)
Human reason has not yet attained to the stage of development 
where contract might emerge; no exchange of entitlements takes 
place, for the quite simple reason that, as yet, no entitlements 
exist, by reason of the diffidence with wnich men behold one 
another, nothing is produced, for fear that others will come 
armed against them; the necessary but unintended consequence of 
this joint inefficiency of conduct, this opposition of the partic­
ular to the general interest, (38) rooted in the material 
conditions of life, is that all are condemned to the most degraded 
subsistence, they are as "the ravens; for they neither sow or 
reap; which neither have storehouse nor barn" (39)« ■
For whilst reason would direct Robinson Crusoe to make
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efforts towards the cultivation of crops and so forth, in order 
that his material environment might 'be determined to the 
satisfaction of his (single) will, the introduction of further 
rational self-interested inhabitants to the island procures a 
curious inversion; for this same rationality will now direct our 
isolated self-interested individual not to expend his efforts on 
the cultivation of crops, since these will only be Appropriated try 
another, by force or stealth. Subjective rationality, as
arbitrary will which in deciding may proceed... 
by using intelligence to calculate which impulse 
will give most satisfaction, (40)
secures its own self-abrogation, as we have seen. Here, 
the consequence of a general pattern of individuals acting in 
pursuance of the immediate advantage over others, that is producing 
nothing, and attempting to appropriate the fruits of others’ labours 
will clearly bring about a condition of things in which nothing 
whatsoever is produced, and the needs of the various competing 
agents go unsatisfied. And this is not because of any lack of 
subjective rationality, but rather at its behest.
Men are led to a life of total conflict, not because any 
among them wish this to be so, but through the necessity for 
launching pre-emptive strikes against potential aggressors; the 
demand for security directly promotes and indeed necessitates the 
radical insecurity of life. Consequently, each and every individual 
is drawn into an all-engulfing contest for the necessities of life, 
(which themselves become ever more scarce as the struggle grows 
in intensity; a vicious circle is thus established) beHum omnium
contra omnes; a war, as with all wars, in v/hich there are no victors.
Alienation can in any epoch and in any form have attributed to it 
a definite social cost; for conflict implies destruction, quite 
apart from the general pattern of misdirection of human endeavours;
Being distracted in opinions concerning the best use 
and application of their strength, they (men) do not
help but hinder one another, and reduce their strength
by mutual opposition to nothing. (41)
The same holds true for disharmony in any form. To take
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.but a few examples tnere were the vast resources, urgently 
required for other purposes, consumed in the insanity of World 
War 1; and at the present time, coldSsal wealth is being expended 
on nuclear weapons, together, for example, with the cost of 
maintaining a standing army and a police force, all of this having 
its origin in the separation of man from man. (42) It is indeed 
strange that Hobbes's famous aphorism "solitary, poor, nasty, 
brutish and short” (43)» as applied to the quality of life in the 
state of nature, is invariably quoted in the shortened form of 
the last three adjectives alone; I should have thought that the 
operative concept was "solitary”. Tne lasting value of Hobbes's 
meisterwerk is that it provides us with a model of unreason, the 
absence of community, its central conceptions being' applicable 
to disharmony of purpose in any form. It is in this basic model 
that we come to perceive the paradigm form of estrangement, or 
alienation, a theme which emerges repeatedly throughout history in 
many guises, until finally overcome by an eventual ideal ordering 
of things; it is in these terms that Hegel's central thesis to 
the effect that human history develops as a progression along' the 
way of the resolution of successive forms Of alienation is to be’ 
best understood. For what we are here considering is indeed 
alienation in the Hegelian sense (in the German "trennung"), in 
that since the actions of separate individuals engaged in
competition give rise, as we have seen, to new mechanical laws
detached from and external to will, it entails tne separation of 
subject from object in addition to tne estrangement of subjective 
minds one from the other. The fundamental contradiction consists 
in that subject as finite spirit of necessity enters into
opposition with itself as externalised object. Purtner, as we
have observed, alienation entails the separation of the subject 
from himself, as both a phenomenal and a noumenal will can be 
distinguished. That is, the subject will essentially wish to 
pursue conduct which maximises the production of objects of 
value, and conduces to stability, and yet is constrained by his 
external circumstances to pursue conduct which directly 
contributes to the frustration of this commonly shared end.
It is by the power of the negative, and through successive 
determinate intermediate stages that the principle of
liberty or freedom subject to constraints comes to self-assertion; 
the earlier analysis concerning the resolution of the tension as 
between the universal and particular wills by means of rules of 
conduct applies no less to the state of nature than to the various 
hypothetical constructs considered earlier, the substance of these 
rules being determined by the nature of the impasse. In the words 
of Hobbes,
And reason suggesteth convenient articles of
peace, upon which men may be drawn to
agreement. (44)
The eventual completion of this movement tov/ards the 
principle of freedom under the law heralds the advent of civil 
society, of which more shall be said presently. (45)
Abstracting from the foregoing, it is now possible to 
arrive at a statement of the characteristic function of the 
institution of societal norms, as consisting in the following 
objectives, in descending order of generality;
1. Advancement of sentient will. This much follows from 
the fact that the institution of rules of conduct is a functional 
device, without the need for any further enquiry as to what the 
function is. It should however be observed that the concept of 
will itself progresses within the process of historical develop­
ment, and that the conceptual development of the Idea of Right 
follows the latter phases in the development of the Idea of will.
2. Following from this, the reconciliation of subjective 
and objective rationality, in which movement the intimate connection 
between will and Right is made clear, in that within it subjective 
will is simultaneously abrogated and yet conserved as an element
of the latter,
3. Hence, the maint'C.nance of conditions of security of 
person, possession, and exchange, within which an overall picture 
of harmonious interaction and social co-operation can emerge. It
. can thus be seen that the chief point of departure of the present 
essay from utilitarianism in any form, lies in the contention 
that the telos of Right is considerably more specific and 
determinate than the indefinitely wide concept of utility.
At this juncture, one refinement presents itself as
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necessary; thus far, I have dealt only with the function of 
societal rules, and I have not adequately distinguished between 
legal and positive moral systems. Throughout, the implication 
has been that both have their origin in social convention; in the 
case of morality, rules and usages arise directly out of convention, 
whereas legal rules are formulated and promulgated by institutions 
which owe their rule-creating capacity to it. One further 
distinction is that legal norms tend to be associated with coercive 
sanctions (46), and accordingly, with a view to elucidating the 
role of the specifically legal normative systems in human affairs,
I shall now turn my attentions to the task of explaining the 
function of sanctions.
We have thus far seen that the more-or-less universal 
observance of certain rules of conduct is essential and 
indispensible to the maintenance of social life. Indeed, one 
consequence of my earlier equation of a society with its 
characteristic normative structure is that conduct which is 
inherently .right is that which is simultaneously inherently social.
(47).
However, even if spontaneous observance, based on the
wider conception of rationality, and indeed of self-interest,
could be miraculously induced overnight, such an arrangement would 
be intrinsically unstable. Why this is so, and for what purpose 
coercive sanctions are thus made necessary, is made pellucidly 
clear by J.R. Lucas, who states that (48)
Although we can all see that civilised society is
better for all of us than the state of nature, 
each one of us can also see that he would be better 
off still if he did not keep the agreement while 
the others did. ■ -
He continues,
It is easy to revert ... to the more limited rationality 
which does not enter into the reasoning of others but, 
taking them for granted as external entities, seeks 
simply to maximise one's own payoff in the given 
situation. There is a standing temptation to cheat.
And men being frail, some will succumb. And once the 
condition of everyone’s keeping the agreement fails
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it seems pointless to keep it oneself, and the 
whole agreement breaks down. Conventions are doubly 
vulnerable. Everyone is tempted, and once anyone 
yields to temptation, the rationale of others 
resisting is weakened, if not destroyed.
Lucas employs the expression "moral mugs" (49) to describe 
those who continue to observe social standards of conduct after 
others have ceased to do so. It will be recalled from the basic 
model pay-off matrix that those following' this pattern of behaviour 
will fare even worse than if they had abandoned all conventions.
This is the factor which, as we have seen, creates a strong 
element of self-sacrifice. And, after all, we are here concerned 
with a social arrangement involving not two, but many, agents; it 
will of course be observed that the larger the number of agents 
involved, the less is the likelihood of universal compliance 
proving to be viable; particularly since not even simple 
subjective rationality can in all cases be assumed.
by means of an analogy with queuing;; and queue-jumping (50), 
Lucas argues that any convention can survive a small number of 
violators seeking only maximum advantage for themselves, but that 
beyond a certain point the whole arrangement collapses, since most 
people will adhere to conventions only on the condition that a 
considerable majority of others do likewise. There is a clear 
analogy here with the concept of unstable equilibrium in physics - 
and, indeed, the savagery of the state of nature can equally be 
likened to stable equilibrium. Since society, in all its forms,
perches precariously over the pit of savagery, an element of
artificial stability requires to be introduced, and this is
ftf-
provided by the authoritive deployment of force. Lucas sustains 
the queue .analogy by quoting (91) B.G. Mitchell as having written 
that;
The presence of a policeman ready and able to deter 
potential queue-jumpers would reinforce the disposition, 
of the ordinary man - tne man waiting for the
Clapham omnibus - to keep nis position in the queue.
Social disintegration, if it goes unchecked, is an 
accelerating process, since, the observance of rule-governed
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behaviour breaks down swiftly, and at an ever* increasing rate, 
once the movement has begun, (52) It is thus the function of 
coercive (legal) sanctions to deter that minority of reprobate 
individuals who cannot otherwise be persuaded to behave other than 
in accordance with direct personal advantage or even' wantonness, 
and by this means to prevent the "snowball" of social collapse 
from reaching an uncontrollable velocity.
We in fact arrive at a perception of law as the specific 
means by which social, real rationality is made actual in the 
minds and practices of men, standing in opposition to the total 
estrangement of the state of nature. Our enlarged conception of 
rationality thus roughly corresponds to "the state of rational 
freedom" (53) earlier discussed, in which each subject directly 
and rationally comprehends the.basis by means of which one rule 
or system can rationally be preferred to all alternatives, and 
simultaneously finds this rationality duplicated and confirmed in 
the actual structures and practices of his own community.
The single element which gives systematic identity to 
the various inconveniences of the state of nature is the radical 
separation of man from man, Hobbes’s vi sion affords us an 
illustration of the intimate logical connection of a condition 
of things with its opposite; the Idea of law or of social reason 
in its highest realisation or development slumbers latent within 
it. In the philosophy of Aristotle (54)> the essence of anything 
developing is one and the same as its purpose, end or highest 
condition of development. Development is the actualisation of 
potentialities inherent in the nature of the entity itself; thus 
it is that the Ideal-together with the various successive phases 
of social organisation entered into by man in the course of his 
. cultural evolution follow by the force of logical necessity 
from the facts.-of personal existence. All that remains, as it is 
with all processes of reasoning, is for what is already implicit 
to be rendered explicit.
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(iii) On the Development of Human Society,
Necessity, then, gives rise to the first form of social 
grouping, based on the natural family; but as with all other stages 
of social development, as a particular form of the general 
tendency of the thing in an imperfect state of development to 
transform itself into its opposite, cohesion on one level serves 
merely to satisfy the precondition for alienation to re-assert 
itself at a, higher level. This tendency of cohesion to produce 
conflict at a higher level is no simple one-way relationship of 
cause to effect, but is rather one of bilateral causation; as 
a logical category, the relationship is characterised by Hegel . 
as weschelwirkung (55)* Thus cohesion may frequently arise in 
response to the threat of a common enemy, so that social solidarity 
is founded upon the solid base of the co-incidence of material 
interests (56),
And so the conflict rages on; men stand united, but only 
against each other. The state of nature determines its own 
solution,- but simultaneously militates against its implementation; 
it is this factor which fixes the successive phases of social 
advance. Solidarity within tne clan grows in proportion to 
externalised antagonism, which induces further conflict, and so on, 
in vicious and ascending spiral. Unflinching loyalty to one’s 
own faction, rather than the objectivity which underlies the 
universally applicable norms of justice, becomes a necessity for 
continued personal survival; as recorded by the Old Testament (57)» 
the destruction of members of other opposing tribes is considered 
morally neutral, or even meritorious. Men are thrown upon an 
endless,series of vendettas, or reprisals and counter-reprisals. 
With ever intensifying animosity, this tendency escalates, the 
antagonisms deepen; a modern parallel is afforded by the sectarian 
feuds of Northern Ireland. (58) In this divided state of social 
unreason, all that flourishes is hatred that is mutual, bitter and 
ensconced; bitterness escalates in direct proportion as the memory 
of the origins of the quarrel recedes.
There will be those who reject my account of the anarchic 
phase which immediately precedes the rise of private property, 
and who give preference to Marx’s depiction of primitive
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communism (59)» an idyllic phase peopled by not so distant cousins 
of Rousseau’s "noble savage" (60), holding the means of production, 
i.e. the land, in common. On the contrary, I would hold that 
insofar as such community ever existed, it did so only within small, 
isolated clans, and only within the context of a general social 
discord. Further, I would contend that the experience of the 
endemic violence of medieval Scotland (61) is by itself practically 
■sufficient warrant for dismissing the Marxian account as being in 
this respect largely fictitious.
The question of the beginning is of not inconsiderable 
significance; a pillar of the Marxian account is the view that 
communism represents the original and authentic expression of 
human nature that must sooner or later reassert itself, bringing 
with it the withering away of the coercive machinery of law and 
state (62), so that temporarily submerged essence takes the place 
occupied by hidden, undeveloped essence in the Aristotelian account 
of destiny. With the assertion of the less optimistic view, the 
question becomes not so much one human nature (63), but rather one 
of human potentiality, what can be achieved, given human limitations. 
Thus for example, the entire concept of social development comes to 
revolve around such questions as that of whether war, or rather, 
antagonism generally, is an immutable feature of the human condition, 
or whether it can be satisfactorily explained as being produced 
out of circumstances external to the human volition.
At a certain stage of social development, then, the main 
problem is that of suppressing the endless blood-feuds, and 
particularly the need to restrict the impulse for revenge. The 
principle of an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth (64) arises 
out of the need to satisfy and thus contain tnis impulse in such 
a manner as to terminate disputes, especially prior to tne emergence 
of legal organs. (&5) Thus by the creative force of social 
convention, two acts in themselves distinguishable if at all only 
by order of sequence, become characterised as logical opposites, 
as crime and punishment, delict and sanction, abduction and arrest, 
intimidation and deterrence, and so forth. The absolute 
historical necessity of a charismatic priesthood arises here also, 
for at this stage it is only by means of an appeal to mens’ 
belief in the supernatural that they can be induced to accept
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principles of any kind. There arises, however, as a direct 
consequence of this appeal to superstition a curious inversion; 
the rules of convention are not comprehended for what they are, 
but rather come to be viewed as products of divine or at least 
superhuman will, and all moral obligation is conceived of as 
deriving from a prior absolute duty of obedience to God (66).
Prom this arises a taboo conception of morality, consisting solely 
in duties without collateral rights, these having no necessary 
relation whatsoever to human wellbeing. Hence in Leviticus, the 
third book of the Old Testament, God purportedly forbids on pain 
of death by stoning or burning a long catalogue of "wrongs”, 
including homosexuality (67) and witchcraft (67).
This hideous compilation of tribal imaginings came to 
form the basis of the doctrines of the Calvinists, whose pre­
eminence afflicted western Europe in the 16th and 17th centuries 
(68), and discloses a conception of Right of the most severely 
deformed sort.
Under threat of invasion from without, men are led to 
converge upon an absolute monarch, a charismatic figure who seems 
the only means of deliverance from internal chaos and external 
aggression. In the words of Virgil,
But then they may chance to see some man whose 
character and record command their respect. If 
so, they will wait in silence, listening keenly.
He will speak to.them, calming their passions and 
guiding their energies. So, now, all the uproar 
of the Ocean subsided. (69)
And, later, they converge upon the hereditary principle, 
which, for all its defects, presents itself as the necessary and 
inescapable solution to the debilitating scramble for power and 
consequent lapse ■into disorder and anarchy that accompany the 
monarches demise (70). Equally, the hereditary principle 
provides a means to a stable succession of property generally.
The first state to extend beyond the single city arises, based , 
upon the ’’religious and political illusions" (71) oi feudalism.
The social environment comes to be characterised by a rigid social 
and military hierarcny, based upon rights of private property in 
land, which are contingent upon the absolute right of tne king and
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are held in return for allegiance and military support.
Hobbes argued for absolute monarchy on the grounds that 
any limitation of the monarch’s power is a partial obstacle to 
commonwealth (72) and, to begin with, this is entirely true; just 
as at this time har^h, inhuman penalties are necessary also, in 
order that the law becomes a credible deterrent, since at this time 
the vast buln of crime goes undetected, and also because of the 
urgency of the continuous struggle against the regression to 
anarchy. This historical precedent of feudalism, incidentally, 
raises the suspicion that, in the present age, a necessary prelude 
to a stable world unity is tyrannical world domination by a 
single power.
However, here, as elsewhere, we encounter the characteristic 
paradox of social advance; at every step forward, the separation 
of man from man re-asserts itself at a higher level of refinement. 
The progress of human society is simultaneously the progress of 
human division. The rise of the state brings the beginnings of 
conflict between states, and also of conflict between the rulers 
and the ruled; this latter opposition finds its tneological 
expression in Roman Catholicism, and is also paralleled by Plato's 
characterisation and analysis of "Tiiriarchy" (73) > which involved 
the subjugation of the population to an entirely separate minority 
caste of expropriators.
At the base of the feudal hierarchy were the serfs, 
subject workers of the land, relentlessly exploited by church (74) 
and-state alike. They were not the private property of their 
masters but neither were tney free, being tied to the soil and 
compelled to serve them unquestioningly in war as well as in 
peace. Indeed, these mere appendages of tne soil enjoyed no 
great advance on the slavery which tended to be associated with 
the earlier city states; rather, in many respects their condition 
was much worse. In the latter years of Imperial Rome, the slaves 
were accorded a certain modicum of legal protection, while recourse 
to the courts for serfs was by no means universal (75)• Even 
where recourse to the courts was available, the serf had no redress 
against the lord and his'"officials except in the master's own 
court. (The very word "court" is in itself an etymological 
reminder of this feudal past; it originally referred to the court-
64
yard of the lord's castle, in which these early tribunals were 
'held). In any case, it was wholly unnecessary for the lord to 
invoke legal rights against the serf; for it is in the very nature 
of feudalism that rights, such as they are,'are dependent upon and 
flow from those of the superior, and as is most clearly demonstrated 
by the system of land tenure which, as we have seen, forms its 
foundation, ultimately all rights flow from the monarch’s claim 
to all things. •
The most atrocious penalties, moreover, were inflicted 
for acts of rebellion; on the Platonic principle, such divided 
societies are
'"necessarily brutal to their less privileged classes" (7.6) 
The government which lacks the solid foundation of 
ostensible popular consent must resort to naked violence, and 
since this repression further alienates the people, a vicious 
circle is established. In direct proportion there grows a demand 
for an impersonal conception of law, according to which the 
rulers no less than the ruled shall be subject to the rule of law. 
Feudalism of necessity demands blind allegiance, but the clamour 
for moral autonomy asserts itself in the religious sphere in the 
iconoclasm of Reformation (77)» and, later, it is demanded that 
all things shall be made conformable to standards of universal 
reason (78).
Feudal absolutism* however, serves a function which is 
demonstrably historically necessary; it serves to induce a 
sufficient modicum of social cohesion on which civil society, 
which follows it, may flourish. Unfortunately, however, rules 
and institutions do not simply dissolve when their rationale is 
gone, as it were, spontaneously, but rather come to be exalted 
as immutable and essential parts of the eternal, natural order, 
particularly by'those powerful individuals whose interests they 
serve and express.
Against this entrenchment, it is argued by Hegel, that,
once the origination of an institution has been 
shown to be wholly to the purpose and necessary 
in the circumstances of the time, the demands of 
history have been fulfilled. But if this is
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supposed to pass for a general justification of 
the thing itself, it turns out to be the opposite, 
because, since tnose circumstances are no .longer 
present, the institution so far from being justified 
has by their disappearance lost its meaning and 
its right. (79)
.An example of such a rule which has become obsolete in 
this way is the former practice, common throughout the ancient 
world, of killing all the male relatives of a murderer (80). 
Although such norms may have proved indispensible to a former 
age, they cannot but appear "superfluous and inappropriate" (81) 
to the modern era. As well as powerful vested interests, however, 
religion can also prove to be an impediment to change, since, like 
language, it tends to reflect and thereby enshrine existing 
beliefs and values, in s^ch manner as to endow them with a cosmic, 
universal significance entirely beyond the simple dictates of the 
time.
With the rise of the mercantile classes, occasioned by 
the rise of commodity production above the level of the cottage 
industry and by large-scale lucrative foreign trade, the 
feudal regime is forceably overthrown. There appears an urban 
proletariat, driven into the towns both by population growth and 
by enforced displacement from the land. This movement is 
described by Marx (82);
To become a free seller of labour-power, who carries 
his commodity wherever he finds a market, he (the 
labourer) must further have escaped from the regime 
of the guilds, their rules for apprentices and 
journeymen, and the impediments of their labour 
regulations. Hence, the historical movement which 
changes the producers into wage-workers, appears, on 
the one hand, as xheir emancipation from serfdom and 
from the fetters of the guilds, and this (side alone 
exists for our bourgeois historians. But, on the 
other hand, these new freedmen became sellers of 
tnemselves only after tney had been robbed of all 
their own means of production, and of all the 
guarantees of existence afforded by the old feudal 
arrangements. And the history of this, their 
expropriation, is written in the annals of mankind 
in letters of blood and fire.
There follows the industrial revolution, which is the
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genesis of the ordering which is referred to by Hegel as ’’civil 
society" (83), and by Marx as "bourgeois society" (84).
We have seen that in order to be real and absolute, 
mankind's rise out of the state of nature requires a principle of 
total society; insofar as society falls short of a single world 
order, it is self-contradictory, in that it amounts to no more 
than division at a higher level of refinement. Only uncompromised 
union can satisfy the highest actualisation of instrumental, 
objective rationality, and the Kantian requirement of universality. 
But at the far from perfect stage wnich is represented and 
heralded by the advent of the bourgeois nation-state, the artificial 
volition of the Leviathan is that of a berserk madman; both 
without, and, as we shall see in chapter 3, within, enstrangement 
reasserts itself in new and dreadful forms.
As between bourgeois states, the conflict rages on, in a 
manner which bears echoes of tne primeval past, while those 
communities at inferior phases of economic development, by the 
general action of evolutionary supercession, fall prey to their 
more advanced and therefore more powerful neighbours; in this 
respect, as in others, it seems pertinent to question whether 
world history is properly conceived of as a progression at all, 
rather than as a mere cycle of endlessly recurring themes on a 
rising spiral.
Mow, in the place of the individual's self-esteem, there 
arises nationalism, the peculiar conviction that people hold in 
the unique destiny and virtue of their own nation or race. And 
as it is between individuals, where all are intent upon pre-eminence, 
the necessary consequence is conflict, rendered all the more savage 
by scale; peace arises only through humility; The division as 
between states is far from being diminished by the role of 
indoctrination, distortion of fact and propoganda, a role, it 
might be added, considered perfectly legitimate and appropriate 
to the state both by Plato (85) and Hegel (86).
It is this nation state that Hegel bids us worship thus;
"The march of God in the World, that is what the state is" (87) 
and yet, the rationality it affords is imperfect, and its
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objectivity is wholly spurious. In fact, whereas Kant in his 
essay of 1795» Perpetual Peace, (88), looked to international 
government as the only possible means of abolishing war, Hegel 
opposed it, as an intolerable limitation on the sovereignty of 
the so-called ethical universe, the state (89). The inconsistency 
involved in this position, drawn attention to by Russell, seems 
undeniable;
This (the preferring of wholes to parts, i.e. the demand 
for logical and political order) justified him in 
preferring a State to an anarchic collection of 
individuals, but it should equally have led him to 
prefer a world State to an anarchic collection of 
States. (90)
This contradiction is all the more unacceptable since 
Hegel's defence of the state involved him in falling back on 
references to Hobbes' state of nature (91); and certainly, the 
most prominent causes of war bear a more than passing resemblance 
to those principal causes of quarrel between individuals 
identified by Hobbes: "diffidence, competition and glory" (92). 
Imperfect, relative rationality appears as no more than higher 
folly.
On the re-assertion of alienation at this higher level, 
Hobbes himself tells us;
And as small families did then; so now do cities 
and kingdoms which are but greater families, for 
their own security enlarge their dominions, upon 
all pretences of danger, and fear of invasion, or 
assistance that may be given to invaders, and 
endeavour as much as they can, to subdue, or 
weaken their neighbours, by open force, and secret 
arts, for want of other caution, justly; and are 
remembered for it in after ages with honour (93)
As with economic competition, war between the bourgeois 
states is the necessary consequence of the insatiable demands of 
capital for access to natural resources (94)» and of. the 
willingness of the exploiters to sacrifice the exploited on the 
fields of battle. And yet, the essential factor is that conflict 
emerges from the joint inefficiency of conduct between states, as 
a consequence intended by none. Consider in this light the
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following remarks made by David Lloyd George, on the subject of 
World War I;
No-one at the head of affairs quite meant war.
It was something into which tney glided, or rather 
staggered and stumbled. (95) •
It seems highly probable that the idea of war guilt grew
out of a failure to understand the realities of competitive 
interaction. In short, at this stage of World History, the
nations stand in the state of nature as between each other. And
as it was before,
Men of vision see the imperative necessity for 
submerging selfish national feelings in the interest 
of a common humanity. (96)
Thus it is that various attempts at the establishment of 
a new Leviathan come to be made, but by reason of the very 
nature of the estrangement, these have so far foundered. (97)
In passing, it seems pertinent to observe that an International 
Law taking the form of normative relations as between states is 
itself wholly imperfect; while Marx’s quasi-Dhuddist views 
concerning the .solubility and artificiality of individualistic 
motivation (98) remains at the very least, open to question, it 
is clear that the basic person of this form of International Law, 
the nation state, is itself an insubstantial illusion, and, as 
such, entirely soluble. The existence of rights as between states, 
as opposed to rights and duties between individuals on a world­
wide basis, is a contradictory condition of things, and falls far 
snort of the ideal of world order.
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Chapter Two Strands of Bourgeois Ideology
"It (the market order) is.the only procedure yet 
discovered in which information widely dispersed 
among millions of men can be effectively utilised 
for the benefit of all - and used by assuring 
to all an individual liberty desirable for 
itself on ethical grounds." (l)
(i) Introductory
I now turn to consider the liberal theory or conception 
of justice, whose foundations consist in an individualistic 
ethic of private property, economic freedom, and equality before 
the law, and which is the characteristic normative ideology 
pertaining to the capitalist or bourgeois epoch. This approach 
is wholly necessary, since it is specifically as the critique 
or antithesis of this conception of justice that, in the procession 
of ideologies, socialism arises. It is not therefore possible to 
reach a theoretical understanding of socialism in isolation 
from the individualism it negates, any more tnan, as an example, \ 
it would be possible to make sense of Protestant doctrine without 
first being' reasonably clear in one’s mind as to the foundations 
of Roman Catnolicism.
Two recent theses serve the presentaion and defence of 
the liberal conception of justice, although these adopt wholly 
distinct perspectives. They are respectively contained in 
Professor Robert Nozick’s Anarchy, State and Utopia (2), and in 
the second volume of Professor P.A. Hayek's Law, Legislation and 
Liberty With each of these I propose to deal in turn.
(ii) Professor Nozick and the
Principle of Natural Liberty.
"deductions from presupposed conditions which in 
themselves may possess no higher validity ... 
by this means the relative is put in the place 
of the absolute" (4)«
The central concern of Nozick’s Anarchy, State and Utopia
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consists in an analysis of the nature and proper functions of the 
state. It is essentially a natural law position, since postulating 
a criterion of absolute legitimacy extrinsic to the positive 
order, related to a system of values logically (and in principle 
historically) preceding social organisation. To this "law of 
nature", the officers of government are subordinate no less than 
anyone else, and natural law is envisaged as the source and 
criterion of the legitimacy of state action. The "state of 
nature" is discussed here also^  but, as we shall see, it connotes 
for Nozick something not entirely similar to its usage by Hobbes. 
Indeed, -since for Nozick values precede and in no way presuppose 
social organisation, "state" in "state of nature" may not simply 
•mean "condition", but may arguably ue intended to carry the 
connotation of a normative order.
There can be no mistaking Nozick's natural law position, 
referring as he does to "those entitlements and rights that 
most clearly are not socially or institutionally based". (5)
This is especially interesting, since paralleled by the 
dictum; "natural rights existing in the people prior to the 
making of any of our constitutions" in Nunemacher v Statet(6) 
an American case of 1906, in which an inheritance tax was struck 
down as being unconstitutional. The whole of the normative 
sphere is already contained, it would seem, in the natural law, 
leaving it only to the positive order (following Blackstone) to 
determine the "particular conventional details fixed upon in a 
given society" (7)*
In keeping with this approach, he goes on, in a footnote, 
to express severe misgivings concerning the positivist theory of 
sovereignty and . legitimacy resting upon habitual obedience. (8)
At the root of Nozick’s system is the concept of natural 
liberty; individuals are viewed as being sovereign over themselves, 
and are therefore conceived of as being at liberty to transact 
with their fellows as tney will, constrained only by the rights 
of others. (9) This conception of people as "autonomous beings" 
(10) is crucial to the whole theory, for Nozick sees sovereignty 
as resting ultimately not in the state, nor even in some 
relation of social convention to the state, but in the people as 
individuals. Tne positivist would assert that as law is the
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expression of the sovereign will, where there is no sovereign, 
there can be no law. (ll) but tnis need not embarrass Nozick, 
for by his account there is in the state of nature not one, 
but many sovereigns, each individual being sovereign over himself. 
This position must be carefully distinguished from that of 
Rousseau, who considered sovereignty to lie in the "general will"
(12) of the people as a wnole, so that each individual would 
possess not the exclusive right to govern himself, but a right 
to a voice'in the process of legislating for all. Unfortunately 
of course, Rousseau’s position is not inconsistent with the
legitimacy of a tyranny of the majority.
For Nozick it follows;
Tne legitimate powers of a protective 
association are merely the sum of the
individual rights that its members or clients
transfer to tne association. No new rights 
and powers arise; each right of the association 
is decomposable without residue into those 
individual rights held by distinct individuals 
acting alone in a state of nature. (13)
From the premisses of ownership of self (14)» and of 
the essential alienability of entitlements, follows the 
permissibility of committing suicide and indeed of selling 
oneself into slavery (15). Tnis is duly acknowledged by Nozick 
(16), who holds that tne individual may dispose of himself as 
he pleases, except insofar as he has acquired an obligation to 
some other to refrain from doing so. In this, he diverges from. 
Kant, who argued from the second formulation of the categorical 
imperative (17)» (by which Nozick, in other contexts, lays 
great store) to the conclusion that since individuals must be 
treated as ends in themselves, and not merely as means,'and 
since suicide entails using oneself as a termination of one’s 
own suffering, it is not therefore permissible. But, might not • 
the same argument be used against subjecting oneself to the 
immediate discomforture of a visit to the dentist, as a means 
of avoiding the more long-term pa.in of tooth-ache?
According to this account, property is a projection of
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one’s self-ownership onto the material sphere, and thus one is 
entitled to whatever one acquires through the process of free 
transfer of entitlements with others. It essentially follows, 
that individuals cannot justly be compelled to aid others,, 
unless they have bound themselves so to do. (18)
Nozick’s conception of justice is essentially deontolog- 
ical (19), and tnerefore diverges from any teleological account 
of moral action, such as that propounded by Professor G.E. Moore 
in Principia Ethica (20). Nozick claims that morality is concerned 
not with maximising' certain qualities viewed as being good in 
themselves, but with side constraints on action, these constraints 
being defined in terms of the rights of others. This outlook 
is based upon a tailored version of Kant’s second formulation 
of the categorical imperative already referred to, which stipulates 
that we must treat humanity not simply as means but as ends in 
themselves. This, incidentally, is a furtner example of the 
radically different conclusions from those drawn by Kant which 
Nozick derives from the categorical imperative; Kant deduced 
from it a duty of beneficience towards the needy (21) whilst, 
as we shall see, Nozick’s system knows of no such duty. Nozick 
also diverges in this from his other main influence, John Locke, 
who wrote of an individual's
title to so mucn out of another's plenty,
as will keep him from extreme want where
he has no means to subsist otherwise (22)
Tnus, Nozick's position is strongly anti-utilitarian 
not aiming at the greatest happiness of the greatest number, 
nor for that matter at any other consequentialist outcome. It 
strongly rejects the idea of the sacrifice of some for others 
which is implicit in grosser forms of utilitarianism, be the 
sacrifice one of life, body or property. (23) Thus, tax, or 
substance "expropriated for reasons of public utility" (24) 
cannot be justified. For no-one has a right to impose taxes, 
even if a greater net amount of nappiness is the outcome.
Essential to Nozick's account is the denial of the corporatist 
conception of the state; the rights of the state are only those
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delegated to it by its subjects,' and not vice versa. This 
position of course stands in direct contrast to Hegel’s doctrine 
of the transformation of quantity into quality (25), in the 
.context of political relationships. It necessarily follows 
that the rights actually possessed by individuals operate as 
an absolute limitation on legitimate state, action;
What persons may and may not do to one another 
limits wnat they may do through tne apparatus 
of a state. (26)
Further, he rejects political motive as a justification 
(27), and denies that a soldier's responsiblity can in any way 
be delegated to or absolved by the state. Consistently, he rejects 
the concept of corporate personality, not only of the state, but 
also of the business enterprise. Rejected also therefore is 
limited liability, unless specifically written into a firm's 
contracts with outsiders. (28)
So wnere, tnen, do these natural rights come from? It is 
contended that the second formulation of the categorical imperative 
demonstrates that the non-permissibility of violations of the 
liberty of others, and the illegitimacy of their use as a means 
to the hapjjiness of others without their consent, are logically 
implicit in the concept of morality itself. "Thus we have a 
promising sketch of an argument from moral form to moral content".
(29)
Hence, the story proceeds, from form can be derived a 
logically necessary minimum content. It would therefore appear 
that a major part of Nozick’s methodology in expounding the 
substance of the "law of nature" consists in a form of transcend­
ental deduction. It can be demonstrated that the idea of 
individual entitlements over objects is logically implicit in 
the very idea of justice in holdings; for if rights over things 
are not recognised, then it is the case that the system simply 
refrains from regulating relations between persons and objects, 
or rather, between persons with regard to objects. If everyone 
owned everything1, the result would be the same as if no-one
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owned, anything, that is, as if there were no rules relating to 
property. Further, from the concept of entitlement follows the 
right to transfer, since logically continuous therewith, and hence 
gift, barter and sale. In Nozick’s terms,
The central core of the notion of a property right, 
in X, relative to which other parts of the notion 
are to be explained, is the right to determine What 
shall be done with X; the right to choose which of the 
constrained set of options concerning X shall be 
realised or attempted. (30)
This follows Kant, who regarded contract as the "alienation 
of one's substance involved in the very idea of individual rights,”
(31).
(it diverges from the view of-the positivist Kelsen, 
however, who envisaged the power to create rights in others as 
being a quasi-legislative right enjoyed by virtue of delegation 
by the state to the individual (32)). Accordingly, it may be 
contended, free trade and all that that entails is logically 
implicit in the very idea of justice in holdings. Also following 
by logical extension are the concepts of compensation, and so 
forth, although it is difficult to see how punishment, for example, 
can be fitted into an account of this sort. This much, it would 
seem, follows logically from the idea of original sovereignty over 
self; however very little scope, - needless to say, is left for 
public property, even in such things as roads and highways. (33) 
But against this background, can even the minimal state, 
(that is, a state restricted in its activities to protection 
against force, theft and fraud, and to the enforcement of contracts 
(34)) be justified? Nozick set out to establish that it can, 
although no more extensive arrangement is acceptable. . Tne 
individual anarchist (35) would point to two features as 
objectionable; firstly, there is an apparently redistributive 
element, as the minimal state would have to require some to finance 
the protection of those who cannot afford to pay for it, and 
secondly, it claims a monopoly over the legitimate use of force.
To allow a word to Bertrand Russell,
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John Locke ... devoted much thought to' the problem 
of reconciling the maximum of liberty with the 
indispensible minimum of government, a problem 
which his successors in the liberal tradition 
have been occupied with down to the present day. (36)
To surmount this difficulty, Nozick sets out to prove 
the legitimacy of the minimal state, that is, to establish that 
it is not necessarily incompatible with natural liberty. This 
he sets out to do by focussing upon
what arrangements might be made within a state 
of nature to deal with these inconveniences (of 
the state of nature) (37)
Nozick proceeds to trace a hypothetical account of how 
people might have converged upon the minimal state, through 
purchasing protection from ousiness enterprises providing such a 
service. (38) These organisations he refers to as, alternatively, 
"protective associations" (39) and "protective agencies" (40).
I prefer the latter usage, as the key concept would appear to be 
"agency", that is, the delegation of the power to enforce clients’ 
rights. Market pressures lead people in a given area to converge 
upon the same agency, so that a de facto monopoly of organised 
force comes into being. (41)• He also demonstrates that the 
apparently redistributive element of the minimal state, far from 
involving a breach of the natural law, is actually required by it, 
in the form of the principle of compensation, as redress for the 
restriction of people's rignts to defend themselves by unreliable 
procedures. (42) He thus considers that he has refuted the 
principled objections of the individual anarchist. It jnust be 
stressed that Nozick’s position opposes compulsory citizenship, 
and insists that is illegitimate to prevent the individual from 
enforcing his own rignts, without resort to state machinery, or 
to prevent him from joining or even starting a rival protective 
agency (43).
A word must be said in this connection concerning Nozick’s 
methodology. He does not of course intend to suggest that anything 
approximating to his protective agency saga has ever actually 
occurred in the course of human history, but it becomes clear
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that he adopts the procedure of relating stofies, such as the tale 
of the slave (44) as tools of analysis by means of which to 
illuminate the nature of the relations between individuals in 
differing modes of social organisation. Thus the protective agency 
saga serves its explanatory purpose, "even if no actual state 
ever arose that way" (45).
In the present instance, the purpose is that of analysing 
the minimal state as a "spontaneous grouping" (46); since the 
minimal state could have- arisen without anyone’s rights being 
violated,.in the manner described, it is not intrinsically 
offensive to natural liberty. It is open, therefore, to doubt 
whether'the minimal state emerges out of the state of nature, thus 
representing a departure from it, as opposed to existing within it. 
This is especially pressing if one defines the state of nature as 
a condition of perfect freedom, within the bounds of the law of 
nature,
This point is particularly important, since it later becomes 
clear that as all rights are essentially alienable, it follows that 
any form of political structure could arise without anyone's rights 
being violated. It would seem that the crucial difference is that 
Nozick's account justifying the minimal state does not involve 
anyone alienating their rights,* delegation does not entail alienation. 
Hence, the more-than-minirrial state would require each separate 
individual to have actually granted the necessary rights over 
himself.
It is essential to Nozick’s view that the principles of 
justice are historical, not end-state. That is, the justice of a 
distribution depends not on how possessions are distributed under it - 
"crying inequalities in the distribution of wealth" (47) - but on. 
how it came about. The objection to equality, therefore, is not 
based on the belief that there is anytning objectionable about it as 
patterns g.o, but rather upon the rejection of the imposition of 
patterns of any sort. The contention is that as all rights are 
freely transferable, then whatever emerges from a process of 
voluntary alienations is itself just (48). Consider,'incidentally, 
the protest involved in the name of the "7-84" theatre group.
Later in the book, he extends this principle to the concept
of Utopia. The ideal society, he contends, is not predetermined by
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any end-state distributional profile, but is whatever people freely 
choose to live in. ■
The Utopian process is substituted for the 
Utopian end state or other staxic theories 
of Utopias. (49)
He points out that if ;a given hind of society was 
in any meaningful sense the best possible, then the practice of 
coercing people to live in it would be unnecessary and superfluous; 
and in any case, it is only within the framework of free association 
that the fraternal feeling, which'is so much depended upon by 
socialists and other Utopian thinkers, could flourish. The ideal 
society would have to be discovered by means of the evolutionary. 
filter process of trial and rejection. (50) So by this route he 
ohce more reaches the conclusion that the criterion of political 
justice lies in the principle of voluntary association. Once more, 
he echoes Kant;
the touchstone of everything that can be concluded 
as a law for a people lies in the question whether 
the people could have imposed such a law on itself (51)•
It follows from this that the same, not separate principles 
of justice govern both micro ana macro situations, that is, both 
situations writ small and writ large (52). This gives rise to
one of the more important weapons in Nozick’s armoury, that is,
the device of testing possible principles of justice in 
hypothetical micro-situations. If it were otherwise, there would 
be little basis for arguing from analogy, or indeed principles 
at all.
Accordingly, the concept of justice in holdings can be 
resolved into three principles - acquisition, transfer and 
rectification. The criterion for whether an object is justly held, 
that is, owned, is in all cases that of whether it was legitimately
appropriated by its.original owner, and whether entitlement can be
traced back to him through an uninterrupted series of voluntary 
transfers.
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No-one is entitled to a holding except by (repeated) 
applications of the principle of justice in acquisition 
and the principle of justice in transfer. (53)
The principle of rectification is required exclusively 
where this has gone wrong, that is, where there has been a violation 
of an entitlement, such as an act of theft. Thus, the legitimate 
operation of the state apparatus is restricted to rectification.
It is not needed for the achievement but merely the maintenance 
of distributive justice, since this arises spontaneously. It 
follows from this that in the absence of improper inducement to 
contract, such as blackmail or direct coercion, there will be no 
element of exploitation. The just distribution of tne benefits of 
exchange rests not upon what the distribution is, but upon its 
having been freely assented to, aggregatively, as it were, through 
the myriad exchanges which are entered.into by particular' transacting 
individuals. Nozick’s thesis discloses no conception of just price 
other than the formal criterion of what is actually agreed upon, 
and advocates "market determination of the mutual benefits of . 
excnange" (54)»
Against Marx’s thesis that the seemingly free transactions 
of civil society serve only to mask a process of exploitation that 
is "naked, shameless, direct, brutal" (55)» even as compared to 
that of feudalism, it is Nozick's position that there is no 
entitlement to be in a position of equal Dargaining strength. Thus 
a contract is still voluntary, even if the employee is "faced with 
working or starving" (5&)»
He further denies the Marxian concept of economic 
exploitation by pointing out that, in terms of Marx’s analysis, (57)> 
"there will be exploitation in any society in which investment takes 
place for .a greater future product" (or even to maintain existing 
machinery) ... "and in any society in which those unable to work, 
or to work productively, are subsidised by the labour of others."
(58)
It would appear from Nozick’s account, however, tnat there 
is nothing ille.gitimate in the fact of workers combining in order 
to enhance their overall bargain power. He refers to "groups of 
workers first reaching some joint agreement and then.presenting a 
package to an entrepreneur".(59)• He also states, "A group of us 
may band together" (60).
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By tne same argument however, neither would, there be any 
breach of the law of nature should employers or retailers form a 
cartel to depress wages or to force up prices.
It is as well to point out here the distinction that Nozick 
draws between desert and entitlement; justice depends solely on 
the latter. It follows that the justice of a transfer, contrary 
to common assumption*, has nothing to do with the moral desert of the 
recipient, but rests upon the entitlement of the donor.
\
Any person may give to anyone else any holding 
he is entitled to, independently of whether the 
recipient morally deserves to be the recipient. (61)
He rejects the notion that entitlement disappears or is 
reduced above a certain level of wealth, or over., prof its from 
investment.of capital.In this . connection consider the system of 
graduated taxation, and the distinction drawn by British tax law 
as between ''earned" and "unearned" income (62). It is partly on 
this ground that Nozic& opposes Rawls, since Rawls contends that
shares stem from differential natural endowments, 
which are not deserved, and that the task of justice 
is to rectify these arbitrary facts and inequalities (63)
Thus Rawls conceives it to be the specific purpose of 
distributive justice is to nullify all accidents of natural 
endowment and social circumstance,
Nozick, who also denies Rawls' postulate that social 
co-operation creates the problem of distributive justice, (63) 
counters with the principle that entitlement resting upon 
ownership of self is the sole criterion of justice, and that to 
this question, moral desert is irrelevant.
Whether or not people's natural assets are arbitrary 
from a moral point of view they are entitled to them, 
and to what flows from them (64)
Further, Nozick doubts that once the individual has been 
denuded of his various personal attributes, any intelligible semblance 
of personality remains, and therefore he also doubts the basis of
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the distinction drawn between people and their natural endowments.
(65).
In Nozick’s theory, free trade emerges as the logically 
indispensible minimum content of justice in holdings, implied in 
the very concept of entitlement. As I have pointed out, Nozick 
acknowledges no substantive conception of just price, and this 
removes the possibility of "wage/price control" (66), (and also 
import control), since on this view regulation in the context of 
rents amounts to "the partial expropriation of the owner" (67).
(Consider in this light the Succession (Scotland) Act 1964, 
which restricts the testator's freedom to dispose of his property 
by entrenching provision for the testator's relict and progeny.
Does this constitute the partial expropriation of the deceased?)
In Legal'Values in Western Society (68), by Peter Stein 
and John Shand, steps to "preserve health, or safety standards, 
or where fair rents or minimum wages are fixed by statute" are 
cited as examples of the mediative capacity of government. This 
is in direct contradiction to Nozick's position which holds such 
action to amount to asymetric intervention on behalf of one or other 
of the parties. As Nozick points out, the practical consequence 
of such legislation is that certain transactions between individ­
uals, even where no third party interests are affected, are forbidden. 
"The socialist society would have to forbid capitalist acts between 
consenting adults" (69). This view is apparently vindicated by 
Marx himself, in the phrase, "The Communistic abolition of buying 
and selling" (70)». A scrutiny of modern British legislation 
reveals abundant instances. Thus, for example, under the Consumer 
Credit Act 1974 arid the Rent Acts, there are a number of provisions 
which we cannot omit from our contract, once we have decided to 
enter into it, and under the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977> there 
is an indeterminate number of provisions which we cannot lawfully 
put in.
At the same time as being a theory of distributive justice, 
in tne broad sense, the "entitlement theory" (71) undercuts the 
concept of distributive justice, in the narrow sense by denying 
that any organised process of distribution should take place at all. 
"The term Distributive Justice is not a neutral one" (72) in that it 
implies and presupposes central distribution of a supply of goods.
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(The converse, "contributive justice" (75) is equally inapplicable 
to Nozick's system). Tne entitlement theory is. a natural law theory 
in the further important respect that it upholds the distribution 
which spontaneously arises, as opposed to that which is brought 
about by conscious direction.
Nozick's account of natural law largely depends upon 
arguing- from form to content, and there follows from this the concept 
of the tension between formal and substantial equality. Nozick, 
like Professor Unger (74)> is quick to point out that the imposition 
of substantial equality, far from treating people equally or fairly, 
entails an abandonment of neutrality as between the well-off and 
the not so well-off. "Whence" he asks, "the asymmetry?" (75)•
(Formal equality, it should be pointed out, is not an end-state (76) 
principle, whereas substantial equality is).
According to tnis analysis,
Taxation of earnings is on a par with forced labour ... 
it is like forcing the person to work ... for another's 
purpose (77)
Thus, contrary to the Marxian position that bourgeois 
society simply replaces feudalism with an alternative mode of 
expropriation of the mass of the people, and that this finally 
ends with the coming of socialism, according to Nozick's analysis, 
socialism involves a regression to feudalism, with some (i.e. the 
less well endowed) occupying
privileged positions based upon illegitimate 
interventions directly or through government, 
into other people's lives (78)
Much the same might be said of state expropriation from 
the benefits of exchange, as by Capital Gains Tax, and Value Added 
Tax.
He also observes that the means of production which "others 
have saved to bring into existence", (75) or what amounts to the 
same thing-, capital, is not absolutely different as an object of 
property from revenue, and that
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private property even in the means of production 
would occur in a socialist society that did not • 
forbid people to use as they wished some of the 
resources they are given under the socialist 
distribution. (80)
Continuing his scrutiny of the various concepts central 
to left-wing positions, and their subsequent rejection, he considers 
the various general rights which are frequently insisted upon, that 
is the right to work, equality of opportunity, the right to 
education, medical aid and so on. He rejects these on the grounds 
of their inconsistency with the substructure of particular entitle­
ments over specific objects.
No rights exist in conflict with the substructure 
of particular rights. Since no neatly contoured 
right to achieve a goal will avoid incompatibility 
with this substructure, no such rignts exist. The 
particular rights over things fill the space of 
rights, leaving no room for general rights to be in 
a certain material condition (81)
A similar treatment is given to alienation, 'meaningless 
work, and to workers1 control. The first two of these categories, 
he observes, have no necessary connection with capitalism, but 
seem to be a problem of industrialised society generally. (82).
The last, he demonstrates, may well be incompatible with socialism;
Since a system of syndicalist factories would involve 
great inequalities of income among workers in different 
factories (with different amounts of capital per worker 
and different profitability), it is difficult to see 
why people who favour certain egalitarian end-state 
patterns think this a suitable realisation of their 
vision. (8$)
A similar thought is expressed by Professor T. 13. Campbell;
The idea of workers’ control in each unit of production 
is not a socialist conception since it simply transfers 
the notion of the (private) ownership of the means of 
production from one group to another. (84)
It is not, however, incompatible with capitalism. Trade
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Unions now have considerable wealth at their disposal - Donaldson 
estimates reserves belonging to British Unions at £120,000,000 (35); 
there is nothing to prevent them from financing democratically-run 
worker controlled factories. So v/hy, JMozick asks ., do they not do 
so?
It is too easy to dwell exclusively upon the right-wing 
implications of the entitlement theory; but in other respects it is 
positively radical, fozick also opposes himself to conscription
(86), the prohibition of the use of drugs, and the restriction of 
permitted sexual activity.
Similarly, the practice of compelling jurors and witnesses,
(87), and the curtailment of the liberty to transact with whom one 
wishes - discriminating if one so desires on grounds of race, 
religion or sex (88) - are both rejected.
The most radical feature of the entitlement theory consists 
in that it cannot be slotted into any standard political pigeon­
hole, but rather presents a fundamental cnallenge to each and every 
established position. Its greatest attraction consists in that it 
scrutinises the articles of faith of the day; in a penetrating 
(analysis, even democracy is called into question, for, just as the 
entitlement theory is a tneory of distributive justice which at the 
same time calls the concept of distributive justice into question, 
it is also a political theory which undercuts the realm of politics. 
(89) The concept of democracy appears to presuppose the more-than- 
minimal state; the minimal state that does no more than protect 
people from violence, theft and fr&vd and enforce contracts, 
does not involve government in any political sense. Apart from 
those decisions that particular persons are entitled to make by 
virtue of entitlement over self or property,
it is not clear that there are any decisions remaining
about which even to raise the question of whether I
have a right to a say in those that importantlv affect me.
(90)
It is, after all, tne rights of the individual that are • 
being defended, be it against a one-headed or a myriad-headed 
master. To live in a perfect democracy is to have a part-share 
in the decision of how much of each individual's property to 
appropriate, and on what to spend it, and to have everyone else
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hold and exercise reciprocal claims over oneself. Democracy is 
collectivism, with the institution of property qualifications on 
voting rights (91) forming an intermediate stage in the transition 
from private property. The right to control is the right to own; 
both can equally be subsumed under the concept of "dominium'1 (92) 
This tension between private property, on the one hand, 
and democracy on the other, was well illustrated in the case of 
Regina v The Greater London Council, ex parte Bromley London " 
Borough Council (93)» in which there was contested the legitimacy 
of a subsidised travel scheme, notwithstanding that this had been 
implemented in fulfilment of an election promise . Lord Denning, 
then the Waster of the Rolls, .construed •. the relevant legislation 
to decide in favour of private property, and issued the following 
dictum;
A manifesto issued by a political party in order 
to get votes (is) not lo be regarded as a gospel.
It (is) not a covenant. (94)
Via the entitlement theory, then, the distinction between 
distributive and political justice collapses, and are one, as 
does the division between private and public law, since precisely 
the same principles fall to be applied as between individuals, and 
as between the individual and the state.
To Nozick’s theory, however, there are a great many 
objections. I  am greatly aided in this connection by Professor 
Nozick himself, as a persuasive and substantial critique might be 
constructed on the strength of his professed misgivings alone.
These objections centre largely upon the question of the nature 
and status of moral norms. (95) Nozick assumes tnese to be 
objectively valid, in no way dependent upon general acceptance, 
and thus to be a part of the world in much the same way as are 
physical facts. But science, in its scrutiny of the natural 
environment, discloses only facts, not values; how then, if the 
norms of justice do indeed have this status, can they be discovered, 
and their substance be Known? .
It is clear that such values cannot be discovered by 
empirical investigation, and thus Nozick is thrown at times, by 
his naturalism, upon naked assertion and at others upon a
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neo-Kantian attempt to show certain norms to be somehow contained 
in the recesses of the fabric of reason itself. As a consequence, 
he appears to attribute more importance to the rights thus unearthed 
than to the interests they protect. Thus, although there is a 
right to life in the negative sense that none are permitted to 
murder, there is no necessary right to the essential means of 
support. Of need he says, MI reject the criterion of justice 
which includes it1 (9&)*
In this connection, it is tempting to speculate whether, 
if tomorrow there was to be discovered, with conclusive certainty
an objectively valid set of moral norms having no necessary
connection with human wellbeing, it would be of the slightest 
importance to any living creature, and whetner there would be any 
point whatsoever in rendering allegiance to it.
Nozick fails to consider - indeed, he abdicates 
responsiblity for the task - whether the side constraints derived 
from rights are absolute. "The question of whether these side- 
constraints are absolute ... is one I hope largely to avoid." (97)
It is as well to have resort to Nozick’s own device of
trying out principles in hypothetical microsituations. May not
casks belonging to another be thrown overboard to save a sinking 
ship? And consider the following. Suppose you are in company 
with two men, one of whom falls ill, and you know that his life
can only be saved if he can be taken to hospital, and that the
only means of doing so is to drive him there in the motor car 
belonging to the third man, which he witholds. (As he is perfectly
entitled to do, by Nozick’s account, in the absence of any
contractual obligation to the contrary.) Would you not be justified 
in employing your superior force to requisition the car for this 
essential purpose?
It is also interesting to speculate wnether, if Nozick’s 
thesis is correct, entitlements are exhaustive of the whole field 
of moral philosophy. Is there nothing more that might be said? 
Consider in this light the case of the Mayor of Bradford v Pickles 
(98), in whicn it was said by Lord MacNaugnten concerning a land­
owner who drained his lands, for no other purpose than to deprive
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a nearby community of its water supply, "1-Ie. may be churlish, 
selfish and grasping. His conduct may seem shocking to a moral 
philosopher". ('99)
And yet, the landlord was held to be acting within his 
rights as delineated by his property entitlements (100), and so 
the court found in his favour. Might it therefore be said, by way 
of conjecture, that there are moral duties of a weaker, and non- 
juridical, nature, not creative of corresponding rights in others?
All of which brings us face to face with the question of 
the status of property rights. Can they really be a part of the 
natural order, and absolute, or are they merely rules adopted as a 
device for the promotion of human-prosperity, and, by extension, 
in some way subordinate thereto?
There is an important respect in which Nozick's thesis' 
does not appear to be a theory of justice at all, insofar as, at 
his own admission, he argues not for but from a certain set of 
values, based upon the assumed ownership of self.
The completely accurate statement of the moral 
background, including the precise statement of the 
moral theory and its underlying basis, would require 
a full-scale presentation and is a task for another 
time. (A lifetime?) That task is so crucial, the 
gap left without its accomplishment so yawning, that 
it is only a minor comfort to note that we are 
following the respectable tradition of Locke, who 
does not provide anything remotely resembling a 
satisfactory explanation of the status and basis of 
the law of nature in his Second Treatise. (lOl)
£-
All of which would seem to be a euphemism for the fact 
that the norms of "natural law" are all simply assumed or fabricated. 
Nozick would appear not even to be attempting to present a complete 
system.
Not inconsistently with this intuitive approach, there 
would even seem to be illicit jumps from description to evaluation. 
For instance, "There are different individuals with separate lives, 
and so no-one may be sacrificed for others." (102)
Without further argument, Nozick's "entitlements" can never 
advance beyond the level of unsupported value judgements.
Nozick bases his system upon man's alleged natural liberty.
(105)
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But many, as we saw in chapter 2, for example'Hobbes and Hegel, 
have denied that man is by nature in a condition of freedom (unless 
in the spurious sense which implies no more than absence of obligation. 
This form, in which freedom most immediately and abstractly presents 
itself, was not of course taken very seriously either by Hobbes or 
by Hegel) and have asserted that it is only by means of an elaborate 
social organisation that man’s freedom is made real.
Nozick’s consideration of the inconveniences of the state 
of nature does not go far enough; far from it being the case that 
it is difficult to enforce one’s rights, the specific defect consists 
in that there are no rights, only interests that go almost entirely 
unfulfilled. In the words of Hobbes,
They (justice and injustice) are qualities that 
relate to men in society, not in solitude. It is 
consequent also to the same condition, that there, 
be no propriety, no dominion, no mine and thine 
distinct; but only that to every man’s that he can 
get; and for so long as he can keep it. (104)
The state of nature is, both in the sense in which the 
term is used by Hobbes, and in the sense in which it is used by 
Nozick, the negation of the political state; it is also, as I have 
argued (105) on the basis of the Hobbesian model outlined in 
chapter 2, the effective negation of .society. As such, it consists 
in the radical separation of man from man, manifested in the 
opposition' of the general to the immediate individual interest.
It entails an antagonism
not in the sense of individual antagonisms,
but of conflict arising from conditions surrounding
the lives of individuals (106)
That is, the "war of all against all" (107), which is 
consequent upon this separation, does not consist simply in the 
hostile mental attitudes of the particular combatants, but is an 
alienation founded in prevailing external circumstances.
they must needs by the difference of their interests 
dissolve, and fall again into a war among themselves (108)
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Nor is it the meek that in this condition of things inherit; 
as I argued in cnapter 2 (109), given the tendency of all benefits 
to drift towards the aggressor, there comes a point of non-
compliance at which .behaviour enjoined by the norms of Nozick's system of 
"natural law" becomes no more tnan an act of spectacular self- 
sacrifice; and hence a vicious circle is established. And no man, 
according to Hobbes, (110) is bound to actions wnich conduce to his 
own destruction. It is a flaw of Nozick’s system that in moral 
evaluation he emphasizes the right of the person acted upon, rather 
than the duty of the person acting; this leads him into difficulty 
in another context when he is confronted with tne problem of 
determining wnat right of a -person who is guilty of a criminal act 
is violated when he is denied a fair trial.
Where there is no society, there are no values. It will be 
recalled that in chapter 1 (iii) I contended that traditional 
presentations of theories of natural law, such as Nozick's, and of 
positive law, such as that of Kelsen, are incurably onesided,, and 
that the reality lies in a synthesis which resolves the basic 
elements of each system. Thus I argued that law and morality are 
essentially positive, but that precisely because of this, it is 
possible^to"jbbjectively jestablish the criterion by wnich values are 
themselves to be evaluated, and hence, the absolute system of values. 
Taking the positivist aspect of this position, it would seem to 
follow that the whole question of whether social organisation is 
justified is misconceived. Law and social organisation are one, 
neither is conceivable without the other. And after all, the absolute • 
system of norms can scarcely be the one which renders itself 
impossible, and thus falls into self-contradiction. (112)
Thus the protective agency saga is wholly superfluous. It 
may serve to drive the assault home, to point out that it doesn't 
even serve Nozick's purpose anyway. For why must compensation be 
paid for prohibiting procedures that may not be used anyhow?
(Remember in this connection that an individual may protect himself, 
provided reliable procedures for determining the guilt are used). 
Tnerefore, Nozick's justification for the redistributive element of 
the minimal state, that obliges the strong to finance the protection 
of the entitlements of the weak, fails. If Nozick seriously wishes 
to retain a conception of justice which exclusively contains such
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norms as generally fall within the province of private law, then it 
would appear that the only course open to him is to advocate reliance 
upon a system of self-help courts such as that which flourished in 
ancient Rome. (113) In all this, we come to perceive the essential 
inhumanity of Nozick’s system, in terms of which the physically 
disabled being left to fend for themselves would be by no means in 
breach of "natural law”.
But who will guard the guards themselves? Who will protect 
the people from their protective agency, should it exceed the 
legitimate functions ? (Unless one envisages an infinite regression 
of protective agencies, each one stronger than the last). Again, I 
can lay "no claim to original discovery, since once, more I am pre­
empted by Nozick himself.
I ignore here the difficult and important problem 
of tne controls on a central authority powerful 
enough to perform its legitimate functions. (114)
This failure is particularly ironic, as the whole question 
of natural law and natural rights (and to this Nozick’s thesis is 
far from being an exception) appears to have grown out of the 
problem of what rulers may and may not do to their subjects. This 
only goes to confirm that only on a level of social organisation 
by no means attained by the minimal state can man's liberty be 
realised.
However, even if we accept Nozick’s reasoning thus far, we 
now encounter a serious impasse; for it is by no means clear how 
this dominion over self which is so strenuously defended can find 
its extension onto the sphere of material objects. On this view, 
it is difficult to see how Nozick's theories as thus far expounded 
can entail the conception of justice in Holding's which he seeks to 
advance, or, indeed, any such conception. At best, it would seem 
to provide a basis for a system of rules which does no more than 
relate to deliberate personal injury. On this point, Nozick has 
singularly little to say. One of his three formal categories of 
justice in holdings is the principle of justice in acquisition, but 
he entirely fails to formulate a substantive principle of original 
acquisition by means'of wnich one might come to hold over a hitherto 
unowned and exclusive, and, on Nozick's terms, natural "permanent
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bequeathable right" (115)
He issues a few pronouncements on the matter of original 
acquisition, but nowhere even attempts to formulate a substantive 
principle of his own. He includes a consideration of Locke’s 
theory, but only to subject it to fundamental criticism, and de 
decisively, and, to my mind, correctly, rejects it as inadequate. 
This failure is absolutely crucial; for how, in Nozick’s scheme of 
things, can natural rights over particular objects be transferred 
until first they come into being (116)? How would one acquire title 
to land? It is surely a juristic fiction that "staking a claim" in 
any shape or form confers a right to land "a caelo usque ad centrum" 
(117), and this independently of institutional recognition.
NIarx himself expresses grave dissatisfaction with this 
Lockean principle of original acquisition;
This primitive accumulation (the doctrine of original 
acquisition) plays in Political Economy about the 
same part as original sin in theology (118)
and further stigmatises it not merely as a fiction, but also as 
an "insipid childishness" (118)•
Nozick’s theory, it would seem, presents us with an 
elaborate structure, but one which is shaky.at the foundations.
There is a serious danger of circularity in Nozick’s argument, for 
if he is proceeding from the assumption that there is indeed some 
natural procedure by means of which can come to acquire original, 
natural rights of property over particular objects, then insofar 
as the rest of his thesis is concerned merely to articulate what is 
already implicit in the nature of the right thus presumed to exist, 
his conclusions, (insofar as they purport to go beyond simple 
conceptual analysis), lose all value, since the line of reasoning- 
on which they rest is tautologous.
Tnere is here at least one fallacy which requires to be 
laid to rest. Nozick employs tne expression "causes to exist, or 
produces" (119). But this is a misconception. Labour does not . 
create objects,.or at any.rate the material contained in them, the 
total quantity of which remains precisely constant, no matter what 
changes in quality take place, and no matter how much labour, 
(produdtive or otherwise), is expended. Production, then, is an
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entirely different matter from creation, and it is only by confusing 
the two that a natural law of original acquisition, and with, the 
claim attributed to Locke and Nozick by J.'L. Mackie
that there is a natural law of property, that we
can decide independently of any positive law or
positive morality, that there is a way in which 
a man can legitimately acquire property to which 
he then has a right (120),
is made to seem plausible. "Things come into the world already
attacned to people naving entitlements over them” (121) This is 
plain nonsense. What of the mass of natural resources, the 
existence of which, in the case of minerals wholly predates man’s 
appearance on the earth? Materials are not in any sense brought 
into existence by human activity, they are merely transported or 
transformed.
However, lest I appear to reject the possibility of a natural
law of original acquisition out of hand, might it not be countered
that while labour is not creative of physical objects, it is creative 
of economic value? And, against a background of unlimited natural 
resources, the total economic value of an object would be wholly
attributable to the labour expended on it. This in fact is the
situation envisaged by Locke’s proviso (122) according to which 
original acquisition is legitimate only where there is enough and as 
good left over for everyone else. But it is clear that in practice 
this proviso can be satisfied only under exceptional conditions.
(And does this mean that scarce resources could not be appropriated 
at all?) And, according to Mackie,
If we are thinking of the acquisition of land, it 
can be satisfied only where there is an indefinitely 
extensible frontier. (12 )^
Further, dt would seem that some variant on Malthus's 
population principle (124) would tend to ensure that the non­
scarcity of natural resources such as land, and therefore the 
applicability of the Lockean proviso, would be an abnormal, temporary 
condition of things. Mackie also makes the point that even when the 
proviso is satisfied, the claim to permanence is extremely dubious,
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since later the proviso may cease to be satisfied.
And there are cases where uncurtailed appropriation does 
not merely leave less for others, but in fact drastically reduces 
the existing stock, a,s it is for example, with over-fishing 
(ignoring nere the complication that fish are not inanimate objects).
It would appear, incidentally, that Locke's theory rests upon an ri 
equivocation of "right" in the strong sense, which denoted exclusive 
dominion, and in the weak sense, which simply denotes an absence of 
contrary duty; and upon a similar equivocation of "possession" in 
the normative and purely physical senses. Consider the following 
dictum, quoted by Nozick with apparent approbation; "The bounds of 
the law’of nature require that no-one ought to harm another in his 
life, health, liberty and possessions." (125) Clearly this cannot 
mean "possession" in the purely physical sense, as a thief possesses 
the article he has stolen. But, if this conception of natural law 
presupposes rather than underlies a system of property entitlement, 
then a somewhat gross form of circularity is involved.
If these comments of mine concerning original acquisition 
are not misconceived, then it would seem that the impasse to which 
I draw attention is fatal to Nozick’s theory of a natural system of 
property rights. But, paradoxically, it is here that we come to 
perceive the positive strength and value of Nozick’s work. Bor this 
theoretical difficulty comes to light precisely because Nozick seeks 
to reduce this major strand of bourgeois normative ideology to a coherent 
essence. Only in such a logically pure form can the characteristic 
inner limitations of a conception become clear, instead of lurking 
undetected amongst eulogies and confusions of thought.
Like Socrates, Nozick shows common moral outlooks to be 
confused and incoherent. Actual history does not present us with 
conceptions of justice in any pure form; rather it is the task of 
the moral philosopher to extract particular formally coherent 
conceptions (126) from the impure'admixtures of the real world.
Only when theyconception is thus presented to us as an object of 
thought or cognition can it be subjected to evaluation, whether 
positive or otherwise, and only then can its conceptual limitations 
emerge. It is at this phase in the development of the Idea, that 
the conception comes into contradiction with itself, and is thereby 
abrogated.
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It is, no doubt to be regretted, however, that Nozick 
sacrifices logical consistency to common sense, by attempting to 
incorporate into his scheme of things such elements as punishment
(127), and the concepts of public interest and organisation surely 
implied thereby, wnich are essentially alien to it.
If there is no way in which a natural,exclusive, objectively 
valid right of property may be originally acquired, neither can such 
acquisition be derivative. What then remains of the principle of 
justice in transfer? be facto inequalities in bargaining power 
operate to ensure that in civil society almost all benefits of 
exchange acrue exclusively to the rich. Civil society treats us 
as equals, but in view of "the subordination that exists in reality".
(128), or to use Nozick's own expression, "commanding market 
positions" (129), is not, "the redress of such imbalance and relief 
from its consequences" (130) a proper and indeed necessary function 
of government? It is ironic that Nozick attaches so much importance 
to Adam Smith’s invisible hand mechanism (131), for it also deeply 
impressed Marx, who based on it his idea of the material forces 
which underlie and motivate economic and therefore social development, 
leading eventually,to the impoverishment of the vast mass of the 
people, followed by the collapse of the circumstances giving rise to 
the value on which civil society is based. (132) In this connection, 
it seems pertinent to enquire whether the end-state can be irrelevant 
after all. On the contrary, the pattern and magnitude of the 
distribution realised, that is, how a principle works out writ large, 
would seem to. be one of the rational bases on which it might be 
preferred to or rejected (133) in favour of anotner; and certainly,
it would seem that the values which Nozick espouses cannot be in any 
sense natural and eternal, if we are persuaded of the truth of Marx’s 
contention that their appearance is limited to a single transitory 
phase of social development. (134)
And what of the property speculators, ticket touts, and 
hoarders, who perform no useful function, but simply manipulate the 
market, by artificially generating scarcities, for their own 
enrichment? Such activities have the tendency of inflating prices, 
to the advantage of no-one but the speculators themselves. And are 
we to take seriously the contention that the rationing of'scarce 
resources, for example in wartime, is against the law of■ nature?
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The essence of Nozick's thesis lies in the assertion that 
in the absence of contractual provisions to the contrary, there is 
no duty to render aid to others. (That it follows from this that 
taxation for redistributive purposes is not permissible is not a 1 . 
very remarkable conclusion.) One major difficulty arising- in this 
respect is that it is far from clear how a child's right to be 
provided for fits in, recalling here of course Nozick's contention, 
that particular entitlements over things exhaust the field of 
rights (135)• It would seem, however, from Nozick's various remarks 
about the institution of the family (136), that the non-authenticity 
of this right is a conclusion that he would be most reluctant to 
reach. In his consideration of Locke's position on this, he appears 
to imply that the duty to care for children rests upon having 
voluntarily brought them into being (137)• But, quite apart from 
the "is" to "ought" jump, what of orphans and foundlings?
The entitlement theory protests its unlimited concern for 
the individual, "the minimal state regards us an inviolate individ­
uals" (138) ahd yet it is indifferent to the paradox of poverty 
amidst plenty. Moral values are brought into the world as a remedy 
for the separation of man from man, but as snail become progressively 
clearer in the course of this present work, it is this radical separ­
ation that Nozick's system of "natural law" is based upon, and indeed 
seeks to sanctify.
(iii) Professor Hayek's Spontaneous Order.
The New Right ... (is) putting forward ideas ...
so long discredited that their resurrection may
indeed seem novel to some. (139)
Although to a considerable degree concurring with Nozick 
in his defence of a society having its foundation in private property 
ideals, Hayek reaches his conclusions by means of an entirely 
different route. Hayek adopts as his starting point not a system 
of alleged natural rights, but ratner the role which justice, 
according to Hayek, plays in human affairs, that is, the preservation 
of a spontaneous order, within wnich individuals are able to pursue 
their own several, ends, without unduly colliding with one another in
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their actions. One major divergence from Nozick attributable to this 
distinction in methodology is tnat Hayek is not unduly concerned to 
vindicate state activity, but without argument acknowledges the 
legitimacy of government jjrovision for the maintainance of law and 
order, that is the enforcement of individual obligation, both civil 
and criminal, and also for certain genuinely collective needs which 
of their nature cannot be satisfied by the market. (140) Accord-; \ 
ingly, unlike Nozick, he does not consider taxation as unjust in 
itself, so long as benefits wnich an individual derives from public 
funds are not grossly disproportionate to his contribution (141).
Further, there requires to be borne in mind one systematic 
limitation to Hayek's thesis which is attributable to this difference 
in methodblogy. He does not proffer a tneory or conception of 
justice in the strong sense of putting forward such precepts as will 
enable us, independently of any particular positive order, to 
determine in any concrete situation who is entitled to what, as 
Nozick's theory would have done, had he managed to advance a 
substantive principle of original acquisition. At most, he offers 
only a conception of justice in the weak sense of arguing in favour 
of a particular- type of legal or moral order, as the normative 
corollary of his'favoured economic system. In contrast with Nozick, 
then, his work would appear to proceed from a tacit agreement with 
Mackie's contention that;
there is no natural law of property; but there is 
at least in Hobbes's sense a natural law that there 
should be some law of property. (142)
Initial holdings, then, in Hayek's scheme, would have to be 
determined in an \ arbitrary fasnion. Tne same charge, of course, 
stands to be levelled against Nozick's system, until he can furnish 
us with a substantive principle of original acquisition.
In common with Nozick, (as the subtitle given to volume 2, 
Tne Mirage of Social Justice, indicated), a dominant tneine is the 
decisive rejection of any conception of "distributive" or "social" 
justice; for Hayek, justice is essentially an attribute of tne 
manner in which competitive interaction is carried on, and not of 
the results thereof, whether in the particular transaction, or writ 
large. That is, justice as Hayek conceives of it is essentially a
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principle of human conduct, (14$), so that only the individual as 
a knowing, acting subject, and thereby in principle capable of being 
the bearer of rights and obligations, or aggregates of such persons 
acting in concert, can meaningfully be said to act justly or otherwise. 
Society, as opposed to government, is clearly not such an entity (144); 
the total outcome of the social process can be desirable or undesirable, 
good or bad, but never just or unjust. He therefore considers
"social justice" a meaningless concept, belonging not to the category
of error, but of nonsense, and to be a dangerous illusion at that, 
since tending to fall into the service of organised interests in 
imposing their demands upon their fellows. (145)
'further, still in consensus with Nozick, he demonstrates that 
rights to be in particular conditions, for example to be engaged 
in remunerative employment, are irreconcilable with (process) 
entitlements under justice so called, that is, justice as an ordering 
of constraints on personal action. It is Qn this ground that he 
repudiates wnat he considers to be the pompous catalogue of social 
and economic or human rights. Universal, general rig'hts are abstract 
and formal, and only particular entitlements acquired under these 
can be substantive. It is therefore left to the free individuals
to create tneir own protected dornain(s) ... the 
rules do not confer (substantive) rights on 
particular persons, but lay down the conditions 
under which such rights can be acquired. (14&)
Hayek*s conception of ethical freedom consists of liberty 
in the classical sense, in terms of which individuals are permitted 
to pursue their own several aims and objectives, constrained only 
in the means by whicn they are allowed to do so. These constraints,
taking the form of universal, general rules are "almost all negative
in the sense that they prohibit rather than enjoin particular kinds 
of action" (147) and belong of course to the traditional private 
law foundations of private property, civil wrong, and contract.
Hayek goes on to point out that principles purporting to govern the 
actual outcomes of the distribution of material goods and burdens 
can only pertain to an organisational or corporate social structure 
(or teleocracy), in which the private law regulating relations 
between individuals has been wholly supplanted by the public law 
which delineates relations between individual and state, and not to
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the spontaneous order, (or nomocracy) in which there is no hierarchy 
of social ends binding upon its members. (I48) The rules of justice, 
tnen, do not have a purpose, in the sense of aiming at any specific 
ordering of things, but rather possess a function in that they seek 
to conserve the sorts of conditions which form "the precondition 
for the success of most private activity" (149) Thus, civil society, 
or to use Hayek's term of art, the Great Society, is a means- 
directed, abstract society, unlike the ends-directed tribal unit, 
corporation, or totalitarian state, in which all the members share, 
or have imposed upon them, the same common visible purposes.
Insofar as the several members of society are obliged to 
pursue the same objectives, society ceases to be free. Thus Hayek 
holds that the demand for "social justice" and the shared visible
purposes implicit therein is no more than a regression to tribal
social forms; before the rise of the Great Society, men are divided 
up into small face-to-face communities, in which the pursuit of. 
common purposes is both viable and appropriate, and, more importantly, 
spontaneous, wnilst at the same time, as between tnese tribal units, 
a condition of anarcny prevails. (190)
However,
the transition from tne small group to,the Great 
or Open Society - and the treatment of every other
person as a human being ratner than as a known
friend or an enemy - requires a reduction of the
• range of duties we owe to all otners (191)
This application of universal rules of conduct to all men,
Hayek considers to be the major acnievement in the development of 
human society, making possible the spontaneous order in v/hich men 
can live in peace and to their common advantage without the necessity 
of reaching a consensus on concrete ends. (This of course directly
contrasts with Marx's view that in civil society men find in one
another not the realisation but tne limitation of their freedom (192)). 
And this condition of tnings, so Hayek apparently claims (19$), is 
sufficient to resolve the tension between the individual and the 
general’ interest, the overcoming of which was earlier identified as 
tne specific role of the institution of legality. Within the 
spontaneous order, people find that the realisation of tneir 
separate ends lies in correctly responding to the "signals"
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generated by the market process. By following these, as movements 
in prices, wages, returns to capital and so forth, the individual is 
led to direct his efforts and resources towards the most generally 
desired purposes; in other words, it is argued that within the Great
r
Society based on liberty and economic freedom, the pursuit of self- • 
interest constrained by tne rules of just conduct alone automatically 
tends to the advantage not only of the immediate actor, but of large 
numbers of other persons, connected only by their participation in 
the Great Society. (154)
Thus, the price mechanism,' motivated by the spontaneous move­
ments of supply and demand, renders a complex central planning 
apparatus wholly superfluous. The decisions as to what is to be 
produced, with what, for whom, and in what quantities are resolved 
automatically; the market process itself is claimed to be adequate 
for the co-ordination of the separate activities and strivings of 
large numbers of otherwise unconnected agents. For example, if a 
commodity becomes scarce, supply will diminish, and the price will 
rise as a result. People will then cut back on their consumption of 
this commodity, perhaps switcning to an alternative which is more 
easily produced, this adjustment directed by reason, but made through 
the .automatic and unconscious workings of the market process. Thus 
Hayek writes that tne market is the only sure means to the utilisation of 
information scattered amongst myriad individual agents. (155) It 
follows for Hayek that state intervention in economic affairs, except, 
perhaps, with a view to maintaining a competitive economy against 
monopoly (156), is not merely superfluous, but positively damaging, 
in that such activity disrupts and misdirects the market process; 
if, by means of subsidies, the government brings about conditions 
in which the price of a commodity no longer'faithfully reflects the 
spontaneous interaction of supply and demand, the price mechanism 
no longer functions correctly, and has to be replaced.
Hayek's advocacy of "a system which relies on the spontaneous 
ordering forces of the market M (157) is, in the final analysis, a 
re-iteration of the "invisible hand" (158) doctrine, venerated by 
the exponents of classical political economy, according to which the 
free operation of the profit motive is by itself (operating of course 
within the context of the rule of law, and military security) 
sufficient to ensure economic efficiency and stability. And it was
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these same ideas which Marx criticised (159) 'as proceeding from a 
mistaken view of the bourgeois economy and accompanying social 
structure as being static and unchanging, rather than as something 
constantly moving, according to its own inherent laws of emergence, 
development, and decline. (160) And it is in this development that ' 
the true nature of the impersonal forces and processes occasioned 
by competitive interaction becomes ever more evident. They are not, 
after all, part of a mysterious providence, but rather, as the 
products of blind interaction, they represent a further self­
reassertion of tne category of nature, as pure being. As it was 
with nature as it originally presented itself (l6l), and as it was 
with the processes, arising out of unconstrained interaction (162), 
interaction constrained only by the rules of just conduct, in the 
form in which these are advanced by Nozick and Hayek, gives rise to 
a random mix of processes, some.-o£ which chance to accord with 
human purposes, and some of which do not. Nor are the outcomes of 
these processes necessarily intended or even foresee^ by any," of the 
individual agents involved. (163)
As the growth of industry comes to demand and depend upon 
ever more large scale investment, and production comes to be 
conducted by means of ever more complex and costly machinery, that 
is, becomes more capital intensive, the economic process' grows 
progressively more unstable, since greater and greater dislocations 
come to be attendant upon the failure of individual business 
enterprises. And as the size of the average business unit grows 
ever larger, so in proportion does the extent of the disruption 
caused increase when one of tnese collapses.
In fact, with the advent of advanced capitalism, the 
"signals" generated by the market order come to be progressively 
more inadequate and misleading as directors of economic activity. 
Thus, for example, in recession conditions, which are induced by 
tne "gradually widening circles of unemployment, with accompanying 
diminution of demand" (I64) brought about by the collapse of business 
ventures, as described above, it is demonstrably unwise, from the 
subjective point of view, for any individual to invest capital, 
although this is precisely what the general prosperity requires.
In short, "Dread of disaster makes everyone act in the very way 
that increases the disaster" (165).
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Of all the phenomena summoned forth by unrestrained economic 
interaction, perhaps tne most spectacular is the trade cycle. (166) 
Broadly, this cycle can be described and explained in the following ' 
terms. The cycle commences with the autonomous injection of capital 
(that is, investment) into the circular flow of income (167). This 
investment has a magnified impact on the general level of income, 
via the "multiplier" (168) effect, this enhanced level of total 
income calling forth an "accelerated" (I69) increase in investment, 
which in turn raises the level of income once more, and so on, until 
the full employment level of the economy is reacned, when the whole 
process is reversed, and economic activity steadily collapses, 
engendering a dramatic rise in unemployment, and fall in living 
standards generally. This alarming and debilitating decline continues 
until equilibrium as between witndrawls from and injections to the 
circular flow of income is restored, at which point the whole process 
commences afresh. Marx believed that these oscillations, marked by 
a recurring pattern of slump and boom, would grow progressively more 
pronounced, and that in a final crisis the bourgeois market order, 
proving.itself to be inadequate and outmoded, would finally collapse, 
its historical function entirely spent. (170)
Since the producers hold no control over the aggregate 
production (171), capitalism remains far from reason as conscious 
appropriation. For it is, as we have seen, the essence of the 
laissez faire economic system which is the corollary of Nozick's 
version of the bourgeois conception of justice tnat collective 
control of the conditions under which economic activity takes place 
is dispened with, and macro-economics is reduced to a purely 
contemplative science, in other words, the whole of the economic 
environment is left to chance.
But cnance is only one pole in an interrelation, 
the other pole of which is necessity. In nature, • 
where chance also seems to reign, we have long ago 
demonstrated in eacn particular field the inherent 
necessity and regularity that asserts itself in this 
chance. What is true of nature nolds good also for 
society. The more a social activity, a series of 
social processes, becomes too powerful for conscious 
human control, grows beyond human reach, the more 
it seems to have been left to pure chance, as if by 
natural necessity ... these laws confront the
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individual producer and exchanger as strange, and 
in the beginning even as unknown powers, the nature 
of which must first be laboriously investigated and 
ascertained ... To this day, the product is master 
of the producer; to this day, the total production 
of society is regulated not by a collectively 
thought-out plan but by blind laws which operate 
with elemental force, in the last resort in the 
storms of periodic commercial crises (172)
I feel myself unable to improve upon this passage from Engels, 
and therefore feel justified in quoting it at length. Capitalism, 
then, as a reassertion of nature as tne sphere of lunatic necessity, 
is not a "spontaneous order", but a manifestation of tne destructive 
cnaos asserting itself at ever higher levels. It is into the realm 
of blind interaction that one enters on engaging in competition 
in any form; the acceptance or repudiation of'the bourgeois conception 
of justice quite simply resolves itself into the choice between the 
rule of a phantom madman, and the rule of reason. The forces and 
processes which are set in motion are the necessary fruits of private 
law society, that is, the Great Society; but the Great Society knows 
of no means to deal with the in. Where tnere is community, there is 
always trie cnance of imposing tne collective will upon the physical 
and economic environment; where there is conflict, the outcome is 
determined by factors entirely independent of will.
The problems in this sphere are in essence, therefore 
essentially the same as those encountered in the state of nature (173)* 
Hence, Popper argues (174) that just as absolute freedom in fact 
entails the domination of the weak by the strong, economic freedom , 
characterised by liberty rignts in fact boils down to the domination 
of the economically vulnerable by the economically powerful. I 
would dispute this opinion only to suggest that it does not go far 
enough; for the essence of both these conditions is that even tne 
relatively strong are at the mercy of forces which are wholly beyond 
the possibility of individual control, and as such are themselves 
dominated. Thus, we perceive the. inadequacy of so-called economic 
freedom, and of its normative corollary, the institution of pure 
liberty rights.
Tne specific contradiction in Hayek’s conception of justice 
lies in the fact of its ever more overt failure to fulfil the 
function of justice that Hayek himself acknowledges, tnat is, the
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reconciliation of the subjective with the general interest (173), 
this function entailing the preservation of conditions in wnich 
private activity enjoys a reasonable expectation of success. (176)
This contradiction is intimately related to the paradox involved in 
the liberal conception of freedom, drawn■attention to by Singer, in 
terms of which in choosing- "freely”, the participants in civil 
society generate outcomes which none, not even tne capitalists 
would have'Chosen. (177) I do not of course mean to imply that 
any of these forces, their outcomes or the general corollary of 
man's subjugation to the vag;aries and fluctuations of impersonal 
processes seemingly external to himself is in any meaningful sense 
unjust, merely that it is a clear measure of the inadequacy of the 
conception of justice wnich fails in its own itinery. Hayek 
acknowledges the existence of the impersonal social forces to which 
I allude; "Freedom means that in some measure we entrust our fate 
to forces which we do not control." (173) But this is surely a 
contradiction in terms; for tnere is no meaningful sense in which 
men are free while at the same time subject to forces truly or 
apparently external to their wills. Any improvement, indeed, on 
the state of nature wnich Hayek's "spontaneous order" offers us is 
merely relative, for humanity remains, although at a higher level, 
divided against itself, and as sucn, dominated by its own actions 
turned against it in seemingly alien form. (179)
.(iv) Capitalist Society
Perhaps then, it is in order to enquire further of the 
realities of life in the social order which Hayek and Nozick advocate. 
We have already considered tne chaotic condition of relations as 
between bourgeois nation-states (180); and witnin, even in times 
of external peace, humanity fares no better. Formal equality stands 
as a thin facade against the harsh opposition of private property 
in the means of production, ana wage labour (181); the unattached 
mass of tne population, who have nothing to sell but their labour- 
power. On Marxian principles, capitalist ideology fulfils the 
double role of simultaneously giving expression to, and disguising, 
misrepresenting, the real social conditions underlying it. Hence,
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the process of apparently free transfer between "equals" serves only 
to obscure the exploitative relationships which under serfdom were 
only too clear. (182) Capitalist law is normore than an elaborately 
disguised codification of the power of the dominant elite; Earx 
addresses the bourgeoisie tnus; "your jurisprudence is but the will 
of your class made into a law for all." (183) As a consequence of 
the imbalance of bargaining power, the employer acquires "a dominating 
position which requires no special legal privileges" (184) and is 
tnerefore effectively able to dictate the terms of the "contract" 
of employment, and thus to appropriate to himself practically all 
of the benefits of exchange. Ever recurring falls in wages are 
enforced by lock-outs (188); and not only can the employer effectively 
dictate terms, especially in times of high unemployment, but in 
absence of legal protection against summary dismissal, he also 
comes to exert a strong power over the conduct of the employee.
For, even after the terms of the contract have come to be determined 
in this thoroughly one-sided manner, the employee is ina weak 
position from which to enforce his rights, such as they are. Equal 
■ rignts continue for the duration of the contract, unless expressly 
waived, but, "the concrete economic situation compels trie worker to 
forego even the'slightest semblance of equal rights" (186). It is 
only when all "special legal privileges" (187) have been abolished 
and the transition from status to contract has been thus
completed that the essential nature of exploitation in the capitalist 
age comes into its own; for while equality before the law means 
nothing more tnan juridical equality, it remains true that;
What happens behind the legal curtains, where 
real life is enacted, how tnis voluntary agreement 
is arrived at is no concern of the jurist. (188)
At will, the employer can depress wages to subsistence level, 
while extending hours of work to their physical maximum.
It is recorded (189) that in the nineteenth century, when 
the power of the bourgeoisie reached its zenitn, six in the morning 
until six at night was a normal working day in Belfast. (Six days 
a week, fifty-two weeks in the year). Wages for unskilled labour, 
it seems, were appallingly low, and, working conditions in terms 
of safety and sanitary standards were atrocious. (190) Capital na,s 
no concern for tne wellbeing of the labourers, unless under external,
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social compulsion.
These facts are corroborated by McCabe, who records (191) 
that in England the new wealth brought forth by industrialisation 
was not shared by tne workers. The general tendency of supply and 
demand to depress the condition of the workers was maintained by 
harsh anti-combination laws, enforced by savage sentences; Trade 
Unions were illegal in Great Britain between 1799 anti 1Q24 (192). 
Children, who worked from ten to twelve hours a day, six days a week, 
for a penny a day, were brutalised from their earliest years. In 
this connection, it is as well to remark on the utter irrelevance, 
of laws proscribing child labour, witnout a corresponding recon­
stitution of the economic structure of society. Such laws succeed 
merely in depriving tne cnild of even this precarious means of 
sustenance, and thus prove to be meaningless. (193)
It appears tnat two per cent of tne Russian population 
were industrial workers immediately prior to the October Revolution 
of 1917, and, according to the account given by E.M. Roberts (l94)» 
their condition was substantially worse.
Every single de jure virtue that is claimed for civil 
society is swift to transform itself into its de facto opposite. (195)
As to these virtues, competitiveness is best disposed of 
first; it soon gives way to monopoly with the inexordebility with 
which conflict begets a victor. More importantly, there are freedom, 
and equality before the law. As we have seen, the bourgeois 
conception of freedom soon g;ives way to the self-negation of both 
economic domination, and tne tyranny of subjection to apparently 
alien social forces. And out of tne bourgeois conception of 
equality, a mode of reversal to feudalism comes into being. Subjection 
to rank is superceded and yet perversely re-asserted via subjugation 
to capital. And just as serfs were frequently denied access to the 
courts, in civil society much the same end is achieved by economic 
factors, so that the workers come increasingly to regard the law 
as something alien to themselves, their ends and requirements.
The wor&ts of the eminent judge are now something of a cliche, but 
none the less still ring true; "The law, like the Ritz Hotel, is 
open to rich and poor alike" (19&)
There remains a farther sense in which the administration 
of justice in the bourgeois age is radically defective. It- is of
105
course an essential precept of formal (or "natural”) justice that 
the judge in any cause must reach his decision impartially, and 
should not therefore himself have any stake in the matter. (197)
But, whilst the judge may have no personal interest in any contest 
which might come "before nim, he may none-tne-less find that his 
class interests are affected. And since, for economic reasons, the 
judges and practitioners of the law in bourgeois society come almost 
exclusively from the moneyed classes, this is a further source of 
imbalance in the law. (198)
Civil society is a virtual negation of society properly 
conceived, that is to say, community. The state remains little more 
than an instrument of class domination, and the wholly spurious 
facade, indeed caricature of community which it affords serves only 
to mask a weltering sea of conflict at every social level. The urban 
bourgeoisie, though formed into a ruling class by virtue of 
parliamentary enfranchisement, find themselves at loggerheads with 
the rural landowners, and also, by reason of the competitive nature 
of the capitalist mode of production, with one another. Most 
fundamental of all, the irreconcilable demands of capital and labour 
find expression in a bitter class struggle between the bourgeoisie 
and workers. Within the proletariat, individuals are thrown into 
harsh competition amongst themselves, particularly in times of high 
unemployment. Further, the proletariat is thrown into contendfng 
ethnic factions, whose antagonisms arise as the outward expression or 
epiphenomenon of antagonisms rooted in the material conditions of 
life, more specifically as a consequence of economic competition.
And, as we have seen, war between bourgeois states grows as an extension 
and implication of competition for raw materials and markets. (199)
Man is himself degraded to the status of a mere means, a 
commodity like all others to be bougnt and sold at rates which are 
only by a fiction the outcome of mutual agreement, rather than of 
impersonal, fortuitous market forces. By means of these blind 
interactions of supply and demand, the distribution of the necessities 
and pleasures of life is efiected in an ultimately random manner.
There is a further sense in wnich civil society entails allocative 
inefficiency; as people find themselves in increasingly rigidly 
defined economic and social roles, their potentialities are not put 
to the best possible use. According to Hayek, it is important that
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individuals find that "their well-being depends primarily on their
v
own efforts and decisions" (200), but surely imthe social order he 
advocates, this condition can seldom be satisfied. Thus the 
intelligent proletarian finds himself trapped in a life of drudgery, 
denied access to education. In an extreme form, those who can afford 
education are the very individuals who have no need to make use of 
the capacities which education develops, and the content of what is 
taugnt comes to be estranged from human requirements. There can 
thus be seen to be profound utilitarian reasons for free state 
education. Social activity in general under capitalism is determined 
in part by blind economic forces,- and in part by the whim of the 
ruling classes.
The bourgeois conception of justice in holdings stands, then, 
as a denial of the ideal; the concept of justice in holdings is 
introduced into the world as a means to the better enjoyment of the 
world's material resources, but at this stage fulfils its function 
ill. Production in its capitalist form is geared not to the 
satisfaction of human needs, but to the dictates of profit. If 
bread is needed by the hungry, and medicine by the sick, while the 
rich require guns with wnich to stave off revolution, it is the guns 
which will be produced. Appropriation and abandonment are the polar 
categories of exploitation, which itself consists simply in the 
treatment of people as means to an end, rather than as ends in them­
selves. (20l) And as the worker's labour is appropriated when profit 
so dicta,tes, so also will he be abandoned. Demand is related to 
objectified human will only in a distorted form.
As has been remarked, it is a poor analysis of civil society, 
and of the conception of justice which is its normative expression, 
that examines it only in its static aspect; a proper dissection must 
scrutinise it as something ever developing and changing within itself, 
according- to its own inherent laws of movement. (202)
The uncurtailed law of succession gives rise to an ever 
intensifying rigidity in the stratification of economic and therefore 
social functions, giving rise to an ever intensifying determinism 
in human affairs (205).
Tnere arises a new aristocracy; "The absurd conditions wnich 
make the only productive class of society the ruled class" (204) 
recreate tnemselves. Free competition gives way to monopoly
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capitalism, entailing a.class of men who have a vested interest 
in continuous shortage and allocative efficiency, and to imperialism. 
It is at-this stage that the bourgeoisie grows ever more superfluous; 
only in the early years of capitalism does it perform an active 
social function of any sort. By Orwell's■time, the owners of capital 
had become;
an entirely functionless class, living on money 
that was invested they hardly knew where ... simply 
parasites, less useful to society than his fleas 
are to a dog (205)
Marx himself considered that the arrival of the joint stock 
company, (206) with its separation of ownership and management 
functions, neralded the bourgeoisie’s forfeiture of their historical 
role. Tne socialisation of production in rendering the owners of 
capital obsolete also serves to satisfy a major precondition for 
the transition to socialism, based on the common ownership of the 
means of production. (207)
Out of ease of acquisition and bargaining strengtn being in 
direct proportion to wealth, the rich grow richer, and the poor grow 
poorer. (208) Addressing the bourgeoisie, Marx observed;
You are horrified at our intending to do away with 
privatenprpperty. But in your existing society, 
private property is already done away with for nine- 
tenths of the population. (209)
Private property begets domination of the few, and domination 
of the few begets private property, so that a vicious circle comes 
into being. This movement is enhanced by tecnnological advance, 
whose advantages are monopolised by the capitalist classes, while, 
for the workers,
The unceasing improvement of machinery, ever more 
rapidly developing, makes their livelihood more 
and more precarious. (210)
The consequent reuuction of socially necessary labour serves 
only to render increasing portions of the work-force redundant, with
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the accompanying further depression of wages as more and more 
sellers of labour confront fewer and fewer buyers. (211)
With tne ever advancing concentration of capital, civil 
society becomes increasingly marked by the contradiction between its 
unlimited productive capacities and ever intensifying restricted 
consumption. This, in fact, is advanced by Engels as one of tne 
three "contradictions" or tensions characteristic of capitalist 
production, - together with the contradictions between social production 
and individual appropriation, and as between organisation within 
tne individual economic unit, and tne anarchy prevailing within 
the context of economic activity taken as a whole. (212) In direct 
proportion as capitalism becomes more and more outmoded, the more 
appropriate does socialism become.
Capitalism, therefore, is in its pure form inherently 
unstable; what then of the socialist and communist forms which 
allegedly arise in its place? In tne next chapter, I shall examine 
the relationship of these conceptions to justice and utopia, and in 
this light, evaluate the claim that communism is to be equated with 
the goal of cultural evolution, "the definitive resolution of the 
antagonism between man and nature, and between man and man" (213) 
and as such with the attainment of "an ideal, and finally satisfact­
ory, social order." (214)
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Chapter 4; Socialism, Communism and Justice.
" The world is a raft sailing through space, with, 
potentially, plenty of provisions for everybody; 
the idea that we must all co-operate and see to 
it that everybody does his fair share of the work
and gets his fair share of tne provisions seems
so blatantly obvious that one would say that no- 
one could possibly fail to accept it unless he had . 
some corrupt motive for clinging to the present 
system. ,f (l)
(i) Some Preliminary Considerations
Insofar as attempts are made to found systems of moral 
philosophy upon socialist ideology, one main ethical doctrine
associated with socialism is the labour theory of property, according
to which, since labour contribution is the active factor in the 
creation of economic value, profits, consisting in financial benefits 
accruing to capital or to land, fall to be regarded as the stolen 
fruits of labour. One of the earliest clear expositions of this 
view was that propounded by the French socialist, Pierre-Joseph 
Proudhon, in his essay of 1840, Qu'est-ce que la Propriete? (2), of 
which Marx was later to write tnat "it has made tine essence of private 
property the vital question of political economy and jurisprudence" (3) 
' Proudhon's conclusions in this respect, which incidentally owe 
much to Proudhon's fellow countryman Rousseau (4), can best be summed 
up in his celebrated aphorism, "property is tneft." (5) Proudhon's 
usage of the term "property", or in the French, "propriete", 
requires furtner explanation. Basically, it refers to ownership 
of the means of production, as the means of holding in bondage the 
labour of others, and as'such falls to be contrasted with, in7 
Proudhon's.(in my submission, somewhat misconceived) usage, mere 
"possession" of goods, even producer goods, and small tracts of 
land, by tne individual, for tine immediate purposes 'of himself, and-;- 
his family. (6) According to Proudnon then, profit from tne labour 
of another represents expropriation of the most straight forward- 
sort, and conversely, justice is satisfied when eacn and every 
worker receives his own undiminished product. (7)
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Opposed to the view, however, were Saint-Simon, Blanc and 
Fourier (8), who looked not to justice thus conceived, but to 
brotherhood, or solidarity (9) for tne basis of a revitalised 
human society. Accordingly, they sought to promote the rival 
principle of distribution according to need; Blanc was the 
originator of the formula "To each according to his needs, from 
each according to his abilities." (10)
Proudhon rejected this position out of hand, and considered 
such an ideal appropriate only to tne smallest social units, such 
as tne natural family; he held conflict to be inherent in social 
life, and inseparable from it. Tne highest peak that human organisation 
can ever attain to, therefore, is that of a comprehensive equilibrium 
of competing claims, in the individualistic form of justice, (ll)
To a more detailed consideration' of justice according to 
Proudhon I now turn. Tnere is implicit here the view that the 
"contract" of employment is a mere fictio juris (12), and that all 
labour in the presocialist society is really forced labour, be the 
working force slaves, serfs, or the "free" .(15) wage-labourers of 
capitalism. One of the grounds on which Marx held Proudhon to offer 
a notable advance on the bourgeois classical economists, was that 
of Proudhon's claim that it is private property per se and not merely 
private property in any particular form that is the falsifier of 
economic relationships. (14) One immediate reservation here, 
however, is that we may appear to come dangerously close to the 
highly dubious notion of an "inalienable rignt". If the worker is 
not to be permitted to transfer his labour as he chooses, then so 
much the less is his right over it taken seriously, or respected.
The account of justice given here, it would seem, is also defective 
in a number of other respects.
To begin with-, it does not appear to take proper account 
of the reflective entrepreneurial function, without which fote, 
active labour is by itself inadequate. It also appears pertinent 
to point out tnat the institution of Proudhon's principle in 
undiluted form would entail the dismantling of the complex welfare 
apparatus constructed by the modern state, and indeed the public 
sector generally, which so many modern leftists seem so concerned 
to protect. (15)
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More radical than this, no doubt, is the difficulty that 
the idea of the right to tne undiminished fruits of one's own 
labour at first signt appears to present an insoluble logical impasse. 
If I am entitled to the proceeds or product of my labour, and that 
right, as is claimed, extends not simply to my immediate requirements, 
but to whatever exists over and above this level, or any part of it 
also, then this, since, as Marx asserts (16), capital consists of 
the accumulated surplus products of labour, operates in one simple 
logical step as a vindication of the private ownership of capital, 
with all the power that it asserts over labour. The paradox which 
arises here is that the right of both employer and employee can be 
demonstrated to be founded on the self-same principle, which there­
fore demonstrably enters into contradiction with itself.
The only possible way around this impasse is to assert that 
although the original labourer is entitled to his capital, he may 
not legitimately direct it to the employment of others, unless he 
pays them the whole of the material proceeds arising from the 
transaction. To this, however, the objections are obvious; and these 
objections are directly relevant to Proudhon, for this notion 
appears to be entailed by his vindication of the private ownership 
of producer goods, provided that these are not used as a means to 
the appropriation of tne labour-power of otners. This is particularly 
the case, since, as Marx has demonstrated, capitalist private 
property inevitably arises out of such a scheme of individual private 
property; one might question whether Proudhon, in demanding that 
each worker be made the ov/ner "of a house, of a small-holder's plot 
of land, of necessary tools" (17) represents any sort of advance 
on Locke. It should of course be recalled that the minute sub­
division of land achieved by the French Revolution failed, since 
the ownership of land came again to be concentrated in a few hands. 
(18) but on what grounds might a mutually beneficial excnange 
be forbidden? To assert that the employer necessarily acts, unjustly 
involves a reversion to taboo morality, within which right and wrong 
function entirely independently of the satisfaction or otherv/ise 
of human will. (19) Furtner, the practical consequence of such an 
injunction on profit would be that the employer would not have 
invested his funds in the first place, since having no motive for 
doing so. Tne workers, far1 from being benefitted by being liberated 
from the yoke of economic exploitation, would simply be deprived
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of their source of income,
I have attempted to demonstrate that even without the 
introduction of any further elements, the alleged rignt to the 
fruits of one's own labour presents an insoluble logical contradiction, 
simultaneously by implication both proscribing and permitting the 
private, ownership of capital. At most, it would be suitable for 
the regulation of human affairs only in a society in which the process 
of production had been wholly perfected, that is, in which the 
bourgeoisie and its role in production had become wholly obsolete.
It would seem certain that such a state of affairs has not yet come 
to pass, if, indeed, it ever shall, even if Engels clearly considered 
that it had come about more tnan one hurndred years ago. (20)
There is a further difficulty which must be resolved if 
Proudhon's principle is to be forged into a properly coherent 
conception of justice. For tne profits of one enterprise come to 
be expended and hence to form part of the profits of another. In 
wnich of the two businesses have the workers been expropriated?
Clearly, both sets of workers cannot hold simultaneous and exclusive 
rights to the same sum of money. Related to this, might Proudhon’s 
principle not raise the antithesis that the owner of the means of 
production, the capitalist, exploits the proletarian not in his role 
as worker, but as consumer, by compelling him to pay more for the 
necessities of life than they cost to produce? Wno is exploited by 
the landlord, the tenant or the labourer wno built the house? One 
thing at least is clear, it cannot be both of them, not, at any rate, 
to the full extent of the profit simultaneously. It might, of course, 
be pointed out in passing that if"it were to be enacted tnat no man 
shall charge more for his product than it cost to produce, no-one 
would have any call to produce anything other than for personal use, 
and trade would grind to a halt. Here, such a norm presupposes the' 
full socialisation of the means of production, for otherwise such an 
enactment would be directly counter-productive in exactly the same 
manner as would a law requiring- that employers pay their employees 
the full fruits of tneir labour.
The answer to all this, no doubt, lies at least in part in 
Nozick's distinction between end-state and process principles of 
justice in holdings (21), but here I am immediately concerned with 
the task of rendering the principle'of justice that is asserted by
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Proudhon into a coherent form, in whicn it can be properly- 
understood and evaluated.
But these pairs of contrasting views which I have adduced 
are, properly speaking, abstractions; what I shall henceforth refer 
to as the socialist principle of justice in holdings, is really a 
synthesis which raises itself above these seeming contrasts.
.For, in truth, in its full conceptual development, the 
socialist principle embodies the precept of remuneration' in 
proportion to labour contribution; it is the sheerest naivete and 
self-contradiction to treat market determination of value as given, 
or to treat wage-levels in this fashion, that is, to resolve the 
antithesis in favour of one abstraction or the other. In fact, when 
tne socialist principle is conerently expressed, we find it to amount 
to the view that the consumer is expropriated when and to the extent 
that arbitrary market forces operate to raise the price, that is, 
the quantity of labour which he must render, above the cost of prod­
uction, that is, the quantity of labour he receives in return, wnile 
the labourer is despoiled when and to the extent that he receives 
less in wages as reward for his labours than is embodied in his 
contribution. Under this, the socialist conception of distributive 
justice, all rignts over particular objects,are contingent upon 
claims on portions of tne total social product, and as such dispenses 
with any need, so it would seem, for a theory of original 
acquisition. As I remarked earlier, labour produces objects, it does 
not create them, but this does not exclude the fact that labour 
creates economic value, and it is this act of creation which under 
socialism is the foundation of all property.
These, then, are tne socialist and communist principles; the 
socialist principle consists in distribution according to labour 
contribution (contribution to whom? Surely, to society. Once again 
we receive a priori confirmation that the socialist conception 
presupposes that tne marcn of history has fully socialised the 
process of production) while tne communist principle involves 
distribution according to need. In criticising the formulations of 
these ideas as they appeared in the writings of tnose revolutionary 
thinkers who preceded him, Marx treated them in precisely the manner 
appropriate to the critique of any theory, that is, he clearly 
demonstrated their systematic limitations, and reduced them to
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components of his own.
The main substance of this critique was that it is entirely 
inadequate to conduct the study of justice in abstraction from the 
real material bases which give rise to moral ideas (22), This
position in essence depends upon an elaboration of Feurbach's
contention against Hegel that the ideal is dependent upon the real, 
not vice versa. (2$) According to the Marxian sociology of morals 
(24), ideology springs from class conflict as opposed to causing it, 
so that particular etnical and legal systems are not to be conceived 
of as absolute, self-subsistent and eternal, as Kant would have us 
believe (25), but as pertaining to specific phases in the economic 
development of mankind, and, as such, historically relative. Having 
thus made clear what he considered the true relationship of the ideal 
and the real, for Marx it seemed to follow that
it is totally impossible to reconstitute society
on the basis of what is merely an embellished 
shadow of it. (26)
It was in this sense that I stated that the principle of 
distribution according to labour contribution presupposes economic 
conditions in which a full development and socialisation of the 
means of production has been brought about. If jurisprudence and 
moral pnilosophy are to be properly scientific, it is claimed, they 
must seek to cornprenend tneir subject matter in relation to the laws 
of human history sucn as Marx described tnem. The historical process, 
as Marx conceived of it, operates independently of human will in 
any form (27), and so for him it seemed to follow that any theory of 
justice which adopts the procedure of selecting from among competing 
conceptions the one by which men are to be governed is fundanentally 
misconceived, .for, in Marx's ov/n words, "Are men free to choose 
this or that form of society for themselves? fsy no means." (28) 
Certainly, it appears inadequate to approach concepts such 
as justice as existing statically and in abstraction from all that 
is progressively realised in ttie sequence of actual events. Entirely 
consistently witn this insight, Marx refrained from looking upon 
capitalism as an unmitigated and superfluous wickedness to be removed 
at the earliest possible opportunity, that is, as existing in ■ 
isolation from the wider drift of historical flux and development.
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For, although far from considering it to be jtist, Marx himself 
described the capitalist epoch as "justified" (29), as being an 
essential moment in the wider historical process and as such a 
necessary prelude to the advent of perfected human society. I 
shall presently turn to a detailed account of Marx’s position on 
the question of justice in holdings, but at the outset, it must 
not be naively imagined that Marx was primarily concerned with a 
moralistic condemnation of the capitalist enslavers; for, according 
to Marx, tne bourgeois no less than the proletarian is constrained 
in his movements by the innate laws of capitalist production.
Just as the worker is obliged to alienate his labour for less than 
its true value, so also is the individual capitalist, on pain of 
bankruptcy, constrained to depress wages to their lowest possible 
level, and ever to supplant living workers with machinery. All of 
this is consequential upon the inherent nature of capitalist 
conditions of production, and "does not, indeed, depend on the good 
or ill will of the individual capitalist." (30)
The Marxian approach was adopted and elaborated upon by 
Friedrich Engels in nis essay of 1875» Socialism: Utopian and 
Scientific (3l)* He held that in order that reason and justice . 
might come to rule human affairs, it is not sufficient that they 
should suddenly be apprehended in the minds of the philosophers, 
and he opposed the naive approach that imagines that, once made 
clear in the minds of men, reason and justice would instantly embody 
themselves in social practice by virtue of their own inherent power. 
Those versions of socialism are "utopian" which involve themselves 
in this error, while those are "scientific" which, like the accounts 
given by Marx and Engels, take note of the inseparable relationsnip 
of the progression of ideologies to the laws of economic and 
historical development. As Engels put it; "To make a science of 
socialism, it had first to be placed on a real basis." (32) This 
approach, it must be confessed, has much to commend it; for how 
much moralising, how much philosophising, how much preaching is 
required in order that men will be induced to order their lives 
according to the spirit of justice, still less of fraternity?
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(ii) An Exposition of the Marxian Thebr.y of Justice.
The fundamental directing force in social development, 
according to Marx, is the dialectical drive, propelled by the class 
struggle (53)> towards the establishment of property relations 
corresponding to and in harmony with the existing level of development 
of productive technology. (54) Thus it is that the increasingly 
social character of production under capitalism comes to require 
social ownership of the means of production (55)» and by means of 
a great social revolution, production is brought under the control 
of a free and associated humanity. In the course of this transition 
from bourgeois society to socialism, the victorious proletariat 
wrests all capital from tne bourgeoisie, and abolishes all private 
ownership in the means of production (56)# This conversion of the 
instruments of production, brought to full maturity under capitalism 
(37)> to the common social property, forms tne basic presupposition 
and institutional prerequisite of post-revolutionary normative 
structures and conceptions.
At this stage, the work of the individual becomes a direct 
part of the total social output; no longer do men work at variance 
with one another. In bringing this to pass, the proletariat puts 
an end to all social stratification, including its own existence 
as the proletariat, thus bringing to a close "the more or less 
veiled civil war" (58) raging within bourgeois society. As the 
final and "irreconcilable class antagonism 'between capital and 
labour" (59) receives its definitive resolution, society is thereby 
constituted afresh upon the solid foundation of the community of 
material interests; since, on Marxian principles, social antagonism 
arises as an epipnenomenon of real conflict rooted in the underlying 
mode of production (40), it is only by such a radical reconstruction 
of the economic substructure that social life itself might be 
advanced. With this initial act of social appropriation, mankind 
attains also to a domination of the material and spiritual processes 
of life.
In the words of Fischer,
economic conditions are more powerful than the
individual, that is not,, for him (Marx) an eternal
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law but a stage of historical development, the 
transcending of which is tne great task of 
humanity. The economy must not dominate man, it 
must be brought under the control of a humanity 
made up of associated individuals (41)
It is precisely this triumph, so it is claimed by Marx 
and his followers, which the revolution brings to pass.
In the task of ascertaining; Marx's position of the role 
of conceptions of justice in holdings’in post-rev.oliit’ionary society,
I am greatly aided, and to a certain extent pre-empted by Ziyad I. 
Husami's excellent article Marx on Distributive Justice (42). This 
work sets out to answer Professors Tucker and Wood, in respect of 
the tnesis which both in turn have subscribed to, to the effect that 
Marx did not, on a correct construction of his writings, consider 
capitalism as unjust. This position is set out by Wood in his 
article The Marxian Critique of Justice (43)• He finds himself in 
a stance which apparently directly contradicts Sir Kai'l Popper's 
dictum, "Marx's condemnation of capitalism is fundamentally a moral 
condemnation" (44)> by stating that although Marx did indeed condemn 
capitalism, he did not do so on the grounds of its alleged injustice. 
Indeed, Wood went so far as to maintain that Marx "insisted" (45) 
that capitalism is not unjust. What is claimed here is, essentially, 
that since the existing mode of productive activity is the real 
determinant of ethical values, it follows that justice is purely a 
matter of accordance and logical compatability of social values with 
tne economic structures of the age; principles of justice pertain 
to the self-image of tne epoch, and as such cannot be used to 
relatively evaluate the competing normative systems of other ages. (46) 
The contention is, therefore, that Marx does not in tne 
course of nis writings subscribe to any conception of justice as 
being the objectively correct one. In particular, Tucker founds 
upon trie distinction between scientific and ethical or utopian 
socialism. (47)
Going to the core of what would seem to be Marx's ethical 
theory, Wood seeks to establish that Marx did not consider 
capitalist appropriation of surplus value to be unjust; that is, 
that Marx's conception of exploitation yields a labour theory 
of value only, and not a LocKean labour theory of property♦ To this 
end, he founds on the division drawn by Marx himself between the
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respective magnitudes of the value of labour,'and of tne value of 
labour power. (48) Wood then proceeds to assert that since it is 
the latter of these which the capitalist purchases, he "merely makes 
use of what ne nas bought antecedent to the (labour) process." (49)
So although the difference between these two quantities accounts 
for the origin of surplus value, and therefore, profit, the 
accumulation of surplus value is an act of appropriation, but by 
ho means ah expropriation. Insofar as the worker is compensated 
in full for the economic cost of the lesser of these two magnitudes, 
his capacity for labour, as opposed to tne value created thereby, 
the transaction is a just one, consisting in the exchange of 
equivalent for equivalent.
In fact, there appears to be an implication in this passage 
that it is not the worker who is exploited, but merely his labour 
power, a commodity like any other; it should be noted, however, 
that such an interpretation of Marx could be directly confuted (50)* 
But later, Wood explicitly asserts (51) that the exploitation of 
labour by capital, tnough not an injustice, is, however, a mode of 
servitude. He is then quick to point out that there is no necessary 
logical connection between exploitation or servitude on the one hand 
and injustice on the other; this fully reflects the principle made 
familiar by Hume that no descriptive term or terms by themselves 
entail further, evaluative,'terms. (52) The use by Marx of terms, 
descriptive of matters and relationships , so universally and 
popularly used in condemnation, and therefore appearing as synonymous 
with evaluative terms, yields the .illusion, but no more than 
illusion of moral denunciation (55)* In this connection, Wood 
demonstrates that the labour theory of value only yields the 
consequence that profits involve injustice when conjoined with the 
labour theory of property, "a natural rights doctrine often 
mistakenly associated or identified with it" (54)
One of course concedes that sucn albeit dislogistic terms 
as "servitude" and "exploitation" do not in themselves entail value 
judgements, whether reactive or otnerwise. After all, we frequently 
talk of the exploitation of natural resources, without for a 
second seeking to imply that the resources are in any sense 
wronged thereby. It seems pertinent here to interject tnat communism 
does not put an end to exploitation, but rather restores it to its
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proper spnere; the wide variety of defects of all pre-revolutionary 
societies can be exhaustively subsumed under two curious inversions, 
namely the treatment of sentient beings as mere means to an end, . 
and of nature, the category of pure being, as an end in itself, in 
the form of the subjugation of persons to impersonal forces.
But against the thesis of Wood and 'Pucker, Husarni is wholly 
correct in drawing' attention to a number of passages in which Marx 
employs explicitly and undeniably'normative terminology, such as 
’'expropriation” (55) - which of course must be contrasted with 
appropriation - "theft" (5b)» and. "extortion". (57) I can but refer 
tne reader to Husami's article itself (58), in wnich its author 
presents an inventory of terms much more impressive than that offered 
here. Furtner, Husarni asserts that the seeming' validity of the 
tnesis presented by Wood and Tucker (indeed, tnelatter of these 
gentlemen considered that he had rendered any contrary opinion 
"untenable" (59)) rests upon passages taken from Marx which have 
been sundered from contexts in which they clearly disclose a 
satirical vein. Chief amongst these is a statement by Marx to the 
effect that the conditions giving rise to the appropriation of 
surplus value amount to
a piece of good luck for the buyer, (i.e. of labour 
power) but by no means an injustice to the seller 
(the worker) (bO)
Having referred to this passage, and having had regard to 
the over-a.ll context, I can but endorse and corroborate Husami’s 
conclusion in tnis respect. It is quite clear that.in this passage 
Marx is describing phenomenal appearances, the self-image that is 
the imperfect bourgeois conception of justice; it is immediately 
after these lines that the characterisation of the appropriation 
as a "trick" (6l), referred to by Husarni, follows, and immediately 
before, Marx describes such a vindication of capitalism as "litany" 
(62), fabricated merely with the design of "pull(ing) the wool over 
our eyes." (63)
If the authentic construction be otherwise, and Marx does 
not indeed deny the adequacy of the bourgeois conception of justice, 
what can he possibly have intended by the following?
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He (tne capitalist) does not care twopence for 
it (the litany). He leaves this and all similar 
subterfuges and conjuring tricks to trie 
professors of political economy, who are paid 
for it (64)
Similarly, Tucker attributes to Marx the opinion that talk 
of rights and justice nad in his time "now 'become obsolete verbal 
rubbish". ,(65) Again, this dictum is quite faithfully transposed, 
but its tine meaning is obscured by severance from context. For 
reasons of style unknown, Marx's discussion of post-revolutionary 
arrangements in this passage runs in the present tense. Thus, for 
example, Marx writes earlier in the same passage of "communist 
society ... as it has developed on its own foundations". (66) It 
would certainly make an interesting extension to Tucker's thesis to 
allege that Marx's writings bear evidence that he held the view 
that communism had, in 1875> already arrived.
Husarni draws a distinction as between Marx's sociology of 
morals, that is, his tneory of the mutual interaction of the various 
successive conceptions of Right with the economic substructure (67), 
on tne one nand, and, on the other, his moral theory, that is, the 
conception of Right to which ne himself subscribed and considered 
suitable for adoption by the revolutionary classes (68); from here, 
Husarni goes on to state that the error committed by Wood and Tucker 
is a consequence of tne confusion of these two quite separate 
matters, so that at bottom tneir contention reduces to the not very 
remarkable, and indeed circular, thesis that capitalism is wholly 
in accordance with its own specific conception of justice.
Husarni goes on to maintain that Marx's sociology of morals 
does not logically exclude him from espousing values not yet 
confirmed in the practice of society, and evaluating bourgeois 
institutions in terms of these transcendent (though not, as we 
shall see, eternal) norms; that is, Marx is not thereby committed 
to a form of ethical relativism. Indeed, quite the reverse; it 
would seem that in order to be abl^/^o^properlyj criticise existing 
institutions, that is, to evaluate them in the terms of norms 
pertaining to higher forms of cultural development, one must first 
be clear as to what these higher forms will be. One qualification 
to this is necessary; the criticism of normative values need not
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proceed by the comparison of these to transcendent norms, and by 
extension need not imply subscription to these. Thus Buchanan 
speaks of the "internal critique” of values, whereby they are 
criticised not by reference to other values, but to internal 
inconsistency or erroneous assumption of fact. (69)
It is with a determination, although not with an evaluative 
assessment, of Marx’s position that tiusami concerns himself in the 
remainder of the article.
Marx’s sociology of morals requires further examination. 
Essentially, normative ideologies belong to the substructure, that 
totality of ideas thrown up in the course of the. self-development 
of themdterial foundations of history; the consciousness determined 
by "the conditions of its social existence and, particularly, by 
its class interests” (70) (indeed, it might be said that the 
"veil of ignorance” (71) device employed by Rawls appears to amount 
to a more or less explicit acknowledgement of this principle.) It 
follows that insofar as a given society is based upon an antagonistic 
mode of production, or else upon a normative expression thereof, it 
shall have appertaining to it not a single conception of justice, 
but also, arising alongside the dominant conception, as antithesis 
to thesis, the conception expressive of the consciousness and 
interests of the oppressed, the rising class; tnese are its "would- 
be ruling norms". (?2) Out of the conflicting forces rooted-in the 
material conditions of life springs the contest of ideas which is 
their phenomenal reflex.
Conceptions of justice, then, possess two levels of existence; 
firstly, as the dominant ideology, finding- realisation and confirmation 
in the existing practice of society, and, secondly, as "counter-norms", 
(73) having a purely ideal or theoretical existence, and arising 
by virtue of the power of the negative. As such, normative ideology 
plays a vital role in animating and orchestrating the revolutionary 
class, and is an essential part of the dialectical mechanism .through 
which, according to Marx, social evolution is propelled. (74) Indeed, 
if we are to take seriously the view that revolutionary ideology 
exists as the ideological reflection of contradictions becoming more 
acute in the conditions of economic life, then it would seem that a 
major role for a revolutionary theory of justice must consist in the
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contrasting of existing norms with those which have become appropriate, 
and thus the evaluation of the former in terms of the latter. In 
the words of Engels,
The new productive forces have already outgrown the 
capitalistic mode of using them ... Modern socialism 
is notning but the reflex in the thought of this 
conflict in fact ... its ideal reflection (75)
It must be remembered in tnis connection, as in all others,
tnat the form of materialism propounded by Marx and Engels does not 
turn upon the non-existence of mind and ideas, but upon their 
substantive dependence upon the real. (76)
This counter-ideology is entirely ignored in Wood's article, . 
and he tnerefore completely fails to notice that there is no 
inconsistency involved in the evaluation of present conditions by 
means of emergent norms; nor does Tucker fare any better, referring 
as he does to "the only applicable norms of justice - tnose operative
in'the existing mode of production and exchange" (7?)
However it remains true, of course, tnat Marx was not 
primarily a moral philosopher; insofar as he concerns himself with 
the making of value .judgements, tnese are for the most part negative 
in character, so that his ethical views must to -a considerable extent
be inferred from the conception of injustice that can be pieced
together from his work. Essentially, this conception focusses upon 
the exploitative nature of the antagonistic, pre-socialist societies, 
briefly considered earlier, the injustice, like alienation, arising 
from and simultaneously reinforcing the private ownership of the 
means of production. It is especially appropriate to begin from a 
consideration of Marx's theory of exploitation, since 'he expressed 
it in remarkably precise, indeed mathematically exact, terms;
The rate of surplus-value is therefore an exact
expression for tne degree of exploitation of labour-
power by capital, or of the worker by tne capitalist. (78)
Following the English classical economists, particularly 
Ricardo (79)> Marx held tnat the exchange value of an object is 
determined by tne quantity (i.e. the product of tne intensity and
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duration) of labour put into it. Furthermore, labour possesses the 
peculiar characteristic of being1 able to create more economic 
value tnan is required for its maintenance and reproduction, "and 
this difference of the two values was what tne capitalist had in 
view, when he was purchasing the labour-power" (80).
Surplus value, although apparently arising in circulation, 
in .the process of commodity exchange, is in fact exclusively the 
product of stolen labour time. (81) The workers, owning no means 
of production, are obliged to alienate their productive capacities 
to the stranger who holds them as his own; dominion over the where­
withal of life entails a consequent dominion over men. In fact, 
there are passages in which Marx clearly equates labour rendered 
under such conditions with forced labour (82); emancipation, from 
slavery or serfdom may appear* empty indeed, in the face of a 
continuing denial of direct access to the instruments of production.
What distinguishes the various economic formations 
of society - the distinction between for example a • 
society based on wage-labour - is tne form in which 
this surplus labour is in each case extorted from 
the immediate producer, trie worker (83)
At any rate, the capitalist profits by requiring the worker 
to continue labouring for a longer period than is necessary to meet 
his wages. Labour rendered after this point, Marx considers to be 
"unpaid labour" (84)• He is enabled to reach this conclusion by 
conceiving of contract as essentially consisting in the exchange
of equivalents, rather than in the apparently free exchange of 
entitlements.
At this stage, a few doubts present themselves. As for the 
idea of equivalents, it might be asked, whether, after all, economic 
value is to be.quantified by reference to any objective standard. (85) 
Might it not be said that an object's value rests on tne particular 
will and circumstances, the illusion of objective value resting- on 
the price determination which arises,out of exchange? If this were 
not so, and the values attached to particular objects by different 
people did not vary, would exchange take place at all? If it is 
indeed true that the opposition of preferences is the foundation 
of contract, it becomes plausible to defend commodity exchange
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on the grounds that it affords the means whereby individuals are 
led to pursue, albeit unconsciously, the utilitarian goal of the 
greatest happiness of the greatest number, in such a manner, indeed, 
that does not entail the sacrifice of some for others. (86) The 
answer lies, perhaps, in part at least, in that the pattern of 
preferences is itself artificial, and is influenced by the unequal 
distribution of economic power. It might thus be argued that the 
benefits of exchange in a contract of employment, for example, have 
no more real basis than the apparent benefits of exchange which arise 
from blackmail or extortion.
For socialists, it is consequent that an unequal contract 
involves a disparity, an imbalance, an injustice. (87)
From all this it would emerge that the foundation and true 
source of bourgeios private wealth consists in "the theft of the 
labour time of others" (88). The foregoing, incidentally, operates 
to directly contradict Tucker's dictum;
They (Marx and Engels) do not admit that profit 
from wage labour under the capitalist system 
is 'theft' (89)
As to the rignts which are central to the bourgeois conception 
of justice, Marx's main critique of these is contained in his essay,
On The Jewish Question. (90) As well as being the definitive 
repository of Marx's tneories on religion (91)» it sets out to 
consider
the so-called human rights, human rights in their 
authentic form, the form that they have in the 
writings of their discoverers, the North Americans 
and French. (92)
On The Jewish Question is essentially a reply to a work of 
the same title by Marx's contemporary Bruno Bauer, in which the 
latter argued that in order to overcome their civil disabilities, 
and thus to attain to the rignts of man, the Jews required first, 
to emancipate themselves from their religion, since their very 
nature as Jews set them apart from the community. (93) On the 
contrary, argued Marx, their Jewishness presents no objection to 
their political emancipation, since it is upon "egoism" and not
123
upon community that the "rights of man" of bourgeois society are 
based. Jewish emancipation, as a microcosm of political emancipation 
generally, does not bring the Ideal to fruition, rather this is 
accomplished in a wider numan emancipation by means of which man­
kind’s alienation, manifesting itself in the political state divorced 
from community, and in religion, is superceded. What is required, 
writes Marx, is not freedom of religion, freedom of property, and 
freedom of trade, but freedom from religion, • freedom from property, 
and freedom from the egoism of trade. Religion (and therefore 
religious antagonism) arises merely as the epiphenornenon of real 
misery, so that with the positive abolition of economic exploitation 
and degradation, the rignt to freedom of religion, hailed as a sacred 
and eternal truth, becomes both redundant and meaningless (94); 
bourgeois rights generally, then, far from being natural and eternal, 
pertain merely to an inautnentic and transient chapter of human 
history.
What then, apart from freedom of religion, are these rights 
of man, these "purely formal rights with which the world of 
selfishness surrounds itself" (95)? ' Essentially they are, as 
enumerated by Article 2 of the American Constitution', .of 1793»
"equality, liberty, security, property" (96). Eacn of these, however, 
requires to be examined in turn.
In terms of Article 6, "Liberty is the power that belongs to 
man to do anything that does not infringe on the right of someone 
else" (97). But, for Marx, "The freedom in question is that of a 
man treated as an isolated monad and witndrawn into himself" (98). 
Liberty, above all, is defined with reference to property, or 
exclusive dominion over some arbitrarily determined portion of the 
world's resources and surface area. Elsewhere, Marx writes of 
"private ownership of the globe" (99) as an absurdity and states 
that even the whole of society represents only the "usufructuaries" (99) 
Article 16 defines the concept of property;
The right of property is the right which belongs 
to all citizens to enjoy and dispose at will, of 
their goods and revenues,.the fruit of their work 
and industry. (100)
However, it might be argued that for people to be able to
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enjoy "the fruit of their work and industry", the socialist principle 
of justice in holdings (101), whicn directly correlates distribution 
to labour contribution, would first have to be implemented.
Private property, incidentally, is as a side constraint the 
supercession of arbitrary dominion, but paradoxically at the same 
time delineates an area, a perimeter, within which arbitrary dominion 
holds sway. (102)
Human self-centredness appears simultaneously as the cause 
and justification of private property, but, in reality, according 
to Marx (103), the relationship is, the reverse, self-interest, as a 
form of alienation or estrangement arises not as the original cause 
but the symptom of acquisitive society.
Equality, of course, is conceived of, by Article 3 of the 
American Constitution of 1793» in the purely formal sense, and 
consists in that "the law is the same for all, whether it protects 
or punishes" (104). Security, also, is conceived of only in its 
weak sense, of protection from aggression, and the conservation of 
property. In the words of Saintsburg, "Even the 'right to live' 
extends no further than the right to protection against murder." (10b) 
This severely7 limited conception of security not only does not include, 
but actually of necessity excludes, security in the positive sense, 
of freedom from want and destitution. (106)
The formulation of the rignt to security nere under consider­
ation, nowever, does in one important respect diverge from Nozick's 
system; according to Nozick (107), the rignt to security, as positive 
protection, does not arise as an automatic consequence of the rights 
thereby protected, but only insofar as this is purchased from others. 
Nozick thus takes this particular conception of justice to logical 
purity; the positive right to protection of one's entitlements, 
independent from any contractual arrangement, must be taken as a 
qualification and partial rejection of the other rignts simultaneously 
espoused. We are presented with the paradox tnat rights to property, 
taken absolutely, actually operate to exclude the right to security 
in one's property.
With the coming of the proletarian revolution, however, in 
which all social stratification arising' from private ownership of 
the means of production and therefore class conflict, is abolished, 
all this is reversed. Tne instruments of production, and tne process
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of production itself, as a superintendance over natural agencies, 
are placed in the nands of the new.community,, so that individual 
property (108) arises only in the "means of consumption" (109), or*'
finished social product. No longer is Right merely "the religious
caricature of morality and law in general" (110).
Marx’s statement on the principles governing post-revolution­
ary society finds its locus classicus in a work of 1875 > the
Critique of the Gotha Programme (ill)
■Two post-revolutionary principles are identified, the 
socialist principle, which-already has been discussed (112), and 
growing out of and superceding iti*. 'the communist-principle, "From each
according to his ability, to each according to his needs" (113).
Tne emergence of communism out of socialism is a direct 
natural and spontaneous development, taking place without the need 
for a further revolution, much in the same fashion as monopoly 
capitalism naturally arises as the negation of individual private 
property, which latter corresponds to the beginnings of bourgeois 
society. (114)
The socialist principle',1 which, as we have seen, entails 
distribution of the means of consumption in direct proportion to 
labour contribution to socially organised production, corresponds 
to the period of revolutionary transition from capitalism to 
communism, that is, the phase of political transformation in which 
"the state can be nothing but tne revolutionary dictatorship of the 
proletariat." (115)
Marx’s critique consists largely in an attack on the 
nebulous concepts of "undiminished proceeds of labour" (116), and 
"fair distribution" (117) contained in the pious and platitudinous 
resolutions of the Gotha conference. For what is meant by "fair"?
Is not capitalism "fair" on its own terms? In any event, Marx argues, 
it is false and fundamentally misconceived to conceive of socialism 
as turning on a question of distribution - still less of redistrib­
ution - independently from the relations of production; since the 
distribution of wealth and also fungibles results more or less as 
an inevitable consequence.of the underlying conditions of production, 
it is upon the organisation of these that attention requires to be 
focussed. (118) And as to the former phrase, what is intended by it? 
Is it, "the product of labour or its value?" (119 ) The total value
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of the product, or only that added to it by labour?
Marx gives tne following answer. .'Before tne social product 
can be divided up and distributed, there are three preliminary 
deductions to be made. Tnese are a matter of economic necessity, 
and, as such, in no way calculable.by equity. Firstly, there are 
to be deducted funds for the replacement of the means of production 
used up; ’’the lost steel of the spindle". (120) Secondly, an 
additional deduction to furnish the expansion of production. (Who 
would decide on the proper extent of this? Would the absence of 
class antagonism necessarily entail the absence of serious disagree­
ment?) Thirdly, to'maintain a reserve fund, an insurance against 
calamity'. After these three deductions, what remains represents.the 
"means of consumption". From this, there remain three further 
deductions to be made, so that the right to one’s own labour is not 
absolute, even in socialist society. The first of these is the 
general cost of administration (121). (But is this really a 
deduction; does not administrative work count as a part of socially 
necessary labour to be treated on the same basis as any other labour 
undertaken in socialist society?) Marx believed that this expenditure 
would become increasingly restricted with the development of post­
revolutionary society; it goes almost without saying, however, that 
tne experience of countries where socialist ideology has taken root 
has been exactly the reverse. There are also to be deducted "funds 
for those unable to work etc." (122) But how much would such people 
receive? The same amount as is received by the average worker?
As the least productive of the workers? Less? If so, how much less? 
Marx leaves the question unanswered, indeed, unconsidered. Elsewhere, 
as I have already stated, he advances the view that any particular 
distribution arises spontaneously and automatically from the under­
lying relations of production, but it is difficult to see how this 
could apply here. The next deduction represents what is.required 
"for the common satisfaction of needs, such as schools, health 
services etc." (123)
The quantum of tnis expenditure grows in direct proportion 
to the development of post-revolutionary society. This passage is 
to be read togetner with the final part of the Manifesto of the 
Communist Party, which enumerates measures wnich would become 
applicable in socialist society. (124) The language here is purely
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predictive, a statement of what will be, but it seems that the over­
all context requires the view that Marx was also simultaneously 
proposing these measures. In this account, he writes of "free 
education for all children in public schools" (124), but no mention 
is made for health. Particularly since health services are 
specifically referred to in the passage from the Critique of the 
Gotha Programme quoted above, it seems most probable that this 
omission was the result of an oversight. It is as well to point 
out, however, that the two accounts of socialist social organisation 
differ; the Manifesto of the Communist Party version provides for a 
graduated income tax, which presupposes deductions from incbme 
ratner than direct distribution after requisite deductions have been 
made, as envisaged by the Critique of the Gotha Programme. Taxation 
in any case represents distribution being effected by political 
intervention, as opposed to determination by tne.underlying mode of 
production. It seems that a total end to private industry is not 
envisaged by the ten measures in the Manifesto; the seventh point 
mentions only "Extension of the factories and instruments of 
production owned by the state" (124).
Be that as it may, it remains the case that distribution in 
direct proportion to labour contribution is not logically compatible 
with a progressive income tax. One must of course remember tnat 
twenty-seven years elapsed between the two works, so this time-lapse 
no doubt accounts for the discrepancies, at least in part. It seems 
safe to take the later work, the Critique of tne Gotha Programme, as 
representing the mature views of Marx* One item, in the tenth 
"commandment", is rather mysterious; "Abolition of children’s factory 
labour in its present form" (125). It is unfortunate that Marx did 
not care to elaborate upon tnis potentially illuminating remark (126) ; 
one might however observe that there are certain tasks which are 
le/swnently suited to children, as spare time occupations. The 
cnief objectors to laws completely abolishing cnild labour would 
witnout doubt be the children themselves.
As A.J.P. Taylor wrote in his introduction to the Manifesto 
of the Communist Party, "Most of (the ten reforms) have been carried 
out by states far from proletarian." (127) It seems pertinent to 
remark in passing that had the ten reforms been offered as forecasts 
of developments in post-war Western ILiirope, Marx would have met with
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considerably more success tnan that with which he has met in 
connection with the predictive analysis which ne did in fact make. 
(128) The provision for a graduated income tax, centralisation of 
the means of communication and transport in the hands of the state, 
free education and central planning of the distribution of population 
are particularly reminiscent of the present day United Kingdom.
There is one further matter which requires attention before 
I leave the ten reforms of the Manifesto, namely the substance of 
the third reform, "abolition of all rights of inheritance" (124) in 
other words, of the right to bequeatn. This also raises the suspicion 
that complete abolition of private ownership of capital was not at 
this time envisaged, and also contradicts the later Marx in a further 
fundamental respect. Marx was later to make the point that just as 
the laws of slavery do not precede the institution of slavery (129), 
real reform can only be effected not by means of piecemeal 
adjustment of societal.norms, but only by means of changing the 
foundations of society, the conditions of production. It is clear 
from the Critique of the Gotha Programme that trade as such would
end, not because it would be rendered illegal, but because it would
)
become impossible, since the entitlements over commodities that 
trade presupposes would no longer exist. (l$0)' In just the same 
way inheritance of tne means of production would also be "positively 
abolished" (151), since the means for effecting this, that is, 
private ownership of the means of production (l$2) would have ceased 
to exist. In this connection, one might speculate as to whether 
inheritance in the limited sense of inheritance of the means of 
consumption and work certificates not used up at the time of death 
might not continue. (By means of a system of certificates, Marx 
tells us, the worker under socialism receives the same amount of 
labour as he has contributed to it in another form.(153) This of 
course must not be taken absolutely, but as modified by my earlier 
outline of Marx's pronouncements on deductions (194)). And if this 
is so, might not these certificates also be freely transferable as 
among tne living? If not, why not? If so, in what respect would 
they differ from the "Universal whore" (195), money?
The principle of contract, however, according to Marx, would 
now attain its fullest fruition, in the sense that it would now 
truly become an exchange-oi1 equivalents, in reality and not simply
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in appearance; Ma given amount of labour in ope form is exchanged 
for an equal amount of labour in another form" (156). No doubt, 
economic demand for such goods and services that people are willing 
to trade these certificates for would play a major role in deciding 
what goods and services are to be produced. Supply, in other words, 
would continue to be correlated to demand, although not by the 
automatic operation of the price mechanism, but through the conscious 
decision of the central production planning autnority. This line 
of speculation tends to find confirmation in Marx's castigation of' 
private property in the means of production as the falsifier of 
economic relations (157); witnout tnis source of distortion, economic 
"signals" would, no doubt, operate more accurately and efficiently.
In any event, people would not be inclined to work if they could not 
use their labour certificates to obtain the goods and services which 
they actually wanted; it remains an important element of freedom 
that individuals be permitted to direct their efforts to ends which 
they themselves chose. Although deductions are made, these 
deductions, we are told, somewhat vaguely, all benefit the worker 
in an indirect form, in his capacity as a member of society. (158)
And yet, the absolute mode of social intercourse is not yet 
reached, there are still "defects" (159); Mln spite of this advance, 
this equal right is still constantly stigmatised by a bourgeois 
limitation" (140) That is, the equality consists in the application 
of an equal standard, labour contribution. But the consequence is 
the maintenance of a further imbalance. Different individuals are 
unequally endowed, some are superior to others in intensity and 
quality of labour power than others, so that the socialist principle 
continues to recognise unequal endowments as "natural privileges". (140) 
Besides, the socialist principle takes no account of varying needs, 
such as family responsibilities and so forth. (159)
Marx clearly recognises that "equality" taken as a totality 
is an incoherent and therefore impossible notion, and as such has 
the appearance of freedom from self-contradiction only in one or 
other of its specific abstractions; consequently, equality in one 
form of necessity contradicts it in another. "It (the socialist 
principle) is therefore a right of inequality in its content like 
any other right". (140) He also acknowledges the tension, also founded 
on by Nozick (141), as between formal and substantial equality; to
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surmount the ''defects", "Right instead of being equal would have 
to be unequal" (159)*
As socialist society advances, it grows to conform to a 
new and final principle, the communist principle. The fully 
developed productive technology, a legacy of the bourgeois age, (142) 
brings emancipation from the more stultifying forms of labour, and 
the deliverance from want and deprivation is procured by the new­
found social productivity; now can "society inscribe on its banner:
Prom each according to his ability, to each according to his needsi"
(139)
One reservation, a relatively minor one no doubt, springs 
immediately to mind; this maxim does not present us with a complete 
principle of distribution, since it deals only with needs. How are 
less pressing desires to be met, that is, how is the social product 
remaining after the satisfaction of needs to be distributed? This 
principle, and also the socialist principle, are both also incomplete 
in the further sense that they appear to envisage the means of 
production and tne means of consumption as exhaustive categories, so 
that the position of consumer durables is to say the least left 
unclear. One must of course remember that Marx wrote in the nine­
teenth century, before tne present age in which telephones, 
televisions, stereos, motor cars and all the rest have become common­
place. It seems plausible to suggest that Marx no more foresaw this 
state of affairs than Hegel, who saw the conflict of nation states 
as a means to progress, envisaged a condition of things in which 
men would come to a possession of the means to self-obliteration. (143) 
Let us take this objection one step further, in conjunction 
with that made earlier, concerning the resemblance of work cert­
ificates to money. Suppose that one man has accumulated all the 
consumer durables that he requires, perhaps because he has been 
engaged in productive activity for a number of years, and that
another man, who has been working for a shorter time, finds that .
his present requirement for such articles is far in excess of his 
immediate spending power. Might not the first man, then, enter into 
an agreement of loan with the second, albeit charging interest?
And, if this should prove sufficiently lucrative, may not the first
man then make his living in this fashion, perhaps acting as a 
go-between, borrowing from others in this position, at one rate of
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interest, and lending- to others at a higher rate. (Such an activity 
would not of course entail the personal ownership of any instruments 
of production). It is all very well to talk of state control of 
credit (144'); tut at the same time, tnere is something decidedly 
unsatisfactory and contradictory about the placing of limitations 
on the excnanges of entitlements which free men may enter into. (145) 
While Nozick1s conception, as 1 have maintained, cannot succeed as 
a complete system,' (146) nevertheless, particularly insofar as it 
relates to freedom of transfer being implicit in and inseparable 
from tne concept of entitlement, it would appear to admit of 
rehabilitation in the limited sense of placing constraints qb wha+< can 
satisfactorily be concluded to be just.
In any event, this example serves to illustrate tnat even 
the full socialisation of tne means of production would not eliminate 
all occasions in whicn there is scope for mutually beneficial 
exchanges to take place. If tnis is so, then a wide range of trans­
actions between individuals cannot but appear legitimate, and this 
fact cannot be reconciled to any final patterned distribution of 
the means of consumption. The socialist principle.then, as best, 
might find itself relegated to the status of a precept regulating- 
initial distribution only.
I.would affirm, then, that the lending of money with interest 
has no necessary incompatibility with tne Idea of justice, that is, 
justice in its perfected form. Nor indeed, by extension, would 
tnere appear to be any direct affront to justice if the funds 
required for investment be raised not by compulsory deduction from 
the total social output, but from voluntary individual subscriptions 
giving rise to differential shares in tne socially owned means of 
production, and in produce thereform.
These objections laid to one side for the present, we 
perceive that in the Marxian scheme of things, production is at 
last, once the socialist principle has been fully superceded by the 
communist principle, geared directly to tne satisfaction of 
specifically human endg.
This much having been made clear, the time has come for me 
to relax, and, if necessary, to discard, a central assumption which •
I have so far made, tnat is, the assumption that the absolute 
condition =of human society coincides with and consists in the full
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development and actualisation of the Idea of Right. For, if the 
realisation of the communist principle represents justice made 
actual, then how can Marx, without severe self-contradiction, 
write that;
Communism abolishes eternal truths, it abolishes 
all religion, and all morality, instead of 
constituting them on a new basis (147) ?
Further, in the Critique of the Gotha Programme (139)9 he 
states that under communism, "equal rignt", "fair distribution" and 
so forth become "obsolete verbal rubbish ... ideological nonsense 
about right and otner trasn."
It would appear, that in Marx’s account, the communist 
principle is not a principle of distributive justice at all, but 
rather tnat it represents tne supercession of Right, which has by 
now been brought to full development in the shape of the socialist 
principle; equal rignt, under socialism, exists in practice, not 
merely in principle. (148)
"Right", Marx tells us, "by its very nature can consist 
only in the application of an equal standard" (140); the equal 
standard being labour contribution. (149)
Consider the following; "only then (i.e. with the advent of 
communism) can the narrow horizon of bourgeois right be crossed."
(139)
This is, on tne face of it, ambiguous. Does "bourgeois 
rignt" refer to the bourgeois conception, or the bourgeois Idea 
of Right? Tnat is, tne wnole question arises as to wnether the 
regulation of human affairs by means of generally applicable norms, 
rights and duties is the enduring and empty form within which social 
development takes place, or else is a phenomenon specific to a 
certain limited historical context. In the light of. the foregoing, 
it seems indisputable that the latter construction is the authentic 
one. This would appear especially so, since immediately after the 
passage from the Manifesto of the Communist Party quoted above (150), 
Marx goes on to point out that the fact tnat religion, lav; and 
morality have thus far (in 1848) survived all political change, 
albeit in ever-changing conceptions, is not to be taken as confirm­
ation of tnese as eternal forms, but rather a^s explicable in terms
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of the basic feature that has been common'to all societies prior to 
socialism, "viz., the exploitation of one part of society by the 
other" (l^ l) Husarni, it would therefore seein, has quite simply 
missed the point when he describes the communist principle as "the 
principle of distributive justice in communist society*” (152)
Lenin himself also commits the very same error, for he writes that 
socialism "still cannot produce justice and equality", (.155) this 
task being left to communism. Further, he states that for Marx,
"equal right (by which socialist society is characterised) is really 
a violation of equality, and an injustice" (154) If this is not 
after all an erroneous construction of Marx's position in Critique 
of the Gotha 'Program, then it is difficult to see what Marx can have 
meant by the passage earlier quoted, concerning tne communistic 
supercession of "ideological nonsense about rignt and other trash." 
(155) Lenin, then, would seem to have entirely missed the analytical 
connection between justice and self-interest, that is, limited 
altruism. (156)
For this reason, I do not believe that Marx advanced the 
communist principle as a principle of justice or of Right. Indeed, 
it is open to question that he- even intended it as an administrative 
norm, such as would in its application raise questions of formal 
justice. It is this point which Bucnanan is making when he argues 
that;
Marx is not offering the slogan as a communist 
principle of distributive justice, but rather a 
description of the way things will in fact be in 
communism (157)
Lenin's error in identifying communism with justice acquires 
considerable significance later in this chapter, as, it shall trans­
pire that Lenin exnibited this misconception not merely by words 
but also by deed. (158)
Although, as Husarni correctly asserts, Marx is not precluded 
from evaluating present conditions in terms of transcendent standards, 
and in fact does so, it does not follow that these standards are 
eternal, nor that they represent for Marx justice, or even Right, 
in its final form.In its realisation, the communist principle 
represents not tne actualisation, but the supercession of Right;
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distribution according to needs exists as a value only in the purely 
negative sense that it serves as a transcendent.norm, as a critical 
evaluation of the values and institutions of pre-communist societies.
It is in this sense that Buchanqn asserts that communism, 
in Marx’s system, is the solution to the problem of justice, not 
because it is its realisation, but because it renders the whole 
concept redundant, (159) and maintains that
communist society - the society of autonomous, 
socially integrated individuals - will not be 
a society in which (general) conceptions of 
rights or justice play any significant or major 
-role in structuring social relationships. (160)
There appears'a further interesting statement in an article 
from the ’’Sunday Times” Review (161), in relation to a review of 
Buchanon’s Marx and Justice, and Wood's Karl Marx (162);
What's distinctive about Marx's view is the 
thougnt tnat eventually considerations of justice 
will simply disappear; an obsession with justice 
is typical of capitalist societies based on 
private property, where everyone is fearful of 
being robbed - and indeed the worker is robbed.
Marx, like Nozick, quite clearly considers justice and the 
direct provision for need as two quite separate matters, and it is 
around tne incompatibility of the two tnat his critique of Right, 
and not of any particular conception thereof, revolves.
In the Marxian scheme of things, I would suggest, it is 
during the not yet perfect socialist phase that justice finds its 
full conceptual development, and remains as a direct legacy of the 
bourgeois age from which it grew. It will be recalled that I 
earlier remarked that the concept of property in the form of the 
definition given in the American Constitution would require socialism 
to bring it into proper effect (163); some system of property rights 
is of course necessarily entailed by the concept of distributive, 
justice, and therefore the supercession of property entails the 
supercession of distributive justice. Related to this, socialism 
gives full expression to the operation of self-interest within a . 
framework of rules of conduct, (164) by directly correlating
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distribution of material goods to labour contribution. Also, the 
theoretical difficulty of original acquisition, which appears 
intractable in the bourgeois age (165), is resolved, since rights 
to objects of value come to depend upon rignts to some determinate 
portion of the total social output. Similarly, I have referred 
to the fact that the principle of contract, according to Marx, 
that is, the exchange of equivalent for equivalent, would also come 
to full realisation. (166)
I do not claim that Marx expressly equated socialism with 
justice; I seek only to demonstrate that this equation accords with, 
that is, it does not contradict in any important respect, Marx's 
statements as contained in The Critique of the Gotha Program and 
elsewhere.
There is a fifth sense in which this assertion rings true; 
insofar as I am entitled to assume tnat the judicial function would 
continue into tne socialist age, formal justice for the first time 
becomes a real possibility, with the elimination of the possibility 
of judicial class bias. (167)
This assumption, in fact, turns out to be correct, for in 
a passage from Marx's The Civil War in France (l68), it transpires 
that a judiciary is indeed a part of the reconstructed socialist 
state, although now shorn of its "sham independence" (l69),.and 
like all other officials under socialism, the judicial functionaries 
are "to be elective, responsible, and revocable" (169). In passing, 
one might express the misgiving that such "reselection" for judges 
might be seen as the supplanting of justice by mass sentiment. 
Similarly, in what sense would "people's courts" (170) differ from 
kangaroo courts?
but now, with the advent of communism, the wnole affair of. 
law, state and religion grows increasingly superfluous'; they are 
positively abolished, not in the sense that they are deliberately 
overthrown or destroyed, but rather in that they vanish as a 
spontaneous development (l?l) together with the material conditions 
which gave no rise.to them, and of which they are tne ghostly 
reflection. The institution of Right arises as the negation of and 
necessary solution to tne estrangement of man from man, but in its 
triumph necessarily procures its own dissolution, and witners away;
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the Idea of Right presupposes that men continue to some extent at 
variance with one another, that is, that it has not fully attained 
its own specific object. In short, Eight finds itself in the dual 
and self-contradictory role of representing simultaneously tne 
solution to and product or expression of alienation. (172) As 
volition objectified, it seeks to unite subject with object, but 
its expression presupposes its own limited realisation. All this 
becomes particularly evident in Bentnam’s characterisation of the 
function of the law as the “artificial identification of interests." 
(173) How superfluous and unnecessary, then, when the identification 
is no longer artificial but real.
"It has been pointed out by Rawls that the theory of justice 
presupposes limited social motivation, and that the society in 
which all men spontaneously co-operate, like a colony of ants or 
bees in which the common interest in no way diverges from that of 
the individual, is a society beyond justice; "It has eliminated 
the occasions when the appeal to the principles of right and 
justice is necessary". (174) This, according to Rawls, is how 
Tucker nas interpreted tne Marxian account of communism. (175)
With the release from stultifying forms of labour, and with 
the new-found material abundance (176), the norms of distributive 
justice, which presuppose, a condition of things in which there 
is insufficient means to the full satisfaction of all wants become 
not merely superfluous, but also wholly devoid of meaning. As the 
human mind attains to a state of final and all-embracing self- 
awareness, and with the arrival of the new-found brotherhood of 
man, securely founded in the material conditions of life, all false 
ideology, the phantoms of human imagining, finally comprehended, 
evaporate, and are forever laid to rest.
Nonetheless, it seems appropriate for me to consider briefly 
the precise relationship of Marxian theory to the doctrine of 
utilitarianism, primarily since it has been charged (ill) that Marx's 
moral theory reduces to "simply a crude utilitarianism." (178)
In point of fact, Marx was singularly unimpressed by the 
principle of utility (179), contending that this reduction to a 
single principle, indeed an "apparently metaphysical abstraction" 
(180) merely reflected the subordination in bourgeois society to 
“one abstract monetary-commercial relation" (ISO).
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It will also be noticed that rny earlier remarks on the 
realisation of objective rationality (181) bear at least a .passing 
resemblance to the utilitarian advocacy of the extension of the 
principle of rational choice, that is, the balancing of contending 
interests in such a manner that the most ponderous prevail, to the 
sphere of interpersonal, that is, social relations.
To this extended principle, there are apparently two 
possible interpretations. Firstly, that tne interests of some are 
to be counterbalanced by the more ponderous and contrary interests 
of otners. Alternatively, tnat an interest neld by all is to be 
outweighed by a greater interest similarly held by all. The second 
interpretation is not of course a categorical, moral, principle, :
since it does not purport to assess the opposing claims of .competing 
individuals, but ratner is a hypotnetical principle which presupposes 
a realised community of interests.
There are, incidentally, two aspects to taxation which 
correspond to the two sides of the dichotomy; firstly, where the 
tax is to finance some common good in a manner'tnat the unregulated 
market cannot (182), and secondly, wnere the tax serves an object 
wnich is overtly redistributive. To redistributive taxation, a 
furtner subdivision falls to be made. Firstly, it can be in the 
form of an actual transfer, as witn social security, or it can take 
the form of a constructive redistribution brought about by progress­
ive taxation (18^ ), or even by means of a proportional tax exacted 
for equal services.
' In the particular brand of utilitarianism espoused by Hume, 
utility is envisaged as co-inciding with the common good. According 
to Rawls, tnis theory is not properly speaking utilitarian, since
he considers the essence of utilitarianism to lie in the fact 
that it permits, indeed requires, tne imposition of sacrifices on 
some where this procures a greater aggregate of advantages for 
otners. Rawls claims that no mention of this is made by Hume (184), 
so that in his writings the problem of the priority of justice, as 
a system of constraints on action, simply does not arise.
Now this notion of Hume’s, the "common good", would appear 
immediately objectionable; it is tne essence of bourgeois society 
that .in it there is no such common good, rather, it is the whole 
foundation of Mark's analysis and critique (18^ ) of tne bourgeois
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epoch that its identifying feature is the myriad of opposing and 
interacting interests which it entails. (186)
Conversely, it would appear to follow tnat the principle 
of utility would become directly applicable under communism; since 
there would no longer be any antagonism of material interests, 
there could be no question of the weighing of the interests of some 
against the opposing interests of others. It would appear therefore 
that side-constraint conceptions (187) presuppose a social back­
ground marked by an essential disharmony of interests. But with 
the coming of communism, according to the Marxian conception,
"nature's eternal harmony" (188) ceases to exist only in transcend­
ent or at any rate ideological forms, and becomes immanent within 
society itself. Further, tne basic alienation model earlier 
expounded, taking tne form of tne opposition of the general to the 
sum of immediate particular interests, can be used to demonstrate 
tnat in tne imperfect society there are two levels on which interests ' 
can be said to exist; the immediate, or phenomenal, and the 
transcendent, or noumenal. (189) Tne realisation of objectified 
rationality, consisting in the resolution of this opposition in 
true community, and which in itself in no way entails the subordin­
ation of the interests of some to the interests of others, is a 
furtner sense in which the Ideal becomes the real, and the real, 
becomes the Ideal.
In tne light of these considerations, it becomes a much 
simpler task to discern the nature of the errors committed by Wood, 
and at the same time tne element of truth contained in his essay.
He is certainly justified in holding that, for Marx and Engels, 
justice is an essentially juristic concept and does not after all 
represent "tne nighest measure of all social things" (190)
It was for tnis reason that Marx criticised those theorists 
such as Proudhon, Lassalle and the rest, who held no more ambitious 
designs on socialism tnan the securing of human rights. It is from 
the juridical perspective only that justice represents tne highest 
ordering of human affairs; but it is precisely the juridical point 
of view wnich Marx sought to transcend. Under socialism, Rignt 
attains its full realisation, but turns out at the same' time to be 
a self-contradictory and therefore impossible notion, simultaneously 
negating and presupposing the separation of man from man, and is
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superceded. Wood and Tucker are enabled to eVade this particular 
conclusion, by the simple expedient of omitting to consider the 
socialist phase which lies intermediate between the bourgeois and 
communist epochs, and in Wood’s case (l9l) by failing to recognise 
the analysis of history as a development, and not as a simple 
succession of social structures.
It is also certainly true, however, that Marx did not 
consider the matter to turn on the question of justice, as we have 
seen. For him, the pre-occupation with justice was inextricably 
bound up with reformist ratner than revolutionary theory (192), 
and holds the implication of striking a conventional balance as between 
the contending, and, according to Marx, "irreconcilable" (193), 
interests of the various social orders. Rather, Marx did not take 
up the task of mediation, but rather was concerned with the elimination 
of tnese antagonisms, in favour of a real harmony of material 
interests; this is, in essence, the historical role of tne proletarian 
revolution.
The concluding section of Wood's essay merits attention; 
here he points out that there is little to be gained by debating 
Marx’s precise ethical position. (194) This is because Marx took 
the practical line of condemning capitalism on the grounds of such 
clearly apparent evils as servitude, economic instability, the 
abject misery of the mass of the people, and so forth, without 
unduly concerning himself with any exact academic consideration 
of tne pnilosophical bases of these condemnations, be they Kantian 
or utilitarian. i (l9b) Wnile on a proper analysis of Marxian 
theory, Marx's writings are not incompatible with a moral viewpoint, 
and in fact disclose such a viewpoint in glimpses, it is true that
Marx nowhere addresses himself to a-full scientific-and definitive 
examination of tne ethical issues raised by his work. His (no doubt
unintended) contribution to ethical theory -consists in that the 
full richness of his work mignt serve to inform a fully systematic 
moral treatise, to be prepared by another.
Before moving on, there is much illumination to be derived 
from a consideration of the upheaval which followed in the wake of. 
the Russian Revolution of October 1917.
The immediate consequence of the revolution was chaos (19.6); 
the workers lacked the expertise necessary to run the factories,
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foreign trade stopped, and the peasants resisted collectivisation. 
These ills sprang essentially and directly from the attempt to 
impose pure communism; communism, on a correct interpretation of 
Marxian theory, is not supposed to be imposed at all, but to emerge 
as a spontaneous development from socialism;
Communism is not for us a state of affairs to 
be brought about, an Ideal to which reality must 
somehow adjust itself. (197)
The whole bitter tragedy of the resistance of tne peasants 
to collectivisation (198) exemplifies as clearly as anything the 
error committed by Lenin and his associates. According to Marx's 
materialist conception of nistory, the full socialisation of the 
means of production, industrial and agricultural, was supposed to 
be one of the unintended achievements of the capitalist age (199)» 
which in Russia was not permitted to run its course. Lenin's 
The State and Revolution, written on the eve of the Revolution, is 
most illuminating in this respect, for in it Lenin pays lip service 
to this aspect of Marxian doctrine, in that he discusses and 
endorses it in general theoretical terms, without descending to 
concern himself with any question of its applicability or otherwise 
to Russia in 1917* (200)
In the face of catastrophe, Lenin introduced the New Economic 
Policy in 1921. This was in fact a limited rehabilitation of 
private commerce, a reversion to practices wnich tne Revolution had 
supposedly abolished. The peasants were again permitted to dispose 
of their surplus on the open market; previously, when this had been 
forbidden, the peasants simply refused to grow any more crops than 
they required for their own purposes, having no incentive to do 
otherwise. The result, of course, was a protracted and severe 
urban famine. The state attempted to fight back, by confiscating 
the peasants' produce, but this of course proved even more counter­
productive, since removing all incentive for producing anything at 
all. Similarly, the more prosperous peasants were again permitted 
to employ otners. (201)
Incentives were introduced in the factories by the N.E.P.; 
this, of course, is incompatible with equal pay, but it is essential 
to notice that there is nothing in either Marx's socialist principle, 
or communist principle which requires this. (202) Nowhere in
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Marx's works does'1 he subscribe to any requirement of substantial 
equality, (205) not even to the extent of the modified egalitarianism 
of Rawls' difference principle (204), which holds that inequalities 
of wealth and autnority are justified only insofar, as tney tend 
to improve the prospects 01 the least well off. Indeed, the vague 
egalitarian conception of justice attributed by Lenin (205) (and 
also by Kelsen (206)) to Marx appears to be a complete misconstruction. 
Lenin's thoroughly careless - or dishonest - "interpretation" of 
Marx's Critique of the Gotha Program is formulated and endorsed 
by Kelsen tnus; "communism will be the realisation of tne ideals 
of freedom and equality, and that means the realisation of justice" 
(207).
I have already dealt at length with the misconception 
that Marx identified communism witn justice, and if he looked to 
communism for the securing of equality what can he have intended 
by the remark to the effect that in communist society all talk of 
equality will have "become obselete verbal rubbish" (208).
In any event, as Marx himself points out, different . 
individuals are no more equal in their needs than they are in 
respect of their capacities for labour (209). In fact, a proper 
examination of his worK reveals that Marx showed little of the 
tendency to exalt the ultimately incoherent (210) concept of equality 
as a quasi-religious end in itself, that is so much in evidence in 
the utterances of his less gifted apostles. In nis critique of 
Proudhon, in which he emphatically rejects all attempts to 
comprehend ideas in abstraction from the economic conditions which 
give rise to them, he poses the question, why equality, as opposed 
to "inequality, fraternity, Catholicism, or any other principle"
(211) wnich one might care to name? Certainly, the "equality of 
labour and equality of wages" (212) with which Lenin appears so 
preoccupied, is not Marxian. (215) The only trace of egalitarianism 
in Marx's writings lies in tne demand of the socialist principle 
tnat all labour is to be evaluated according to the same standard 
and remunerated at the same rate. The rewards accruing to each 
individual would of course vary according to the quantity of labour 
he would choose to perform. Bertrand Russell speaks of "allowing 
a popular vote to decide ... wnetner more leisure or more goods 
were to be preferred." (214)
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However, Marx's formulation of tne socialist principle 
would seem to imply that in his scheme of things the striking of 
the balance between leisure and material goods would be a matter 
of free individual choice. If one individual would choose to do 
no work, and consequently receive nothing from the means of 
consumption, then that is entirely his decision. Kussell also 
writes that "In so far as work has to be enforced, it will be 
enforced by the criminal law, not by economic sanctions." (21b)
but, again, this would appear to be misconceived, for not 
being entitled to any portion of the total social output as a
consequence of deciding to do no work would not be a matter of
sanction or punishment, any more than tne non-existence of a wall 
in front of my house is a socially organised "economic sanction" 
incurred by me for not bothering to build one.
but even this vestige of egalitarianism, the remuneration
of all labour according to the same standard, the quantity of 
labour contributed, seems objectionable; for without any prospect 
of advancement, no-one would have any incentive to develop or . 
enhance his skills. We are again, indeed, confronted with the 
crucial difficulty of distributive justice; that the whole matter 
would be relatively simple if there was a relatively fixed stock 
of goods and services which were simply there in the nature of 
things, and the only problem was that of deciding on which basis 
the distribution snould be conducted. However, the difficulty is 
that the distribution itself affects the quantity of goods and 
services which are available for distribution. It is vital to recall 
in this context the role of justice as a means to the bringing of 
the operation of self-interest into harmony with the common good; 
for if a rigidly egalitarian standard for the remuneration of 
labour contribution is adhered to, no-one will be led to master 
the skills and knowledge wnicn tend to expand the stocks of 
available economic goods. Tne advance of tecnnology in the 
present century has come to require tne cultivation of skills 
which can be acquired only by means of a considerable amount of , 
effort, so that even Marx's rendition of the socialist principle 
seems totally inadequate in present circumstances.
And in any case, even under machine conditions of production, 
work would clearly not be homogeneous. Some forms of labour would
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remain less attractive than others, so that different occupations 
would require to be remunerated at different rates, according to 
the normal laws of supply and demand, if people are not to be 
coerced into working- in particular sectors.
As Hayek puts it,
an authority that fixed remuneration ... could 
not make these remunerations 'just', i.e. 
proportionate to desert, or need, or the merits 
of any other claim of tne persons concerned, but 
would have to offer wnat was necessary to attract 
or retain tne number of people wanted in each 
kind of activity (216)
-In this connection, it is as well to refer to the view that 
tne refusal-to allow people to cnoose tneir own line of employment 
would entail a regression to slavery. (217)
However, it is to Marx's eternal credit tnatthe socialist 
principle, for all its shortcomings, is not some utopian scheme 
requiring men to act according to some motivation radically diverg­
ent from self-interest. Hatner, it is expressive of the severely 
limited altruism that must be expected from men wno have only just ' 
emerged from bourgeois society. (218)
In this connection especially, it becomes clearly apparent 
what a profoundly mistaken interpretation of Marx it is to suppose 
that he would have approved of the imposition of the communist 
principle by means of organised force. For, after all, while the 
actions of individual moral agents are to be evaluated according 
not to their actual but their intended consequences (219), exactly 
tne reverse holds true for the evaluation of rules and institutions, 
which are to be judged not by their intended, but their actual 
results; an attempt to reconstitute society on the basis of the 
direct correlation of distribution to needs would, in the face of 
self-interest, be directly counterproductive. Since men would have 
no incentive to produce, there would be nothing with v/hich to meet 
needs.
We thus perceive the total lack of suitability of the 
communist principle as a principle of justice; to be appropriate 
for this function, a principle must be suitable for imposition, 
and for this reason, Marx refused to accept it as such.
At least during some phases of human development, distrib­
ution having some correlation to labour contribution is a precept 
having its basis in human nature; self-interest is not therefore 
a wholly negative factor, but properly directed, it can be a 
motivating, vitalising force, operating to the general interest. 
(220) The wnole question of communism, then, turns on the extent 
of the malleability or otherwise of nurnan nature (221); if men do 
indeed cease to be self-interested under certain conditions, then 
it follows that the highest form of social life is that in which 
self-interest gives way to a general unlimited concern for the 
common good, and in which the use of universal values as a device 
for the resolution of disputes becomes superfluous, since such 
disputes cease to arise. (222) If, however, this is not the case, 
and self-interest.to a greater or lesser extent remains as an 
enduring feature of the numan condition, then so also do binding 
rules of conduct assume the form of an eternal necessity.
The whole spirit of the New Economic Policy and of tne 
system of "state capitalism" instituted thereby is best summed up 
in the words of Lenin himself, "Personal incentive will step up 
production." (223)
Self-interest plays a dual role; as an incentive in the 
development of the instruments of production, and in the act of 
production itself. In the former role, it becomes unnecessary 
when in the culmination of bourgeois society, the techniques and 
instruments of production are brought to full development; in the 
second, when it is supplanted with tne spirit of altruistic 
fraternity.
The only question which remains is that of whether Lenin’s 
dictum remains true only in certain stages of the cultural 
evolution of mankind, or is true for always; in Marx's writings, 
this question is' to be resolved by history itself.
(iii) The Withering Away of Law and State.
I propose now to consider further the doctrine of the 
withering away of law and. state, as it appears in the writings of 
Engels and Lenin, and to a subsidiary extent, in tnose of Marx
himself.
This doctrine flows from the analysis of the machinery of 
law.and state as an essentially repressive device through which 
one class imposes its collective interests upon another by means 
of organised violence, and holds that other class in a condition 
of economic servitude. Such was the contention advanced by Engels 
wnen, with characteristic lucidity, ne wrotej "in reality,.the 
state is nothing more tnan an apparatus for the oppression of 
one class by another" (224).
Similarly,
* the state power is nothing more than tne organisation 
with which the ruling classes - landlords, and 
capitalists - have provided themselves in order 
to protect their social privileges. (223)
Prom sucn a position it naturally follows that the state, 
as the totality of political power and characterised by the 
essentially parasitic bureaucracy and standing army, is, far from 
being an enduring and perennial element of human society, the 
creature and companion of society divided into classes. (226)
With the advent of classless society, then, it becomes both 
"unnecessary and impossible" (227), since there remains no exploited 
class to be suppressed.
With the coming of tne revolution, the final form of the 
state comes into being, and from the moment of its inception begins 
to wither away, and finally vanishes of its own accord. This final 
form of state is the "dictatorship of the proletariat" (226), a 
special repressive force by means of which the new ruling class 
subdues the remaining elements of the bourgeoisie and divests tnern 
of their property. (229) If* incidentally, one remains faithful 
to Marx's account of economic and social development, it seems 
improbable that the expropriation of the bourgeoisie would 
degenerate into tne arduous and bloody struggle envisaged by 
Lenin - and indeed by Engels, who describes social revolution as 
"the act whereby one part of the population imposes its will upon 
the other part by means of rifles, bayonet and cannon." (230) - 
since by the march of nistory, trie remaining members of the. bourgeois 
class would have been transformed into a miniscule and hopelessly
outnumbered proportion of the total population. (231)
Phis then, is the crux of the divide between the "Marxist- 
Leninist" camp on tne one hand, and the anarchists on the other; 
both factions concur in advancing the liquidation of the political 
state as the ultimate aim, but differ on the precise route through 
wnich this is to be acneived. Against tne anarchists, the "Marxist- 
Leninists" maintain that the state, together with all the social 
evils attending the exploitation of one portion of the population 
by the otner, cannot simply be thrust aside overnight; the 
immediate' task for tne revolutionary proletariat is not to destroy 
tne state, but to seize control of it, and, albeit in a radically 
modified form, to turn it to their own ends, that is, to the radical 
transformation of society. As Marx himself pointed out, previous 
revolutions have not destroyed tne state, but merely altered, 
indeed developed, its cnaracter. (232) As tne last traces of class 
society fade away, so also does the state as a centralised coercive 
order spontaneously witner, as less and less remains for it to do.
Engels appears to suggest tne view tnat all conflicts are 
class conflicts, and that therefore in tne absence of classes, 
conflicts would cease to arise. (233) This argument, wnich 
apparently purports to demonstrate the viability and plausibility 
of a society based on spontaneous and uncoerced co-operation, as 
a matter of logical necessity - that is, as if this conclusion can 
be reacnea simply by considering the meaning of the terms involved - 
is, I would contend, incurably naive; tue flaw in Engels reasoning 
consists in nis confusing class interest with self-interest.
For, obviously, a society beyond class divisions would by 
definition lie beyond class interests also, but the wholly sepa;rate- 
and to my mind, highly improbable - thesis that sucn a society 
would at the same time transcend self-interest also requires to be 
established by empirical evidence. However, I am quite willing to 
concede that insofar as tne post-revolutionary order would meet 
with success in attaining a nigh level of social stability and 
prosperity, the incidence of collisions requiring to be regulated, 
or artificially resolved, by means of a centralised coercive order 
would be vastly reduced.
Generally more satisfactory, however, is'Lenin's 
explanation that with the removal of the fundamental iniquities
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of bourgeois society, spontaneous social conesion becomes for the 
first time a real possibility; the anti-social excesses whicn 
require to be curbed by organised force are themselves in the main 
the effects of the estrangement, the brutalisation, the impoverish­
ment, tne dehumanisation engendered by capitalist exploitation. 
Private property necessitates the maintenance of a legal system, 
but at the same time this self-same "environmental snare" (254) 
renders genuine social harmony impossible.
The human cnaracter is largely determined by environmental 
factors, so that given decent conditions of existence, people will 
grow accustomed to behaving correctly towards each other. Engels 
cites as historical evidence for this proposition the "model colony" 
established at New Lanark by Robert Owen, "in whicn drunkenness, 
police, magistrates, lawsuits, poorl-aws, cnarity, were unknown."
(23b)  ■
Of course, as we have seen, Engels also cites as evidence
his claim that tnere has in fact existed, prior to the rise of
private property, a stateless, lawless community. (256) But this
appears to have been far from idyllic, for altnough tnis community,
even by Engels* account, was not subject to centralised coercion,
*
it was none-tne-less cnaracterisea by a primitive system of 
socially recognised rignts, enforced by an essentially coercive 
self-help system. (25?)
As the social wounds heal, it is contended, there will arise 
"a new generation, brougnt up under new and free social conditions", 
(258) to which organised coercion will be wholly alien and . 
unneccessary. For people will now naturally adhere to wnat Lenin 
describes as "the elementary rules of social life, known for 
centuries, repeated for thousands of years in sermons" (255).
It is no doubt unfortunate tnat Lenin considers the substance 
of these rules to be altogether too obvious to require to be 
reiterated by him; .this omission is doubly regrettable since it 
would nave been a most illuminating exercise to have compared 
Lenin's conception of communist morality with the "Law of Nature 
or decent behaviour known to all men" (240) wnich is so strenuously 
championed by C.S.Lewis. All the more so, since Lewis proceeds to 
explain tnat tnis "Law of Nature" is in fact a "Law of Human Nature" 
(241), and it should be recalled that it is a central tenet of
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communism that it is in communist society that human nature finds 
its unalienated and authentic expression, (242)
In any event, Lenin contends that such excesses as may 
from time to time occur can readily be contained by an informal 
conventional morality
as simply and as readily as any crowd of civilised 
people, even in modern society, parts a pair of 
combatants or does not allow a woman to be outraged.
(24 3)
It will be recalled that in the Manifesto of the Communist 
Party, Marx writes that communism abrogates law and religion, thus 
banishing these phenomena from human society, instead of merely 
reconstituting tnem on a new basis; what is interesting here is 
that he extends tnis pronouncement to apply to morality also. (244)
It should be immediately obvious tnat this viewpoint, reiterated 
in tne "right and other trasn" (24b) passage, fundamentally diverges 
from tne account given above, according to wnich a conventional 
morality has a central role to play in a communist society, Marx, 
so it would seem from the analysis given in section (ii), would 
appear to have proceeded from the assumption tnat in post­
revolutionary society human nature would be transformed and perfected 
to such an extent that men would abandon tne pursuit of self-interest 
entirely, so that the conditions wnicn necessitate the subordination, 
voluntary or otherwise, of human conduct to direction by rules,, 
would 'be wholly' dissolved. Insofar as there would remain any 
relic of social values in communist society, this would take the 
form of an ethic of spontaneous love, more akin to the precepts of 
tne Sermon on the Mount tnan to "the rule-bound inoralism of the 
Pnarisees" (246).
We have then, a fundamental divide; the crux of the 
difficulty is tnat tne whole concept of "law and state", which we 
are assured will wither away, requires' furtner explanation. Is law 
to be equated with organised coercion? If so, must that coercion 
be centralised? Or ought law to be understood as possessing as 
its essential characteristic its nature as a system of norms?
What is it that is supposed to witner away, the rules tnemselves, 
the coercive apparatus by means of whicn tne rules are enforced,
1^ 1
the formal hierarchy of officials by whom the rules are made, 
applied, determined and enforced, or some other thing? It should 
of course be remembered that tne definition of tne word "law" is 
one of the most controversial and intractible problems of analytical 
jurisprudence (247) so that nothing definite can be said about law, 
without first making clear what one intends by the term. And as 
to what exactly is to be understood, by the phrase "the withering 
away of law and state", there is clearly only an approximate 
consensus amongst Marx, Engels, and Lenin,
Engels writes of unalienated. generations of post-revolution­
ary. society that "Once such people appear, they will not give a 
rap about what we today think tney should do" (248), so that in an 
obvious sense, it is futile to attempt to predict, in any detail, 
the future social arrangements. There is surely, however, some 
room for analysis of certain of the concepts involved, although 
this task has been so sadly neglected in tne primary sources of 
socialist ideology.
Engels clearly did not reject the role of societal values 
in some shape or form in communist society, speaking as he does of 
the possibility of "a really human morality which stands above 
class antagonisms" (245) which become possible only in post­
revolutionary society. Further, while rejecting tne notion of 
there being a true morality "in the sense of absolute finality" 
(250), ne stated tnat, nonetheless, in his time the proletarian 
morality contained "the maximum elements promising permanence" (251).
However, Engels points out tnat certain values would become 
obsolete, and advances tne following reasoning in support of this . 
contention;
In a society in which all motives for stealing1 
have been done away with, in which therefore at 
the very most only lunatics would .ever steal, how 
the preacher of morals would be laughed at who 
tried solemnly to proclaim tne eternal truth: Thou 
shalt not steal1 (252)
Clearly, preaching at people, and coercing them, to obey 
this or any other rule would become unnecessary, wnere compliance 
is voluntary and universal, but would this mean that the norm 
involved had become redundant? On tne contrary, the prohibition
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on stealing would, as a moral value, find its confirmation, not . 
its dissolution in universal compliance, even though it would 
cease to require trie protection of legal sanctions (253). Indeed, 
it could form an element in the socialist critique of law as a 
coercive order that it is an ineffective and second-rate method of 
protecting moral rights.
Nor can Engels tie defended by the claim that stealing will 
disappear because the institution of property will also be dissolved, 
for the continuation of the institution of property and therefore 
the possibility of theft is implied in the assertion tnat such • 
behaviour, on the part of lunatics, might continue. In any event, 
to develop my earlier assertion that social forms are to be 
identified by and with the systems of values on whicn tney are based 
(254)* I would contend tnat the concept of society is inseparable 
from the concept of rule-directed behaviour.
There is one pronouncement by Engels which is of particular 
interest; "in tnis process (of history) there has on the whole been 
progress in morality" (255)« y^ wnat criterion or criteria
does Engels reach this evaluation, and how does he reconcile it to 
the relativistic position he expounds earlier on the same page?
This judgement raises tne question of tne evaluation of positive 
values and therefore of social forms'by standards ulterior to these, 
that is, transcendent values by any other name. (256) Bit if, 
as Engels claims on the same page, there are no eternal values, 
what ontological foundation do these second order justificatory 
principles possess? As Campbell points out,
the question of wnat rignts ought to exist is 
far from identical witn the question of what forms 
of behaviour are morally right and wrong (257)
• ' •:’!‘-but tnis succeeds only in shifting the problem of absolute 
vindication one stage backwards. Ey own views on the matter, and 
my attempt at a solution, to the general effect that the criteria 
by wnich values are themselves evaluated are conceptually determinate, 
and can be arrived at by means of an analysis of the terms involved, 
have already been explained (256); but, to my knowledge, Engels 
does not offer a similar nor indeed any explanation.
Engels would probably have endorsed the socialist justificatory
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principles advanced by Campbell (259), i«e. need-satisfaction and 
utility, but it should be noticed in passing tnat need-satisfaction 
as a second order criterion, tnat is, as a criterion for tne 
evaluation of values, is not exclusively socialist, and is in 
evidence in the writings of Hayek;
If we wish everyone to be well off, we shall
get closest to our goal, not by commanding by
lav/ that this should be achieved, nor by giving
everyone a legal claiim to what we tnink he ougnt
to have, but by providing inducements for all to
do as much as they can that will benefit 'others. (260)
It will of course be recalled in this connection that I 
earlier argued (26l), by way of an internal critique of the first- 
order principle of distribution according to need, that such a 
rule would spectacularly fail in its own object, if it were to 
be imposed as the basis of the social order.
One important recent contribution to the analysis of the 
place of normative structures in the socialist utopia is contained 
in Professor T.D. Campbell's book The Left and Rights, the basic 
thesis of which is the claim that rignts would have a place even 
in such a society. It should be noticed from tne outset that 
Campbell is not concerned to advocate nor even to evaluate the theory 
and practice of socialism, but adopts the more limited aim of 
demonstrating the language of rights to be not incompatible nor 
essentially alien to tne community which is based on co-operation, 
not competition, and made up of truly social beings, which is to 
be found in the visions of tne socialists. (262)
The argument taKes place in two stages; firstly^ Campbell 
seeks to demonstrate that societal norms of some sort would have 
a part to- play even in such a society, and secondly, although 
this stage of the argument is of lesser importance to this present 
essay, that at least some of these norms would be creative of 
rights, as opposed merely to obligations. For, as Campbell states, 
there may logically be rules and obligations without corresponding 
rights, but the reverse does not hold. (265)
Further, it should be noticed that if we are to sustain 
Campbell's thesis concerning the compatibility of rights and
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socialism, this does not by itself commit us to abandon the assertion
<
that communism is the supercession of material justice, for the 
rights involved may be based not on justice, (264) but on need, or 
utility, to take but two examples. (265) however, the existence, 
of rules and values of any sort raises the possibility of questions 
of formal justice.
Campbell proceeds by enunciating tne various elements in 
the socialist critique of tne concept of rights, and by meeting- 
each in turn.
Tne first element in the tries is that tne concept of rights 
is inseparable from the pluralistic competitive individualism of 
liberal capitalism is the argument that rights are an inextricably 
legal or juristic concept; if this be so, then
rights must be analytically tied to an institution 
(i.e. the state) to wnose abolition or withering 
away revolutionary socialists are committed both 
in theory and in practice. (266)
The second element proceeds from the opposite premise; 
that rignts are to be associated with moralistic stances. The 
argument runs to the effect that moral values, as part of the 
ideological superstructure, spring from the process of social 
change, rather than causing it,, so that any appeal to moral rights 
is ineffectual and futile. (267)
But this seems unsatisfactory on two counts, is normative 
ideology not an important factor in animating the consciousness of 
the revolutionary class, and as such vital in persuading them to 
take "timely political action in line with changes taking place ' 
in the economic base of society" (268)?
As such, could not a revolutionary, conception of rights .be 
combined with an understanding of "the real determinants of social 
change" (265)?
Further, if this first objection of mine cannot be sustained 
and morality has indeed no role to play in tne process of . 
revolutionary change, Campbell is surely correct in making the 
point tnat (2f0) one can evaluate social forms according to moral 
values witnout being in any sense committed to the assertion that 
these or any other moral values possess motivating force. The
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opposing view, surely, tnat these two different statements are to 
be taken as identical, would appear to equate right with might.
I may condemn a state of things, but I do not contradict myself if 
I deny that it can be overcome, or that it is in any way altered 
by my condemnation.
It should be noticed that the moralism and legalism 
objections to tne concept of socialist rights are incompatible, 
but they could of course be presented as alternatives. Beyond 
that, the socialist critique of rights described by Campbell■is 
.cumulative.. The third element in this critique is the "individ- 
ualism" objection, which depicts rights as legal powers, and as 
such weapons in the competitive straggle of self-interested being's, 
pursuing their separate ends, who are therefore constantly concerned 
to assert the priority of their demands over those of others. 
Accordingly, it is claimed tnat the entire of rights discourse is 
essentially grounded in the social conflict and constrained 
selfishness of bourgeois society.
Campbell concedes that rights possess a "close connection 
with individualism if only because they characteristically belong 
to individuals" (271), but denies that rignts have any necessary 
connection witn self-interest, the necessary connection is merely 
with interests, which need not be selfish, nor seek to assert 
themselves in preference to all others. (272)
He is enabled to reach tnis position by rejecting the power 
theory of rights in favour of the interest theory, which consists 
in the analysis that a person possesses a right when there exists 
a rule (which may be legal, in which case the right is a legal right, 
or moral, when tne right is a moral right) which directs the 
protection o’*? furtherance of some interest of his.
This analysis, if correct, opens the door to a socialist 
conception of. rights, in which the satisfaction of the interests 
thereby protected is identified as the proper goal of communal 
effort, and establishes that;
The individualism of rights requires no more tnan 
an acceptance of the organisational significance 
of the concerns and projects of sentient beings. (27$)
The fourth and final objection is in fact an extension of
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the first, and asserts that rights involve corresponding obligations, 
and tnat tne existence of obligations in turn implies tne presence 
of coercive sanctions;
Rules wnich establish rights also, typically, impose 
obligations and obligations, wnere these arise from : 
positive .'rules, rest ultimately, it is argued, on 
force 01 coercion '(274) >
This is considered to be unacceptable, for in establishing 
true community in the place of a society held together only by a 
combination of selfish ulterior motives and brute force, (275) 
socialism is supposed to transcend the need for coercion. Campbell 
proceeds to undermine tnis argument by denying and seeking to 
disprove the logical nexus between force and duty, and maintaining 
that tnese are separable concepts. For even if we provisionally 
accept tnat law is to be defined as a normative order enforced by 
coercive sanctions, the removal of the coercive sanctions from a 
system of rules may do no more than deprive it of its cnaracter- 
istically legal pedigree, this would not in itself alter the 
validity of tne rules, and as such would continue to be a source 
of obligations of one form or another. To say that I nave an 
obligation, in the specifically normative sense in whicn "obligation" 
is directly synonymous with "dbty" means that there is a determinate 
course of conduct whicn 1 ought to pursue; to be "obligated", to 
follow Professor Hart's terminology (276), that is, to be under a 
duty, is clearly not synonymous with being "obliged", i.e. forced 
to do something, as a moment's reflection will confirm. I may be 
under an obligation to perform a certain action, but it may be the 
case tnat I am not actually forced to do so. Conversely, I might 
be forced to do something, wnilst having no duty to do so, or even 
wnile possessing a positive duty not to. One strongly suspects, 
indeed, that tne sanction theory of obligation has arisen solely 
as a consequence of tne equivocation of the term "obligation".
Y/nereas there is undoubtedly a relationship of some sort 
between the concepts of breach of obligation and sanction, it is 
probably erroneous to exaggerate the intimacy of the link, and to 
make the notion of sanction an essential part of the analysis of 
obligation. Kelsen tells us tnat
conduct has the cnaracter of a delict (i.e., breach 
of an obligation) because and only because it is a 
condition of a sanction. (277)t
but surely this approaches the problem from the wrong end; 
it is surely the case that tne visitation of an evil possesses the 
character of being a sanction because and solely because it is the 
response to a wrongful action. For example, if we adopt Kelsen's 
approacn, we may be led to interpret taxation as a sanction. On 
tne contrary, if we tax.e delict and therefore obligation-as being 
logically prior to the concept of sanction, we learn that there is 
no legal obligation to refrain from earning money, and that therefore 
taxation is not to be interpreted as a sanction or punishment.
These two senses of tne term "obligation", corresponding 
to force and duty, are clearly quite distinct, ana are certainly 
not synonymous. So can a conceptual entailment between the two 
be established on other grounds? In this respect, those positiv­
ists who endorse trie sanction tneory of obligation tend to fall 
back on the argument that general compliance with norms, can only 
be ensured by means of coercive sanctions, but as Campbell assert^ 
tnis, even if true, does not establish an analytical link between 
duty and sanction, but on the contrary is a synthetic and
empirical claim which cannot be made unless we
can distinguish between legal norms and tne sanctions
which may be used to bacx tnem up. (278)
In any case, tnis argument, resting on tne claim that 
people will not follow societal rules unless forced to do so, 
does not appear to be available to tne socialist, unless at the 
cost of contradicting- the belief that human nature undergoes a 
radical cnange upon the transformation of the productive foundations 
of the social order. In fact, for a socialist to rely on this 
reasoning would amount to acknowledging the truth of Hobbes' 
egoistic vision of human nature and motivation (279) v/nich is so 
antithetical to the Marxian tneory of innate human sociability.
It is surely correct, even in bourgeois society, that "sanctions 
are by no means the sole.motivating force affecting the law- 
abidingness of most individuals" (280) and that
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we can conceive of people conforming- to 
behavioural norms without being coerced, where 
there are norms ... (whose) functions or 
purpose (is) explained and understood. (281)
The realisation of this possibility, as we have seen, 
appears to have been the limit of Lenin’s ambition, and corresponds 
most closely to Hegel’s vision of rational individuals freely 
conforming in a society in whose constitution they recognise the 
demands of universal reason. (282)
Having dealt with tnese four bbjections to the concept of 
socialist rights, Campbell sets out in the next pnase of his 
argument to determine wnetner rules would have any place in the 
socialist -utopia, and to this end, undertakes "a survey of the 
variety of purposes served by societal rules" (26^ ), togetner with 
an enquiry as to wnetner any of such rules as may be compa.tible 
with or even required by socialism would tend to establish or 
generate rignts. His conclusions can be summarised as follows. 
Firstly, there would in socialist society be a need for rules of 
conduct wnich would be intended not so much to "restrain malicious 
selfisnness" (284) as to "ensure that tne human good is protected 
in ways wnich are not self-evident to the ordinary benevolent 
individual" (28p) and tnerefofe to enable altruism, or at least 
sociability, to express itself.
Secondly, where any person, or group of persons, has 
allocated to them certain goods even for limited purposes or 
restricted occasions, this allocation could be expressed in terms 
of rules and rights. As an extension to this principle, being 
allotted a particular task in the productive process may well 
generate "functional rights" (286), to the use and therefore 
possession of s.ucn equipment as may be necessary to the effective 
pursuit of tne task in question.
Thirdly, rules wnicn would determine "liberties, claim 
rights and powers" (287) would necessarily be involved in any 
attempt to realise particular' distributive patterns. Furtner, tne
A
interests thereby protected would effectively be constituted as 
rights to participate in the social, productive process, to a 
share in the proceeds thereof (288), and so forth.
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Fourthly, there would be a need for rules defining standard 
procedures for resolving differences of opinion as to how the 
common ends are to be most effectively pursued. (289)
Fiftnly, and probably most important, there would be a need 
for organisation in mature socialist society, which would be 
characterised by "large scale co-operative behaviour". (290)
This need for organisation would of course be on a far 
greater scale than any corresponding need under capitalism (29l), 
and would involve a requirement for the common acceptance of norms 
co-ordinating numan conduct, just as, for example, there js a need 
to establish one side of the road or the other as the correct one 
to drive on, quite independently of any question of limited 
altruism or tne need for coercion.
It is fully acknowledged by Engels that administration, as 
opposed to adjudication, will remain as a permanent feature of 
mature communist society; all tnat Campbell adds in this respect 
is that organisation of this kina requires rules
if only to facilitate co-operative and educational 
activities, and that some of these rules will be 
directed towards the protection and furtnerance of 
individuals, thereby constituting rights. (292)
Engels draws one conclusion from tne need for organisation 
which is particularly illuminating; that is, that organisation : 
implies authority. "'But whoever mentions combined action speaks 
of organisation; now is it possible to-have organisation without 
authority?" (293)
he is most scathing of the anarcnists who equate authority 
witn the state, and therefore reject it as an absolute evil;
Indeed, how tnese people propose to run a factory, 
operate a railway or steer a snip without having 
in the last resort one deciding will, without 
single management, they of course do not tell us. (294)
To abandon authority, organisation and the subordination 
of the will of the single individual, Engels tells us (295)j is 
tantamount to abolishing modern large-scale industry, which in the 
bourgeois age progressively displaces the isolated actions of
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individuals in favour of complicated co-operative processes, and 
to return from modern technology and productive forces to the 
spinning wheel.
In fact, all this raises the.question of
.whether there is a valid sense of 'state* in which 
it is not identified as an instrument for the 
exploitation of one class by another, but refers 
to those general administrative arrangements of a 
society which Engels and almost certainly Earx, 
assumed would in communist society replace the use 
of physical coercion. (2y6)
and of a further role which rules might be required to play 
in post-revolutionary society, that of
'secondary rules' granting power-rights to certain 
persons to change and adjudicate on the application 
of primary rules in accordance with established 
criteria which are specified in what Hart calls a 
'rule of recognition'. (297)
Campbell's speculations concerning "non-coercive jural 
agencies" (298) tend to find confirmation in the writings of Engels, 
who opines that;
the most powerful prince and the greatest statesman 
or general of civilisation may well envy the humblest 
gentile chief (pf primitive communism) for the 
uncoerced and undisputed respect that is paid to him.
The one stands in the midst of society, the other is 
forced to represent something outside and above it. (299)
No doubt such leaders would also be expected to emerge in 
tne regeneration of numan society which would take place after 
the revolution.
In fact, Engels has presented us with a third possibility, 
additional to Lenin's tneory that communist society would involve 
an informal, conventional morality, and to tne view implicit in, 
Marx's work tnat all values would 'become redundant, since super­
fluous; that of rules being formulated, promulgated, and applied 
by (non-coercive) political authorities. It will be recalled 
that I earlier (300) distinguished law from positive morality on
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the grounds that while tine norms of positive morality spring from 
social convention directly, legal norms arise also from social 
convention, but indirectly, that is to say, tney are made or 
posited by agencies which derive their authority from and are 
themselves the creatures of social convention. If conventional 
morality can' be compared to football in tne park without a referee, 
then the scheme implicit in hhngels1 vision is analogous to football 
with a referee, but one who is obeyed by the players out of respect 
for the rules, and indeed for the referee, without any threat or 
question of sanctions being invoked. In this respect, the system 
of norms created and applied by the non-creative jural agencies 
would be more akin to legal orders than to systems of positive 
morality, but would differ in the respect of being non-coercive; 
the question remains as to wnetner or not coercion is a defining 
feature of the law. There are here two possibilities; firstly, 
that coercion is essential to lav/ in the sense that it is a 
logically necessary feature of obligation, and tnerefore of any 
normative order; or tnat it is a definitive feature of law in 
that provision for coercion distinguishes law from other forms of 
normative system.
Campbell, who argues for "tne logical possibility of the 
idea of uncoercive law" (301) contends that hart's treatment of 
international law as a sanctionless legal order (302) opens the 
door to the rejection of organised force as an essential feature of
law, even if Hart himself does not pursue his position to its logical 
conclusion in this respect. There, in fact, does not appear to be 
any definite conceptual- barrier to treating the presence of second 
order rules rather than provision for coercion as the definitive 
feature of law. In any case, the matter of wnether Campbell has 
discovered a new type of law, or a new form of normative order, 
is, I believe, little more than a matter of semantics, for I am 
more concerned to locate the concepts themselves, than to discuss 
the names by which they are to be known.
In this section, I hope to have -helped clarify the various 
theories concerning the role, if any, of law, state and morality 
, in fully-developed communist society. As distinct from being 
superceded altogetner, it would seem that in communist society 
(if it is indeed the only true society, or community) the institution
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of societal rules would come into its own; a product of reason, 
made by and for man, and understood as such by all. It also seems 
to follow tnat certain values characteristically associated with 
justice, as opposed to a morality of altruism - I nave in mind 
norms prohibiting murder or the deliberate infliction of physical 
injury - would be part of the etnical code of such a society, 
although presumably these values would be contained in the positive 
morality of the.society, ratner than in its legal or quasi-legal 
system.
It is from this point on that mankind inhabits "the state 
of rational freedom" (505), dreamed of by Marx from his earliest 
days '
(iv) Trotsky's Revolutionary Morality; The Ethics 
of Insurrection.
We have thus far given consideration to the normative 
structures of post-revolutionary society, and I now propose to 
conclude this chapter with a consideration of the ethical issues 
raised by the war of the classes, in which the revolutionary 
proletariat seeks to bring sucn a society into being.
Trotsky’s position, primarily contained in his essay of 
1958, Their Morals and Ours (504), revolves around his discussion 
and ev®.ntual endorsement of tne maxim; "the end justifies the 
means" (505)•
His, tnerefore, is a teleological morality, and as such 
finds itself in direct opposition to the strictl;y deontological 
moralities of Kant and Hozick. (506) According to Trotsky, the 
rightness - or wrongness of an action depends upon the end 
encompassed by the agent, to the apparent exclusion of all other 
considerations. (50?) One must of course keep in mind the 
distinction between, on the one hand, the situation in which the 
means employed nas, in addition to the overall aim,.an immediate 
consequence - which is of course itself an end - whicn, in itself 
would be wrong, and on the otner hand, the simple situation in 
which there is no such bad immediate consequence, and in which,
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therefore, the means requires no justification. Of this distinction, 
Trotsky says little; it is clear, however, that the supremacy of 
end over means in fact can be resolved into the question of 
justifying one consequence (i.e. end) as being necessary to the 
fulfilment of some other, ethically more significant end. Trotsky's 
view is presented within an overall context of a class-struggle 
perspective (508) and those ends whi.cn are themselves justified 
are those whicn coincide with the aims of the revolutionary class, 
and as such, the theory holds, with social progress. There are, it 
seems, no constraints upon the permitted means of struggle, other 
than in relation to the ends served thereby, (509) 'fo the pursuit 
of the revolutionary emancipation of humanity, even the demands off 
formal justice are subordinated (510), and the sacrifice of 
innocent lives (511) is justified.
In defence of his position, Trotsky launches a formidable 
assault on Kant's categorical imperative (512), and on "transcendent 
morality" (515) in general, the norms of such ethical systems being 
"abstract" (514) in the following three senses. Firstly, in tnat 
these values are universal (515) and as such applicable equally to 
all men, and therefore supraclass. Secondly, in that they are 
general, and therefore equally applicable in all situations in 
whicn they are relevant. Thirdly, in that tney are presented as 
being naturalistic and eternal; on tne contrary, Trotsky holds, all 
morality requires to be related to socially evolutionary principles. 
(516) The abstract values which Trotsky opposes assume the absolute 
form of "Thou shalt not kill" (51?)» l>uij Trotsky tells us, Kantian 
idealism stands merely as a stage between religion and materialism 
(518); total and unqualified prohibitions on killing, violence and 
deception merely obstruct the pursuit of the class struggle, thus 
serving the interests of the reactionary class and retarding the 
evolution of human society. (519)
But is there no indispensible core of morality, which is 
common to and transcends all particular class-based conceptions? 
Trotsky answers tnis question in the negative, for not even the 
right to life is unqualified, since it is in a state of suspension 
during periods of armed conflict. (520) And class conflict 
assumes the form of open civil war,, with the straggle of tne 
proletariat, in Trotsky's scheme of things, assuming a particularly
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acute form of life-or-death struggle against tne forces of a 
reaction, fascism and imperialism. Violence and killing, in a 
condition of conflict, assume a completely different moral character 
depending on -whether the behaviour in question is directed in the 
interests of oppression or in the cause of liberation;
A .slaveowner who through cunning and violence 
shackles a slave in cnains and a slave who 
through cunning and violence breaks the chains - 
let not the contemptible eunochs tell us that 
they are equals before a cour.t of morality I (321)
Within the context of Trotsky's theory, as we have seen, 
there are no limits to the means which the proletariat or their 
representatives may justifiably employ in seeking to overthrow 
tne bourgeoisie. Trotsky's argument, however, is premissed upon 
the view that the proletarian revolution would involve violent 
upheaval, wnereas this is apparently alien to Marx's completed 
system (322); certainly, tne concept of reaction (323) is an 
intrusion. This deficiency in Trotsky's writings is evidently due 
to the fact that, wnereas the essence of Marx's thesis consists in 
the demonstration of the vital significance of economics for human 
society and its evolution, Trotsky discards this element in favour 
of a crude c'lass-war conception of social development. (324)
However,even if one does not endorse Trotsky's views on class 
struggle, it seems quite possible to accept his ethics of conflict 
in general terms , and thus to acknowledge that ne exposes a 
significant weakness in Kantian theory; for few would denounce the 
killing of the soldiers of a hostile aggressor state by civilians 
organised into a resistance movement and the killing of civilians 
by occupying troops in terms of equal vehemence.
There is however, one implication of Trotsky's thesis which 
is illuminating in relation to the place of ethical values in 
mature society; since, on Trotsky's terms, such a society would 
have risen above class struggle, would not a system of abstract 
norms along the lines envisaged by Kant become appropriate? It 
would certainly seem that a supraclass morality would come into its 
own in trie first supraclass society. Consider the following; 
pronouncement by H.B. Acton;
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But morality, according to Kant, is not concerned 
with the interests of a limited group, but witn 
the possibility of a universal community of free 
men (323)
It is surely a community of this sort which Trotsky believed 
that the revolution would establish; in a society no longer divided 
into social classes, Trotsky’s objections to Kantian moral philosophy 
would cease to be relevant. There would appear to be no further 
reason wny universal, abstract norms of conduct could not apply 
when there is no longer an overriding justificatory te'los to be 
established. Trotsky himself asserts that "Norms ’obligatory upon 
all' become the less forceful the sharper tne character assumed by 
the class strugglei' (326)
Conversely, one mignt argue, such norms would, grow the more 
forceful, and indeed completely so,in the society which is beyond 
class struggle. All the more so, since want's system seems competent 
only to provide us witn first order norms; this conclusion would 
appear to neatly coincide with Lenin's version of the doctrine of 
the withering away of law and state (32?), according to wnich post- 
revolutionary society would be neld together by a simple informal 
conventional morality. It will be recalled that in the first 
chapter of this essay (328) I advanced the view that the division 
of ethical theories into those wnicn are deontological and those 
which are consequentialist is not a division wnich can be sustained 
absolutely; this view is now reinforced, for it would seern tnat 
the telos encompassed by Trotsky's conaequentialism is itself of 
a deontological nature, wnile, in general, proponents of overtly 
deontological systems advocate consequentialist measures’for the 
preservation of their ’favoured orders. It would seem tnat we have 
not been perceiving two different objects, but merely the self-same 
object from opposite directions.
Furtner confirmation of this last conclusion would appear 
to be afforded by the consideration tnat abstract ethical principles 
are, after all, required in order to establish whicn of two contending ' 
factions is in tne right to begin with, and hence, to determine 
wnicn end justifies tne means to it. Trotsky speaks of the 
"dialectical interdependence of end and means" (329).
Tnis imposing sounding phrase signifies nothing;; more than 
the fact that what is an end in relation to a particular means,
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turns out to be itself a means to a further end, and so on, back 
to the ultimate end in relation to which all else is- justified... 
but it is this end wnich I have said can only be justified by an 
abstract moral principle, since it is not itself a means to a 
further end. Or, as Trotsky puts it, "Moreover, the principle the 
end justifies the means naturally raises the question; and what 
justifies tne end?" (330)
The answer.wnich Trotsky supplies is as follows;'
the liberating morality of the proletariat ... 
deduces a rule for conduct from the laws of the 
development of society thus primarily from the 
class struggle, this law of all laws. (531)
However, it should be noted tnat even if there are histor--a 
icist laws of social development, tnese are not prescriptive, but 
descriptive,laws, akin to, for example, the law of gravity, rattier 
than to anything normative. Thus, it would seem that Trotsky's 
argument is fatally flawed, since it is built on tne equivocation 
of the two senses of the word "law". On tnis elementary error 
(332), Trotsky's argument rests, and falls.
16?
Chapter 5 : The Modem Age.
"The vicissitudes of class struggle strip the 
state of every pretense to impartiality and 
transform it into an acknowledged tool of 
factional interest." (l)
(i) Revolution versus Reform
Thus far, I have sought, inter alia, to describe the course 
followed by human history, togetner with tne attendant sequence of 
ideologies, until and including the age of unrestrained capitalism, 
in which Marx himself was writing-. In this, the concluding chapter,
I intend to assess the phenomena of the present age, in the light 
of the concepts wnich I nave outlined in the first four, my aim, in 
part, being that in the course of this exercise, the concepts of 
justice and Bight, and the relationship between these two, snail 
come to assume clearer forms.
The first question to present itself is that of the relevance 
of the Marxian critique of capitalism, more tnan a century after 
tne deatn of I'iarx, an enquiry which in turn leads us to consider 
Marx's analysis of tne patn whicn he believed was being followed, 
in nis lifetime, by world nistory. From at least 1858 (2) Marx 
held tne conviction that tne capitalist epocn had almost run its 
course, and that tne socialist revolution would shortly come to 
tne economically advanced nations, such as England and Germany, which 
would in turn set out to liberate those lagging behind in the march 
of history. (5) He held that, leading up to tne revolution, wealth 
would become concentrated in fewer and fewer hands (4), with the 
corollary that the proletariat would come to comprise a progress­
ively, larger proportion of the population (5),.that tne gulf 
between the two main social classes would grow increasingly pronounced
(6), and that tne cycle of economic slumps and booms would grow 
more find more acute. (7) He also claimed that in this movement, 
the bourgeois age was unconsciously preparing the way for its own 
Supercession, not only in effecting tne full development and 
socialisation of the processes of production (6), but also in
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breaking down national barriers, through the economic uniformity 
implied by bourgeois free trade. (9) It is now a commonplace that 
world history has proved most reticent in recognising Marxian 
theory in any of these respects. (10) It seems undeniable, there­
fore, particularly since the radical instability culminating in 
revolution has thus far been averted, that if Marx's vision of the 
human destiny is to be retained at all, it can be retained only in 
a considerably modified form.
Chief among the reasons for these failures, I believe, :s 
the philosophical inadequacy of tne "historicism" which Marx 
inherited from Hegel. Hegel conceived of history as " a rational 
process of development" (ll) and as such subject to ascertainable 
dialectical laws of motion, such that the knowledge of those laws 
affords a basis for the prediction of future trends together with 
the end to which history is tending, in much the same manner as a 
theoretical grasp of the principle of astronomy enables astronomers 
to issue precise forecasts of eclipses and so fortn. (12) In 
Marx's hands, this evolutionary conception was shorn of the religious 
and mystical overtones which it had held in the Hegelian system, 
and was reformulated in accordance with Marx's view that it is 
economic factors which crucially direct the structure and development 
of human society. (15) Hence, Marx wrote of Capital that " it is 
the ultimate aim of this work, to lay bare the economic law.of 
motion of modern society". (14)
In my submission, as I have already asserted, (15) this 
form of historical determinism, with its preoccupation with 
"necessity" (16), or fate, or destiny, by any other name, owes 
much to the misconceived displacement of dialectical method from 
conceptual analysis, to the analysis of real movement. This error 
consists in the equivocation of "development", in the strict, 
logical, sense of movement towards the Ideal, with "development", 
in the loose sense, connoting movement, not in the world, of 
concepts, but in the world of objects. By this means, it can be 
made to appear that world history proceeds steadily towards the 
Ideal, and that all along,; this has been an inexorible tendency 
driven oh by absolute reason in the form of necessity.
At this point, it would perhaps be useful to state that 
the present essay sets out to describe the development, in the
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strict sense, of human culture (17), and by no means attempts to 
claim that such a path is necessarily followed other than in the 
ordering of Ideas., Thus, for example, Hobbes' state of nature (18) 
is the logically necessary starting point in this conceptual 
odyssey, independently of whether such a condition of things,in 
the sequence of real events, ever existed.
With specific reference to Marx, his vision of the human 
destiny was intimately linked to what he took to be the original 
and authentic form of the human condition. Marx's position on 
primitive communism, and the innate sociability of man, which, as 
I stated earlier (19), seems distinctly unsatisfactory, provides 
the basis for the condition of things which Marx believed must 
sooner or later re-assert itself. It is in this respect that Kelsen 
considered that Marx and. Engels had failed in their objective of 
promoting communism from "a utopia to a science" (20), in that 
their conclusions concerning the human destiny rest upon a 
subjective and unsupported value judgement as to mankind's natural 
condition. They purported to have demonstrated that communism is 
not to be manufactured, but to be discovered as imni.nent in social 
reality; but
this scientific discovery is possible only 
because the allegedly discovered value has 
previously been projected into reality, the 
Marxian reality with a double-bottom. (21)
Therefore, in that this doctrine of the perfectability of 
human nature is an essential element in the Marxian system, it is 
to be doubted whether Marxian theory represents any real advance 
on the Utopians at all, that is, tnose
wild and mad-headed enthusiasts, whose silly
speculations and absurd paradoxes, are not
worthy of the attention of any reasonable man. (22)
There are, it seems, several flaws and/logical inconsistencies 
in Marx's reasoning, which go some way to explaining why events 
have not followed the course anticipated by him. There are, for 
example, the factors discussed by Adolf A. lerle Jr. in his ' 
article "Marx was wrong and so is Khruschev" (2"j); firstly, tnere
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is tne rise of the labour unions, which have "refused to try to 
seize the ownership position or take over government" (24) but have, 
instead, restricted themselves to the task of securing a higher 
proportion of the productive output for their members, through a 
process of free collective bargaining. Secondly, there is the 
development of "corporations", or public limited companies. As 
Berle points out, an ever increasing scale of operation in industry 
in no' way necessarily implies that tne ownership function is 
concentrated in progressively fewer hands, and, in fact, a 
considerable dispersal in the range of the distribution of 
industrial profits has taken place. (24)
But, more fundamentally, there is one factor, the third of 
the elements advanced by Eerie, which "changed both the direction 
arid structure of affairs." (24) This is the expansion of the 
politically organised community, the state, both in respect of its 
sphere of operation, and of tne range of its elective franchise, 
a development which, I  would contend, renders economic determinism, 
in any form, implausible; for, in assuming a measure of control 
over tne macroeconomic environment, the state restores an element 
of will,, and tnerefore of unpredictability. Economic forces, 
invested with life by the "invisible hand" mechanism (25), althougn 
confronting the isolated individuals as external necessities, 
merely await rational direction by the state, and sucn direction 
is by no means exclusive to post-revolutionaiy society.
I t  is specifically my contention that society has been 
progressively and qualitatively transformed by the emergence of 
tne modern social democratic welfare state, so that any analysis 
proceeding from the premiss ofunrestrained capitalism as the social 
foundation is now totally inadequate, fhrougnout the main corpus 
of the writings of Marx and Engels, there runs a strong; suggestion 
of the impotence of the political state to influence or modify 
social reality (26), but on the evidence of modern developments, 
such a view can no longer realistically be sustained. Related to 
this is tne bankruptcy of tne Earxian theory of tne fc>tate as the. 
means through which the owners of the means of production impose 
their collective will or class interests on the remainder of 
society; it must surely be self-evident from even the most cursory 
scrutiny of the mass of social and welfare legislation which nas
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been passed in recent decades throughout tne western nations that 
to characterise tne state as "the national war engine of capital 
against labour" (27) is now, at best, a gross oversimplification, 
and, at worst, completely false.
Since tne latter half of the nineteenth century, the 
bourgeoisie has deemed it necessary or prudent to bring the 
proletariat into the political a.rena, for example, as a sort of 
bribe to induce support and co-operation in times of war (26), much 
as the mediaeval kings of England found themselves obliged to 
enfranchise the great lords, when financial assistance from these 
persons was necessary. (23) With this development, the class 
struggle has entered an entirely new phase (30), and subsequent 
history has provided ample justification for Engels' characteris­
ation of the universal suffrage as "an instrument of emancipation" 
(^ l), in that the state has, in the hands of the people as a whole, 
proven a potent means to the realisation of a number of specifically 
socialist ideals, without the proletariat being first required to 
assume direct control over and responsibility for the means of 
production. To enumerate tnose socialist ideals which have been 
thus attained, direct provision for basic course-of-life needs, 
or a "reasonable social minimum"'($2), in the form of social security 
legislation (33)» free education (34)» free health care (35)> 
subsidised housing,'provided through local autnorities (36) and 
centralisation of certain of the means of communication in the 
hands of the state (37) have all become established facets of the 
social order prevailing in the present-day United Kingdom. The 
principle of allocation of economic goods according to need is also 
in evidence in the progressive income tax system. (36) Resources 
are also redistributed to meet not only individual needs, bat also 
social needs, sucn as public nealth (39)» planning of land use (40), 
maintenance of highways (4l)» prevention of monopolies and 
restrictive trade practices (42), the maintenance of a uniform 
system of weignts and measures (43)? and education, as already 
mentioned. Present day society has moved far from the sanctity of 
private property; high levels of taxation, and planning and 
compulsory purcnase (44)legislation epitomise the subordination 
of individual property rights to wider social objectives. (43)
One of the most prominent recent contributions in this
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field is the thesis presented by Professor P.M. Unger in his book ■ 
Lav in Modern Society (46), in which he identifies the modern epoch 
as "post-liberal society" (47)» representative, in essence, of the 
rise of corporatism, and departure from the rule of law ideal.
This ideal, Unger tells us, consists in the principles of the 
generality and autonomy of the law.-: (48) Corporatism is to be 
understood as entailing the breaking; down of the sharp division as 
between tne lav/ and state on the one hand, and society on tne other.
(49) The law thus becomes, with the expansion of state activity, 
an instrument of positive macro-economic and other social ends; 
the essence of the welfare state, according to Unger, lies in the 
emergence of the involvement of the state in tasks of "overt 
redistribution,regulation find planning". (50)
This analysis broadly converges with Hayek’s pronouncements 
concerning the progressive transformation of society from a 
"spontaneous order" of individuals in a condition of liberty, to 
an organisation, involving private law, the lav/ of just individual 
conduct, being' to a substantial extent replaced with public law, 
the law of subordination. (51) Indeed, there is more than a grain 
of truth in Eerie1 s characterisation of the modem state as a 
"socially directed commonwealth". (52)
Under the corporate state, therefore, legal regulation 
attains to a higher level, in that the law is no longer merely a 
framework of rules within which spontaneous interaction takes place, 
but actually seeks to regulate tne interaction itself. We are 
thus presented with the abandonment of group pluralism, consisting 
in a comprenensive and conscious programme of legislative 
intervention on behalf of such social categories as employees, 
tenants and debtors, or in class terms, the non-owners of the 
means of production and exchange. (53) The "reverse preferences"
(54) which legislation of this sort frequently matces use of relieve 
the various individuals benefitted thereby from the burden of 
negotiating their own agreements, and amount to a-statutory 
recognition of the spuriousness of formal freedom of contract. (53) 
Turning specifically to the dichotomy of revolutionary 
and reformist socialism, it can be seen tnat the latter connotes 
"abandonment of the revolutionary goal" (58) in two distinct 
senses. This corresponds to two separable senses of "revolution",
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the first of which signifies tne forcible displacement of a political 
constitution (157)* and not merely radical legislative change 
without any attendant challenge to established criteria of formal 
legal validity; the second signifies the radical transformation of 
the economic structure of society, consisting, for example, in 
the wholesale social appropriation of the means of production. 
Revolution in the second sense may or may not simultaneously be 
revolution in the first. Thus, socialism can be described as 
reformist in that it repudiates the violent seizure of political 
power in favour of participation in the democratic process (58)» 
or in that it abandons the central Marxian aim (59) of the conversion 
of the means of production to public ownership.
Although his earlier stance on this question was less 
unequivocal (60), it' is clear that towards the end of his life Marx 
vigorously opposed reformism in both its aspects. (6l) After Marx's 
death, however, Ehgels gave considerable encouragement to the 
rising view that socialism could most expediently be brought about 
through the "successful utilisation of universal suffrage" (62), 
and that by this means the state could be fashioned into the primary 
instrument of the proletarian will, the dictatorship of tne 
proletariat. Certainly, in light of Marx's belief that the inherent 
laws of capitalist jjroduction were operating to increase both the 
number and militancy of the workers, it is far from clear why he 
regarded the forcible seizure of the state as necessary when all 
the time, on nis terms, the march of world history was delivering 
it into proletarian hands.
As to the second strand of reformism, it is this which has 
been the direct inspiration for the modern legislative developments 
which we nave teen considering. How closely these satisfy Marx's 
vision of the human destiny can be discerned from his comments in 
the Circular Letter to Rebel, Liebknecnt, Bracke, and Others, in 
which he speaks of
all sorts of petty rubbish and the patching up 
of the capitalist order of society in order at 
least to produce the appearance of something 
happening without at the same time scaring the 
bourgeoisie (65)
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and, of
those petty-bourgeois patchwork reforms which, by 
providing the old order of society v/ith new props, 
may perhaps transform the ultimate catastrophe into 
a gradual, piecemeal and as far a.s possible 
peaceful process of dissolution (64)
Hayek would appear to corroborate this analysis; he draws 
attention (65) to the fact that although tne demand for public 
ov/nership of the means of production was formerly a definitive 
element of socialist doctrine, this demand has come to be regarded 
by socialists as simply a means to the introduction of a "just" 
distribution of wealth, and not as "the way, the truth, and the 
life" (66) of social transformation. Accordingly, since 
recognising that much tne same redistributive end can be just as 
conveniently pursued through piecemeal adjustment of the outcomes 
of the market process by the interventionist state, the demand 
for the more radical social reconstitution has been substantially 
shelved in favour of "social justice" (67), with its attendant 
ideology of various social and economic rights, which are 
essentially redistributive in orientation. Marx's (unfavourable) . 
view of the di.stributivi.st tendency are made unequivocally clear 
in The Critique of the Gotha Program.
It was an important strand in the Marxian critique of
justice (6o) tnat in the nands of the reformists "justice", was bound
up with the apjjroach which seeks to do nothing more tnan to strike 
a fair (whatever tnat might be) balance as between the contending 
class interests, the very oppositions that were in the revolution 
to be transcended. It must of course be recalled that in Marx's 
theory, in common with all other evolutionary tneories (69), 
opposition and conflict play a vital role in the process of 
development, so that striking an artificial peace merely operates 
to the impediment of tne evolutionary process. The reformist
legislation which we have been considering, wnich concerns itself
not merely with formal rules, but with the positive regulation of 
social antagonisms, is a very curious creature indeed, since it 
simultaneously negates and yet perversely reasserts the bourgeois 
conception of justice and bourgeois social relationships. Social
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security legislation presupposes an underlying social insecurity, 
labour laws regulating- the hours and conditions of work presuppose 
tne survival, of the wage-labour system, and, in the same manner, 
the Rent Acts hold the ring between landlord and tenant. This 
further illuminates the doctrine of tne withering away of law and 
state (70), for with the supercession of these divisions, laws 
devised to contain antagonisms no longer existing would be deprived 
of both function and meaning.
Consider in this light the "right to work" (71)• It is 
difficult to see wnat significance this right could have in a society 
which nad transcended the absurd economic conditions which give 
rise to the involuntary unemployment of able-bodied workers. In 
any case, as Campbell observes, such a right would be 
much less important in mature communist society, since in that 
society, whose characteristic principle is distribution according 
to need (72), the recipience of course-of-life needs would no 
longer be dependent upon the opportunity to dispose of one's labour. 
(73) Similarly, Raphael points to tne fact that equality of 
opportunity implies competition, and could therefore surely not 
be applicable to a society based upon unrestricted co-operation. (74) 
It would seem, then, that social and economic rights such as tnese 
can only exist as transcendent norms, to be invoked in criticism 
of capitalist society, or else are incurably reformist.
In any event, the central question becomes this; are the 
legislative developments which characterise the modern age to be 
attributed to reformist socialism, or to a neo-classical attempt 
to preserve the capitalist mode of production from collapse, or to 
a converg-Qnce of both? Tne third of these possibilities envisages . 
opposing intentions coinciding in their external effects. Clearly, 
the attempt to implant specific social objectives, notably the 
provision for individual and social needs, which of course entails 
substantial incursions on the formerly sacrosanct principle of 
private property, is socialist in the sense of being antithetical 
to individualism. However, when one has regard to such aspects.as 
the maintenance of a competitive market by means of monopolies 
legislation - a role for the state wnich Hayek by implication (75) 
deems to be legitimate -, tne redress of imbalances in bargaining 
power, and the general policy of making the law more accessible to
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all (76), through legal aid, simplified court procedures, state 
financed advice centres and so forth, cannot these phenomena be 
interpreted as an attempt to make bourgeois society operate as 
according to its apologists it ought to? This line becomes all tne 
more plausible, since we find protected here the cardinal bourgeois 
virtues of free competition (77) > freedom of contract, and equality 
before the 3.aw.
And, as was earlier remarked, government can and does, by 
means of a few simple monetary and fiscal adjustments, eliminate 
the worst excesses of economic instability even within a capitalist 
economy. (78) After all, even Adam Sinitn (79) conceded to the 
state a role in perfecting the workings of the invisible hand; wnile 
there is much in contemporary western legal systems wnich may at 
first sight appear broadly socialist - redistribution, fair trading 
laws, restrictions on monopolies and so forth, but which is perhaps 
best comprehended as part of a general scheme of things by means 
of which the competitive mechanism is left intact, but kept under 
control in order that any shortcomings in its operation may be 
rectified. Indeed, it would appear that it is this principle which 
Donaldson identifies as being the factor which distinguishes the 
social democracy from the command economy;
In principle, Keynesian techniques are decidedly 
gentlemanly. They consist of general manipulation 
of the major variables in the economy rather than 
specific and selective direct controls. (80)
Neo-capitalist tendencies are in fact strongly in evidence 
in Keynes' theories. Thus, William J. barber writes;
Some critics regarded Keynes's doctrine as 
dangerously radical end as a threat to the 
perpetuation of the capitalist order. A 
considered judgement of the content of Keynes' 
thought supports quite the opposite conclusion. (61)
for, although the implementation of Keynsian' macro-economic 
policy has entailed substantial incursions upon the principle 
of private property, Keynes in fact considered that this strategy 
embodied precisely those types of reform which would have to be
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made if the characteristic merits of capitalism were to be maintained 
in any recognisable shape or form, and in particular in order to 
eliminate the social unrest created by mass unemployment. Here at 
least we find some vindication for the view that the modern welfare 
state is no more than a cosmetic exercise, a means to
maintaining the stability of a system which would 
otherwise collapse under the effects of its 
inherent self-destructiveness (62)
in the interests of the ruling class, and to providing a 
workforce which is healthy, docile, and educated in the desired 
skills, and, when necessary, maintaining redundant sections of 
the workforce intact for later use. It at least becomes clear 
that social reform can be by no means a gospel for one class alone
(65); after all, if the necessary consequence of unrestrained 
capitalism is its own demise, then indefinite resistance to change 
can scarcely be said to be in the interests of the capitalist class.
Indeed, it would seem that neo-capitalism can.be 
represented as presenting a modified version of Hayek’s thesis (84), 
consisting in an expanded view of what activities the state must 
undertake in order to provide "tne precondition for the success of 
most private activity" (85) and on the foundation of which the 
interaction of free private individuals will function as a 
"spontaneous order", (db)
We have, in fact, arrived at a condition of things which 
I is best explained as a convergence of reformist socialism and 
neo-capitalism, thougn for quite different motives, upon tne same 
results. Whatever evaluation one places on this state of things, 
the fact remains that it is impossible, or at least extremely 
difficult .to reconcile with the Marxian conception of history.
Consequently, by 1690, "historical materialism" (8?) was 
already in a state of crisis. In an attempt to make the theory : 
fit the facts, Engels found himself obliged to put forward a 
severely modified version, in terms of which he made a number of 
important concessions. . Firstly, ne acknowledged that the 
economic element is not the only influence which conditions human 
history and culture (68); he recognised the relevance of, for 
example, geographical factors (69). Secondly, ne accepted also that
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there is a significant volume of ideology for wnich no meaningful 
economic explanation can be found. (90)
Thirdly, Engels conceded that the ideological superstructure 
can react back; upon the economic base of society, so that the 
relationship between tne two is no simple one-way movement. (9l) 
Political power is.itself an economic force (92); thus, the law of 
inheritance
react(s) back, however, on the economic sphere 
to a very considerable extent, because (it) 
influence(s) the distribution of property. (95)
Tne relationship between the economic structure of society 
and its ideological forms is now conceived of by Engels as a : 
mutual interaction;- to this he adds, ratner vaguely, that the 
spnere of economic activity is "the ultimately determining element 
in history" (94) to wnich the interaction is subject. Engels 
concludes his letter to Joseph Bloch in singing the praises of 
degel and the dialectic, but it seems tnat by now the latter had 
come to signify for Engels nothing more remarkable than the mutual 
interaction of economics and ideology. (95)
When tne materialist conception of history is diluted to 
this extent, it is probably approximately true, but it is also 
uncontroversial. It is not surprising tnat Singer was later to 
remark that in Engels1 hands historical materialism had 
degenerated into a hopelessly indetermina.te formula from which 
anything at all could validly be deduced. (96)
(ii) The frontiers of Justice.
It is to be hoped that it will now prove possible to bring 
together all that we have tnus far concluded to be true of the 
Idea of justice, and hence to present a systematic and coherent 
vision of tnat Idea together with its conceptual limitations.
In the most general terms, and at a minimum, justice is a 
normative absolute (97); tnus, for Lenin (9d), as we have seen, 
justice connotes a condition of things, an ordering which in some 
sense conforms to how things ought to be, and marked, one would
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suppose, by the absence of injustice. Justice emerges into a more 
clear and determinate form, in the writings of, for example,
Bawls (99) Raphael (100), by whom it is additionally perceived 
to possess the characteristic of being- a normative order, that is, 
a system of rules and values, for Hayek (101), justice is a norm 
of human conduct, by means of which, and by means of v/hich alone, 
an in principle unlimited number of competing, self-interested 
individuals are enabled to live in society, tnat is, in that 
condition in which each is substantively free to pursue his own 
chosen objectives. It transpires therefore that the substance of 
justice coincides with that system of first-order norms v/hich can 
be inferred as affording- the resolution of those objects which 
characterise. Hobbes’ state of nature model. (102) As I demonstrated 
in chapter 2 (103), political unity, when attained only within a 
limited faction, is swiftly transformed into its opposite, in 
that it serves only as the precondition for disunity reasserting 
itself at a higher level; from this, I would argue that justice 
is made real only when the Kantian requirement of universality is' 
satisfied through the establishment of a single world order.
I see no motive for departing from Hayek’s vision, duly 
modified along the lines suggested in section (i) of the present 
chapter, particularly since Marx appears to have conceived 
similarly in constructing his critique of the concept of justice.
(104)
Justice thus conceived of as a "principle of liberty or 
freedom subject to constraints" (105) is an essentially private 
law (106) concept, bearing with it the connotation of suitability 
for imposition (107), and is a rule of personal interaction' 
defining a spontaneous order, as opposed to that corpus of rules 
pertaining to the arrangements by means of wnich that spontaneous 
order is preserved. (108) It is that pure deontological order 
which possesses itself as its own perceived telos.
In chapter 4, I concluded that it is an inherent character­
istic of the concept of justice that it embodies a systematic 
recognition of the postulate of self-interest. (109) This 
principle is in evidence both in justice in holdings, and in 
retributive justice, and is a conclusion which is by no means 
antithecal to Marxian tneory. (110)
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It was also demonstrated tnat justice contains as part of 
its necessary minimum content a law of property delineating 
exclusive claims legitimately asserted by individuals over 
particular material objects (ill); by extension, it was conceded 
to Nozick that we can also derive as part of the necessary minimum 
content the transferability of entitlements (112), with all that 
follows from it. As we have seen, (llj), the socialist conception 
of justice in holdings, consisting in distribution in proportion 
to labour contribution, represents the assertion of the first of 
these three principles, that is, systematic recognition of self- 
interest, to the total exclusion of the third.
Justice is that juristic core of the normative order which 
relates directly to an individual’s entitlements over the integrity 
of his person and his property, and is as such narrower and more 
determinate than that wider parameter of societal norms into which 
is thrown all that we conceive of as morality. As we saw earlier, 
in speaking of those "moral duties of a weaker, and non-juridical 
nature, not creative of corresponding rights in others", (114) a. 
person can be said to act selfishly, or churlishly, and in many 
other respects immorally, but in so doing, so long as he does 
not act outwith his entitlements, he cannot be said to act unjustly.
Justice, then, is that rule of conduct, which, ideally, 
governs tne relations of interacting individual's, by extension, 
tne rules of formal or natural justice are those which are 
required to be observed by judicial agencies in the application 
of substantive norms.
Additionally, justice should also govern relations between 
the individual and the state, except where its requirements are 
overriden or placed in suspension by more fundamental considerations, 
as when, for example, cargo is thrown overboard to save a sinking; 
snip. (113) What tnese more fundamental considerations are, falls, 
in part, to be determined by means of direct reference to the 
function which rules of conduct play in human affairs. It will be 
recalled from chapter 2 (ll6) tnat tne objectives involved in this 
function are as follows, in decreasing order of generality;
1. The advancement' of the demands of sentient will.
2. The reconciliation of subjective and objective rationality.
(117)
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5. The maintenance of security of person, possession and 
exchange.
We firstly encounter tne paradox that positive rights of
security'.require the maintenance of a. public lav; enforcement
machinery, the costs involved in which necessitate incursions into
the entitlements thereby protected. (118) Justice cannot survive
without this machinery, and it was in part for this reason that I
argued in chapter 5 that WoziCK's attempt to subsume the entire of
tne normative order within a single system of first-order precepts
could not be sustained. (119)
The essential one-sidedness of the concept of justice grows
clear, and it passes over and is absorbed as a subordinate moment
in the wider totality of Right. It is Right thus conceived which
is the colossus that bestrides tne myriad variety of particular
subjective wills, bearing the scales in one nand, and the sword in
the other. In order that justice may flourish, its various
institutional prequisites must be preserved from attack, from
within, in the form of criminal activity, and from without, in tne
form of external aggression. With the establishment of a single
world order, (120), however, only the former would survive.
The second limitation which we encounter arises in the form
of tne difficulty that competitive interaction, even within the
framework of rule-governed behaviour, generates further impersonal
forces, particularly in the sphere of economics (121), and to tne
extent that this state of affairs is permitted to flourish, Right
a * " "
is unsuccessful in its itinery of effecting the resolution of the 
tension between subjective and objective rationality. It was in 
the light of this consideration that I argued in section (i) of 
the present chapter that we have to establish an expanded 
conception of those activities which the politically organised 
community, the state, must undertake in order to provide a frame­
work within which free and spontaneous interaction can take place. 
The establishment of a single world order would provide us with 
the means whereby externalised social forces could be repossessed, 
and our deliverance from destructive chaos secured.
Thirdly, provision requires to be made for those wno 
through no fault of their own are unable to fend for themselves. 
Following the line of approach suggested by Professor T.D. Campbell
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in nis article "Humanity before Justice" (122), I would contend 
that proponents of v/elfare rights conceptions would be more 
ontolog'j.cally correct to base their claims not upon justice, but 
rather upon humanity, understood as a more fundamental ethical o: 
consideration overriding justice.
Justice and direct need-satisfaction are two entirely 
separate matters, not least for Karl Marx, in whose vision of the 
emergence of a communist society with direct provision for 
individual and social needs as its foundation, this transformation 
represents not the realisation, but the supercession of justice.
(125) Justice is a system of rules designed for the regulation 
of the competitive interaction of self-interested individuals, 
and therefore direct provision for needs must be alien to it, since, 
as we have seen (124), attempts to impose need satisfaction as the 
basis of tne social order, are, in the face of self-interest, 
unavoidably counter-productive and therefore self-negatory.
Welfare rights, therefore, can only be understood as a partial 
qualification of the bedrock of strict entitlement, made on behalf 
of those who cannot be expected to participate in the competitive 
pi^ ocess upon v/hich the concept of justice is premissed. It will 
be recalled that the ineluctable foundation of Right is will, and 
need is will in its most immediate and pressing, form. Where justce
a\r
visibly fails in its itinery of providing the means whereby people 
are substantively free to satisfy their most basic needs, it must., 
superstition aside, give way.
We in fact arrive at an effective inversion of Nozick's 
conception, in terms of v/hich considerations of justice place 
absolute constraints upon action, whereby the opera.tion of justice 
is itself held to be subject to certain constraints. One could, 
indeed, go on to enquire as to whetner these constraints are 
absolute. In this light, it may indeed transpire that human rights 
are fundamental rights, and tnat these refer directly to tne 
second-order criteria by means of v/hich particular values fall to 
be evaluated, and that these are not after all to be founded upon 
justice, (125) but upon those other species of evaluation v/hich 
we have identified as being "above this sceptred sway" (126) of 
justice, such as numanity.
The extent to which justice requires to be overriden by
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more fundamental ethical considerations will be the greater the 
more imperfect the conception of justice; we must carefully 
distinguish between modifications which require to be made to 
correct defects in particular, imperfect, conceptions of justice, 
and to the concept of justice itself. Thus, for example, if tne 
spontaneous order defined by the rules of justice were made perfect, 
the question of the unemployment of, and the need to make direct 
provision for, ablebodied persons simply would not arise.
Even in perfected world order, however, it would be necessary 
for the politically organised community to make provision for those 
who are, tnrough age, infirmity and so fortn, unable to work, to 
provide, for the maintenance of law and order, to regulate the 
macro-economic process, and to provide those various other social 
goods wnicn spontaneous interaction cannot, and to that extent, 
it might appear that the need to raise public funds must always 
operate as a qualification of tne various entitlements secured by 
justice, and tnat,■therefore, the conflict between general social 
order and justice in government policy referred to by Rapnael (127) 
must remain as a fixed attribute of political association. I 
would suggest, nowever, particularly since world unity would 
eliminate the need for defence expenditure, that sufficient funds 
for necessary state activities could be raised by placing a charge 
upon tne appropriation of hitherto unowned primary material 
resources and upon tne occupation of land. This arrangement, under 
wnich all particular property entitlements would be contingent 
upon the ultimate sovereignty or title of tne world state, would 
of course possess the additional merit of resolving- the problem 
of original acquisition, whicn in chapter 3 1 ne'Ld to be 
absolutely fatal to Nozick's tnesis. (126)
There will be tnose, of course, who will protest at my no 
doubt peculiar, idiosyncratic and certainly unorthodox usage of 
the terms "justice" and "Rignt". for my part, I must confess that 
the names wnich we confer upon objects of thought are, in the last 
analysis, wholly arbitrary. Tne objects themselves,, nowever, are 
not, but present a fabric, an ordering of Ideas, which is 
absolutely objective, and in no way contingent upon tne conscious 
human mind..
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formal reasoning. At p.210 pf the same work, Russell 
points out .tnat one difficulty for trie formal logician lies 
'in accounting for where first (general) propositions come 
from.
In Legal Reasoning and Legal Theory, at p.265, Rei1 
MacCorrnick makes the interesting suggestion tnat tne 
inadequacy of formal logic and of formal justice are 
connected phenomena.
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(328). In section (iv), at p.31, supra.
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(118)
(119)
(120)
(121)
(122)
(128) Cf. chapter 3, section (ii), at p.90, supra.
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